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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This thesis contains an examination of the development
in Scots law of the common law crime of fraud in
comparison with the development of the crime of fraud
in the law of South Africa. In contrast with the
Anglo-American jurisdictions where the law has traditionally
consisted of statutory offences such as false
pretences and deception, the Scottish and South African
systems have developed a general crime of fraud
applicable to a wide range of cases involving deception.
In both systems the crime of fraud was closely
connected in its early stages with a series of
specific offences of falsehood in a manner strongly
suggestive of the influence of the corresponding
Roman law.
The advantage of flexibility offered by such a
crime is however balanced by the corresponding
uncertainty as to the range of protected interests
relevant to the crime. The latter question has
remained a matter of acute controversy in modern times
in both systems. An important consequence of the
flexibility of approach made possible by the general
conception of fraud has been that in both systems the
development of the crime has not been impaired by
the creation of numerous ad hoc statutory offences of
misrepresentation under, for example, the Trade
Descriptions Act 1968 or, in South Africa, the
Insolvency Act 1934. In each system, the statutory
offences have tended to supplement the ambit of
/liability
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liability of the common law crime rather than vice
versa.
The distinction between fraud and theft has been
one of recurring difficulty in both systems and in
each the influence of English doctrines associated
with larceny and false pretences has been particularly
strong. In Scots law, the original conception of
theft, which limited the crime to cases where the
goods were obtained by violence or stealth rather
than by deception, has been greatly modified, not
least because of English doctrines imported into the
law of contract. In South Africa, a similar
modification has resulted from the importation of the
crime of theft by false pretences, with its obvious
origins in the English larceny legislation. Even
today, its proper place in the South African criminal
law has never been clearly worked out.
The examination of modern statutory offences of
fraudulence is outwith the scope of this thesis,
although reference is made to the modern English
offences in the context of mens rea by way of contrast
with the development of the theory of the mens rea in
the two common law systems.
The scheme of the thesis is as follows:
In Part I, the historical development of fraud in
relation to the early offences of falsehood is traced
in the laws of Scotland and South Africa with reference
to the Roman law which, as modified by the Roman-Dutch
/writers
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writers, was at most an indirect influence on the
modern South African theory and, in Scots law,
scarcely an influence at all. The active development
of the definition of the crime in the nineteenth
century Scots law and in the pre-Union South African
case law is then described.
In Part II, the elements of the crime are
analysed under the headings of the deception, the
mental element, causation, and the result and in
connection with the latter element the modern case law
is discussed by way of illustrating the difficulties
of defining satisfactory limits to the range of
results relevant to the crime. The further special
problem of the potential prejudice theory of the modern
South African crime is also discussed. In each chapter
in this Part, comparative examples are drawn from the
corresponding statutory offences in English and other
jurisdictions.
In Part III, the distinction between theft and
fraud is dealt with in relation to the transfer of
title in cases involving deception. The distinction
is considered historically and the influence of
English doctrines in the offences of larceny and
obtaining on the development of modern Scots law is
then discussed. This Part concludes with a survey
of the distinction between theft and fraud in South
African law and an analysis of the hybrid offence of
theft by false pretences, particularly in relation to





The early Scottish law of fraudulent offences
A. FALSEHOOD
The early criminal law of Scotland restricted the
punishment of fraudulent acts to those specific offences
which fell within the generic description of falset or
falsehood. The Reqiam Malestatem describes falsehood
as follows: "Generale crimen falsi plura sub se
confinet crimina specialia. quemadmodum de falsis
chartis. de falsa moneta. de falsis mensuris et falsis
ponderibus. et similia quae talem continent falsitatem
super qua debet aliquis accu<Arj et convictus condemnari".*
Balfour's paraphrase of this passage refers to the
2
"divers and sindrie crimes" of falset and includes the
3
further cases of false instruments and writs, from which
there developed in later law the specific crime of
4
"forgery". Falsehood also included the offences of
5 6
perjury, falsehoods by notaries, false depositions,
7
the clipping or adulteration of current coin, and
Q
the adulteration of wine.
The foregoing features of falsehood are typical of an
early crime. In the primitive stages of the Scottish
criminal law, as in Roman law and English law, only the
more obtuse forms of dishonesty were repressed and then
9
only where they affected the public at large. In the
Scottish offences of falsehood it was the essentially
/public
public nature of the misrepresentation and not any
specific harm to an individual, which formed the
basis of liability.10 These offences fell within
two broad categories; those which involved practical
techniques of fabrication, such as counterfeiting and
forgery, and those which involved deception of a public
nature such as perjury, the dishonest exploitation by a
notary of his public office, and suppositio partus.11
Generally speaking, such falsehoods attacked a publicly
accepted standard of accuracy and might not be guarded
12
against by ordinary caution. The Act 1621 c.22, for
example, was passed for the purpose of "eschewing the
danger wherein many of His Majestie*s Lieges stand by
counterfeiting and falsifying of Svidents". It was
probably for these reasons that counterfeiting was
13
brought within the treason laws. For these reasons,
too, it was sufficient for liability that the falsehood
was "uttered", since the interests of the public were
thereby put at risk. Under the Act 1621 c.22 even the
14
uttering of a false writ was held to be unnecessary
and this principle survived in the Scots law of foregery
until the eighteenth century.15 Liability in falsehood
was therefore predicated upon the potentially prejudicial
nature of the forbidden act, and the occurrence of actual
prejudice or harm to any particular individual was not
required.
/In
In these respects the Scottish offences of falsehood
closely resembled the crimina falsi of the Roman law,
those specific acts of public dishonesty which were
made criminal in the Republic under the Lex Cornelia de
falsis. for example counterfeiting,^ bribery in
17
connection with litigation and forgery of certain
18
documents such as wills. These, like the other
iudicia publica under the leges Corneliae were earlier
in origin than the generalised crime of fraud which under
the name stellionatus developed during the Empire, and
19
was tried extra ordinem instead of by the guaestiones.
The early Scots law, at least as it was expounded by the
writers, maintained a similar distinction between
falsehood and a general crime of fraud or MstellionateM.
The main sources on this question, the writings of
Mackenzie, Forbes and Bayne, are significant in two
respects: firstly, in the attempt by those writers to
generalise a single crime of falsehood from the
numerous statutory offences already referred to, and
secondly, in their attempt to introduce the term stellionate
from the Roman law, with little authority for it in
contemporary practice, to describe a general crime of
fraud. In his description of falsehood, Mackenzie
20
incorporates a considerable amount of civilian authority,
although his classification of the crime according to
its methods of commission is more closely related to
/Scottish
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Scottish practice. The question of the prejudice
element in falsehood is scarcely discussed, except in
connection with forgery where Mackenzie is in some doubt
21
as to whether uttering is necessary.
Forbes defines falsehood as "a palming and imposing
upon the world some counterfeit instead of a reality:
or a deceitful suppression, or imitation of the truth,to
22
the prejudice of another*'. Bayne adopts the civilian
definition of "a fraudulent imitation or suppression of
23
truth done to the hurt and prejudice of another".
Forbes does not deal with falsehood in relation to the
question of the harm or prejudice, if any, which may
result, but Bayne states that the crime requires
"damage either done to another, or which will probably
be the consequence of the falsehood, with this difference
as to the punishment of the crime, that in the last case
24
it will be mitigated". In order to meet his
requirement that the offence must be at least potentially
prejudicial, Bayne considers uttering to be necessary
25
in forgery. In these statements lies the origin of
the modern Scottish principle, established in the
nineteenth century, that liability for forgery was
26
complete on the occurrence of the uttering.
B. STELLIONATB
Along with these uncertain attempts to establish
/general
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general principles of liability for falsehood, the
same writers attempted to establish a correspondingly
general liability for fraud in relation to private
acts of dishonesty affecting individuals. It is quite
clear that before Mackenzie*s time there was no such
general crime of fraud in Scots law. There were,
however, a number of specific statutory offences, not
constituting falsehoods, in respect of private acts
of dishonesty. It was the use in one of these
statutes of the term stellionatus. with its obvious
27
reference to the Roman law, which seems to have
provided a basis for the description of a crime of
fraud known, among the writers at least, as stellionate.
The only statutory use of the word stellionatus is to
be found in the Act 1592 c.60 which declared the
granting of double assignations, sales or mortgages to
28 29
be "crimen stellionatus of the law". Balfour and Karnes
discuss the crime of stellionate in relation to the
offences under this Act. Other writers, however,
30
considered that the offences against the Act 1540 c.23
(double alienations of lands, etc.) and the Bankruptcy
31
Act 1696 c.5 (fraudulent bankruptcy) constituted
stellionate, and in this respect they seem to have




The Roman crime of stellionatus comprehended cases of
private trickery and swindling. It was a residual
32
crime which supplemented but did not include the
crimina falsi. and since it was not a leqitimum crimen.
33
it carried no fixed penalty. The function of the
crime was to extend criminal liability to fraudulent
acts which in earlier law were actionable only civilly.
As a result of the development of this general crime
of fraud a charge of stellionatus. according to Ulpian,
could be bro ght in respect of any fraudulent act
34
giving rise in the private law to the actio de dolo.
Among the examples of it in the Digest are the pledging
35
of property already encumbered by lien and the
obtaining of credit on a pretence of wealth.
The Act 1592 C.60 was taken up by Mackenzie as the
basis of a general common law crime which protected
private economic interests against fraudulence.
36
Mackenzie in describing "stellionate" draws heavily on
Roman authority. Significantly, however, he cites no
authority in Scottish practice. He says of stellionate
that "to infer this crime, it is requisite that there
be a cheat or fraud used, and that the cheat want
another name, for there are frauds which cannot be
comprehended tinder this title, as falsifying writs,
counterfeiting seals". He takes the use of the term
stellionatus in the Act of 1592 to indicate "that our
/law
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law presupposes the civil law to be our law as to the
crime, for it does not determine what is to be accounted
stellionate, or appoint a particular punishment for
stellionate, but only clears declaratorily, that the
disposing duties or rents of lands to several persons,
shall be accounted stellionatus{ and therefore,
whatever was punished as stellionate by the civil law,
may be punished as such by ours, not only a pari, or by
extension, but by approbation, the Roman law having
37
by the allows ice of that Act become ours". In the
absence, however, of further authority, it seems
unlikely that the Act of 1592 had or was intended to
have the wider effects ascribed to it by Mackenzie.
The writers after Mackenzie adopted his treatment of
stellionate with little alteration. Forbes describes
stellionate as "a general word signifying any crime
38
committed by fraud wanting a more particular name".
In addition to the examples taken from the Digest, he
mentions the case of one who obtains money from a
messenger sent to pay a debt by pretending to be the
39
creditor.
Bayne, like Mackenzie, considered that all of the
acts? constituting stellionatus in the Roman law were
also punishable as such in Scotland, by the express
/authority
authority of the Act of 1592. He defines the crime
as comprehending "those facts which though criminally
fraudulent, yet whose essential characters are
different from those which have received a fixed and
40
certain name".
Erskine too recognised a general common law crime of
stellionate defining it as "a terra used in the Roman
law to denote all such crimes where fraud or craft is
an ingredien , as have no special name to distinguish
them by. It is chiefly applied, both by the Roman law
and that of Scotland, to conveyances of the same right
41
granted by the proprietor to different disponees".
There is, however, a case noted in 1710 in the Justiciary
Records of Argyll where a charge of "stellionate and
fraudulent and sinistrous practices and couzenage" was
brought in respect of an allegation that a landlord had
tricked "ane poor ignorant and unliterat person" to hand
over to him his receipt for rent in order to obtain
42
double payment of it.
Despite these general statements of the crime, it seems
reasonably clear that there is only slender evidence
to suggest that stellionate was ever established eo nomine
as a crime of dishonesty in Scottish practice. Hume,
despite his extensive survey of the Justiciary Records,
makes no mention of it.
/In
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In contrast, however, there is ample evidence to
prove that as early as 1722 and as late as 1842, the
term was in common vise in criminal practice in
indictments libelling certain unusual forms of
43
assault to severe injury.
There was however obvious uncertainty among the
Scottish writers as to the true distinction between
falsehood and stellionate. Mackenzie, for example,
considered it falsehood to soak tobacco to increase
4
its weight. On this point he followed the authority
of Carpzovius, who included stelllonatus within a
45
general crime of falsum. Matthaeus on the other hand,
in distinguishing falsum from stellionatus. considered
it to be stellionatus to mix dust with pepper, or sand
with meal, or fat with butter, or to store spices
underground in order to increase their weight by humidity
Forbes was probably wrong in his view that falsehood
was committed by "sturdy beggars who counterfeit
lameness to procure charity; or those who feign
themselves to be dumb to draw money from people, or
soldiers who, upon a feigned pretext of sickness have
got themselves listed, and lurk as invalids in a hospital
None of these examples falls within any of the
recognised categories of falsehood and on civilian
authority they clearly constitute stellionatus.
Furthermore, the Scottish writers who preceded Hume gave
little attention to the result element in cases of fraud
/and
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and, probably because of the restricted definition
48
of theft in that period which confined the crime
to cases of forcible or clandestine methods of
49
appropriation, were free of the problems of title
which complicated the development of fraud in later
law.
- 12 -
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CHAPTER II
The development of fraud in Roman-Dutch and
South African law
A. THE ROMAN-DUTCH WRITERS
In view of the adoption by the early Scottish
writers of a Roman approach to crimes of dishonesty,
and their enthusiastic use of Roman terminology, it is
useful at this stage to describe the variety of approach
taken by the Roman-Dutch writers; and to trace the
rapidity of »velopment of the modern South African
law on the matter by way of contrast with the more
gradual development of the Scots.
There was a divergence of approach among the Ro.an-Dutch
writers* between those who strictly adhered to the
Roman distinction between the crimina falsi and stellionatus
and those who described a unified crime of falsum or
falsity which comprehended the general offence of
swindling as well as the specific crimina falsi. There
was also so ae uncertainty among the latter writers as
2
to whether actual prejudice was required in falsum.
3 4
Matthaeus and Voet are closest in their treatment to
the outline of the Roman law, both dealing with falsum
and stellionatus in separate titles. Matthaeus requires
actual loss as an element of the offence of stellionatus
but not of falsum.5 Voet, although adhering to the
/Roman
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Roman distinction,6 mentions one or two contemporary
instances of swindling which, in a departure from the
Roman theory, are statutorily denominated as falsum. such
as certain forms of switch-selling and adulteration of
7 8
merchandise. Van Leeuwen also maintains the Roman
distinction between falsum and stellionatus. noting
the particular case of switch-selling given in Sande*s
9 lO
Decisiones Frisicae as an example of stellionatus.
On the other land, the writings of Damhouder, the German
jurist Carpzovius, Huber and van der Linden are to the
effect of unifying the two crimes. Damhouder1* discusses
crimen falsi according to five methods of commission
the first of which, falsitas per consensus, is c^-vrly
12
referable to stellionatus. Carpzovius, although
13 14
defining stellionatus separately from "crimen falsi".
deals with the latter as a generalised crime and not
a collection of specific statutory offences. According
to Carpzovius, potential prejudice sufficed in falsum,
but falsitas non nociva was not punishable."''6 Huber
does not mention stellionatus but includes minor
17
frauds and tricks within the categories of falsum.
18
Van der Linden states that the crime of falsity
requires actual prejudice of a wide range of categories.
He includes in falsity those acts which are classed
unt sr the general term bedrieqerijen or cheating.
/Although
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Although writers such as Matthaeus and Voet formally
maintained the Roman distinction between the crimina
falsi and stellionatus. there was sufficient modification
of the Roman position in Roman-Dutch practice and in the
statements of other writers to ensure that that
19
distinction would be obscured.
B. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE LAW
It becaP"* accepted at an early stage in the law
of the Cape tuat the Roman distinction between
20
falsehoods and fraud no longer applied. Although in
later years the Roman conception of falsehood was
recognised and on occasions adopted, notably in the
21
Transvaal case of R. v. Cowan & Davies. where there
was a charge of bribery of witnesses, fraud became
completely assimilated with falsum, so-called, and has
22
remained so in the case law ever since. The reports
indicate that from an early stage the terms fraud,
falsum, criuen falsifalsitas falsite?! and falsity^
came to be used indiscriminately, and the assimilation
of the two crimes was in due course completed by the
Appellate Division in a series of decisions between
1924 and 1928.
The Appellate Division first considered the definition
27
of fraud in R. v. Faulding where they identified
fraud with crimen falsi and stated, obiter, that a
/potentially
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potentially prejudicial consequence was sufficient to
28
constitute fraud. The matter was more fully considered
29
in R. v. Jones & More where, under reference to the
Roman-Dutch writers, fraud was defined in terms of
falsum as "a wilful perversion of the truth made with
30
intent to defraud and to the prejudice of another".
In that case, however, it was held to be sufficient,
where the deception failed to achieve its purpose,
that the false representations were "calculated to
prejudice" t! j victim, but that where the accused*s
31
object was carried out, actual prejudice was essential.
32
At about this time in R. v. Seabe the court considered
a charge of fraud where the facts of the case disclosed
forgery. The court again identified the two offences
33
as species of a generic crime of "crimen falsi*. In
34
R. v. Hymans. where the charge was forgery, the court
accurately stated the theory of prejudice in falsum but
misstated the historical position by describing
35
forgery as "a special type of fraud". Finally, in R. v.
Davies * it was confirmed that fraud was a species of
"crimen falsi". which was defined in that case as "a
wilful perversion of the truth made with the intent to
defraud and to the actual or potential prejudice of
37
another".
C. THE PREJUDICE ELEMENT
The inconsistency of the theory expounded in the
/foregoing
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foregoing cases with the historical principles of
38
the matter is fully explored by de Wet and Swanepoel.
But the main difficulties in the modern South African
approach lie in the analytical problems created by the
attempt to engraft a result crime such as fraud on to
39
a generic conduct crime such as falsua. The most
notable consequences of this attempt have been the
remarkable extension of the range of relevant consequences
in fraud and the development of the theory that in
fraud a potentially prejudicial consequence is sufficient
to attract 1 ability for the completed crime, with
the associated problems which this theory causes in
40
the law of attempts.
It may also be said that the South African courts, as
the case law has developed, have become inaccurate even
in their conception of falsum because, although it was
a conduct crime, they have looked up>on potential
prejudice in some cases as if it were an element of
the actus reus and therefore a matter requiring to
41
be specified in the charge. The true position,
however, in falsum. as in any conduct crime, is
surely that the potentiality of the conduct to cause
prejudice of one sort or another is the policy reason
which determines that that conduct shall be held
criminal; for example drunk driving, or the carrying
of offensive weap>ons. This, it is submitted, is what
the Roman-Dutch writers understood when they stated
/that
20
that falsum of an innocuous nature was not
42
punishable, and is probably what was meant by
43
Innes C.J. in R. v. Hymans where he suggested that
forgery was to be taken as prejudicial per se and that
it would be for the accused to plead the harmlessness
of the forgery by way of defence. This approach is
similar to that of Scots law where it has never been
necessary to include averments of potential prejudice
in the terms of the charge.
From the early forgery cases it became established in
South Africa that the prejudice element need not be
44
economic and that it included such considerations as
45
threats to public safety, infringement of a v->r4ety
46
of legal rights, loss oi reputation or loss of public
47 48
office, and exposure to risk of prosecution or
49
civil litigation. The limitations put upon the
prejudice element were directed not so much to the
nature of the result as to the remoteness of it or the
unlikelihood of its occurrence.50 There was also a
de minimis principle applied in some cases.5* From
an early stage the theory of the matter was applied
52
also to fraud and such results as the displeasure of
53
the victim's superiors were considered to be relevant.
Various formulations of the prejudice element were
54
attempted:for example, in R. v. Dhlamini it was said
that "(Prejudice) includes far more than pecuniary loss.
/It
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It includes impairment of reputation or personal
dignity. It extends to the risk of prosecution,
however unfounded, as the result of acting on the
forged document, and we have assumed that the term is
wide enough to cover any substantial inconvenience
55
which the perpetration of the forgery may cause".
56
The matter was summarised in Heyne. a fraud case,
where Schreiner J.A. described the prejudice element
as involving "some risk of harm, which may not be
financial or >roprietary, but must not be too remote
or fanciful, to some person, not necessarily the person
57
to whom it is addressed."
The result therefore of these decisions is to est^lish
in modern South African law a crime of fraud which
applies where the prejudice, if any, sustained by the
SB
victim, can be of virtually any kind. The borrowing
of the conceptions of prejudice historically associated
with the crimina falsi have thus ensured that fraud in
the modern South African law cannot satisfactorily be
classified, as it usually is, as an offence against
property.59
From an analytical standpoint, however, the enduring
consequence of the process of assimilation which created
the composite crime of which fraud is really only a part,
has been the theory that so-called •potential prejudice"
is sufficient to create liability for the crime.60
- 22 -
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The development of fraud in modern Scots law
A. HUME. ALISON AND BURNETT
The distinction maintained by the arly Scottish
writers between a group of offences called falsehood
and a general common law crime of fraud came to grief
in Hume's discussion "Of Falsehood and Fraud".* Hume
2
described the following categories of falsehood: forgery
3
written falsehoods, that is to say, false statements
in authentic writs; and falsification or vitiation
of writs, a miscellaneous group of lesser forgeries
devised in order to avoid the death penalty - for example,
the alteration of the sum in a bill of exchange, the
insertion by the writer of a deed of a provision in his
own favour - and sundry other written falsehoods, such
as the antedating of deeds and the issue by public
officials of false certificates. Hume also included
in falsehood a crime of false conspiracy which he defined
as "any sort of conspiracy or machination, directed
against the fame, safety or s ate of another, and meant
to be accomplished by the aid of subdolous and
deceitful contrivances, to the disguise or suppression
4
of the truth". The two examples of this cited by Hume
involve the deception of innocent witnesses in order
5
to cause a miscarriage of justice. The last category
described by Hume is the false assumption of character
or office, such as that of a clergyman or exciseman.6
/Hume
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Hume defines fraud as comprehending "those offences, of
a private and patrimonial nature, which fall under
the description of what is known in England by the
name of Swindling; and are committed by some false
assumption of name, character, commission or errand,
for the purpose of obtaining goods or money, or other
7
valuable thing, to the offender's profit". He includes
0
in this category the case of Jack and Ewinq. where
weights were furtively switched within Revenue premises
in order to avoid duty. He also includes schemes to
9
defraud insurers, and, contrary to historical
principle, the use of false weights and measures.^
By the end of the eighteenth century the historical
distinction already referred to had become blurred.
In George Smith the indictment was for "fraud and wilful
imposition"'*'1 and in Nicholas Kirby it was for
12
"fraudulent and wilful imposition and falsehood".
This obscuring of the proper historical distinction
13
culminated in Burnett's definition of falsehood in
which the two Crimes of falsehood and fraud became
completely assimilated. Alison, who deals with these
14
offences under the heading of "Fraud and Swindling"
does not use the term "Falsehood" at all, but instead
recognises "forgery" as a separate offence.1^
B. FRAUD IN 19th CENTURY PRACTICE
In the first half of the nineteenth century the
case law followed the example of writers such as
/Hume
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Hume and Alison in obscuring the historical
signification of the term "falsehood", and various
terms were adopted in Scots practice to describe
J ^
private fraud, such as "swindling"" an • "falsehood f
fraud and wilful imposition". It was inevitable that
the latter description should give rise to uncertainty
and for a considerable time it was not clear if it
17 18
described three separate offences or one offence.
There was a striking divergence between the theory of
the early writers and the practice of the courts, and
the historical principles of the crime of fraud were
quickly lost sight of. Early in the century the term
"falsehood" appears to have been used purely as a term
19
of vituperation in indictments alleging dishonesty.
Later, about 1836, the nomen iuris "falsehood, fraud
and wilful imposition" was adopted. Two cases in
2Q
which this style was used are Mclnnes and MacPherson.
where the accused obtained money on a pretence of
21
being policemen, and McKinlay and McDonald where
sheriff-officers acted while i^idcr suspension. In
22
Robert Millar. a sheriff-officer executed a
diligence while under suspension and received fees
from the instructing law agent. He was charged with
"falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition", and the
indictment charged three consequences - the payment
of fees to him by the agent, the imprisonment of the
debtor and the ultimate loss sustained by the agent*s
clients. On the historical principles of the matter,
/the
- 30 -
the accused was liable for falsehood on respect of
his conduct in pretending to be an authorised
sheriff officer, and the falsehood was aggravated by
its consequence to the debtor. He was e ;.so liable
for fraud in respect of his obtaining the fees from
the agent. It would appear, however, that the charge
in that case was intended to describe fraud rather
than falsehood. This view derives some support from
23
the case of John Smith where a sheriff officer
fabricated and uttered a false service copy of a summons
and citation. He was charged with "falsehood, fraud
and wilful imposition" in respect of his having
obtained from the pursuer the expenses he said he had
incurred, "as also falsehood", in respect of the
fabrication and uttering of the copy summons, "as
also falsehood and fraud" in respect of the false
execution of his duty. It is difficult to assess
what supposed distinction lay behind the latter form
24
of charge. Soon after, in James Wilson the same
charge of "falsehood and frauc" was added, for no obvious
reason, to a charge of "falsehood, fraud and wilful
imposition" where the facts disclosed fraud but
certainly not any of the offences of falsehood.
Although it was recognised as late as 1844 that
forgery was only a particular type of falsehood
25
properly so-called, it was decided in 1852 that
the term "falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition"
described one offence.^0 The inevitable result
of this was that the true nature of falsehood was
/lost
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lost sight of and after 1853 falsehood and forgery
tended to be considered separately, contrary to the
27
true principle of the matter.
The charge of falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition
was regularly used in cases both of uttering and of
fraud where money or property was obtained as a
28
consequence, and in certain cases *the charge was
breach of trust and embezzlement * as also falsehood and
29
fraud. Fraudulent bankruptcy charges were also
combined with a general charge of "falsehood, fraud
30
and wilful imposition", but in one such case in 1837
31
the second charge was simply "fraud". That charge was
held to be relevant, Lord Justice-Clerk Boyle
observing that "Fraud, especially when practised by
an insolvent person is a relevant charge" and adding
that it was "not necessary that the fraud should eventually
32
succeed". When the Crown tried unsuccessfully to
establish attempt liability at this time the charge was
33
one of "attempting to commit i aud". That the term
falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition referred to
fraud and not to falsehood is clear from the statements
34
made in Michael Hinch^f and particularly from that
of Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis that if the
misrepresentations failed to achieve a result there
35
was only "an attempt to commit fraud". "Falsehood"
however, was not used in indictments about this time
where an uttering had not led to the obtaining of
/property
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property. In these cases the term "forgery""*6 was
used. From a historical viewpoint, however, these
were precisely the cases in which "falsehood" properly
so-called was committed.
The confusion between falsehood and fraud was compounded
by the practice of charging fraud in addition to uttering
in cases where the use of a forgery resulted in loss
to the victim.3'
By the middle of the nineteenth century the historical
distinction between falsehood and stellicnate or fraud
38
had been irretrievably lost. In Taylor" in 1853 the
accused sent a letter to the victim which purported to
come from the victim*s brother, asking her to send
money to a post office to be collected. The victim
sent the money but the accused did not call to collect
it. The accused was charged with forgery and with
"falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition". There was
clearly liability for forgery, a form of falsehood,
since a false writ had been made and uttered, and if
it had been recognised as a <£ase of falsehood it would
have been unnecessary to consider the result element,
since liability was complete as soon as the writ was
uttered. But since a charge of fraud xvas brought, it
was necessary for the Court to consider if there bad
bean a sufficient result. It was held that it was not
essential that the accused should have obtained the
/money
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money and that liability for fraud was complete as
soon as the victim posted the money in response to
the letter. This was probably only an attempted
39
fraud, but since there was at that txme no
liability for attempted fraud the Court took an
extended view of the result element.
It will be apparent, therefore, that the terminology
adopted by the Crown in the nineteenth century cases
proceeded from a failure to understand the proper
distinction between falsehood and fraud and the nature
and elements of each of those crimes. In view of the
confusion of terminology and the conflicting
judicial observations on the matter, it is scarcely
surprising that later writers, particularly Macdonald,
were led to make futile classifications in their
treatment of the crimes. The confusion has persisted
into modern law as is illustrated by the curious
substitution of the term "falsehood, fraud or wilful
imposition" by section 52 and ch. 5 of the Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Act 1963 for the term "falsehood,
fraud and wilful imposition" in the jurisdiction
provisions of section 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction
(Scotland) Act 1954. Historically, however, the
confusion arose primarily in connection with forgery
and written falsehoods.
40
In 1859 in Simon Fraser the Full Bench decided by a
majority that it was "falsehood" but not "forgery" to
adhibit a genuine signature to a writ which falsely
recorded an execution of citation. In that case the
/accused
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accused, a sheriff officer, had obtained the
signature of another with the word "witness" after
it, on a blank piece of paper. He then superscribed an
execution of citation of a criminal libel which he
himself signed as sheriff officer. The debate
41
proceeded on the concession that the witness had
intended that his signature should be used for the
purpose for which it was actually used and the
decision accordingly was restricted to the limited
principle that false statements in a genuine writ
were falsehood but not that particular species of
falsehood called "forgery". This distinction had
the authority of Hume. It may be contrasted with
what is submitted to be the correct distinction which
was made as late as 1864 by Lord Neaves in Michael
42
Hlnchey when he distinguished between forged
documents and documents which were "false merely in
the sense of being mendacious". Uttering authentic
documents which contained written lies was in his
Lordship's view, at the most attempted fraud, but
uttering forged documents was sufficient to
43
constitute liability for "forgery or falsehood".
C. MACDONALD'S ANALYSIS OF THE RESULT ELSMSNT
Macdonald's Criminal Law appeared soon after
Hinchey in 1867. Macdonald maintained the formal
distinction between falsehood and fraud. He followed
Hume and Burnett in discussing the whole matter in one
/chapter
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chapter entitled "Falsehood and Fraud", a
description which he explained, inaccurately, as
"embracing all offences which consist in fraudulent
deception" and, like Hume, he obscured the
historical basis of the two crimes by wrongly
classifying the relevant factual elements.
Macdonald, like Hume, made a primary distinction
between "falsehood by writ" and "fraud and cheating"
44
which comprehended all other criminal dishonesty.
"Falsehood by writ" was divided into forgery and
45
"minor falsehoods by writ", a category which
consisted of the drafting, signing and issuing of
documents narrating falsehood by persons acting in
an official capacity, for example the making of false
seisins by notaries or false executions by messengers
"setting forth proceedings which never took place"
the signing of executions as witnesses by persons who
were not present and the issuing of false certificates
of marriage or of banns. Thir category also included
minor fabrications not amounting to forgery, such as
antedating a deed, serving a false copy summons,
fabricating a letter which was unsigned or uttering
46
false but unsigned banknotes.
The distinction between falsehood by writ and fraud
and cheating which was made by both Hume and Macdonald




Macdonald of the vitiation of deeds and by both
Huue and Macdonald of the use of false weights and
48
measures as examples of fraud and cheating was
contrary to historical principle. The iifficulties
created by this classification are demonstrated in
Macdonald^s discussion of the prejudice or practical
result aspect, from which no clear principle emerges,
and in his attempted distinction between the various
methods of cheating. But the immediate and enduring
result of the confusion was the attempt by Macdonald
to distinguish the so-called category of "practical
cheating". This category, so far as it related to a
method of committing fraud, involved only an
immaterial distinction of fact, and so far as it
extended to fraud the principle of the crime of
forgery was misconceived. Macdonald himself adopted
the terra, which had not previously been used in the
Scottish courts, to describe a supposed category of fraud
in which a result was unnecessary. According to
Macdonald "Practical cheating ^aems to divide itself
into two classes; first, where an article is made over
to others as being that which it is not, for the
purpose of obtaining an advantage; and, second, where
a fraudulent act is done to the defeat, or with a view
49
to the defeat of the rights or privileges of others".
From the first of these classes, Macdonald distinguished
a category of cases in which spurious articles were
/"uttered"
50
"uttered" and concluded that since these were "the
51
corporeal embodiment of a fraud", liability was
complete at the moment of the uttering. In the
second class, Macdonald included all cafes of
"vitiation or destruction of deeds, concealment
(sc. of assets) by insolvent persons, or the like...".
In such cases the overt act of vitiation or destruction
of a document already in existence, combined withthe
intent to defraud, constitutes a complete offence,
52
without any subsequent success of the fraud".
This classification was patently unsound, however,
because it involved the propositions that the vitiation
of an existing and genuine deed in any essential part
53
was criminal even without uttering, unlike forgery;
and also that specific nominate common law and
statutory offences such as fraudulent bankruptcy,
fraudulent concealments by insolvents, fire-raising
or sinking ships to defraud insurers, and falsehood
in registrations of births, m? riages and deaths
were species of a general crime of fraud, which was
certainly not the case.
P. THE MODERN VIEW OF THE RESULT ELEMENT
MacdQnald*s category of "practical cheating",
54
although adopted by Gordon has, fortunately, not
been subject to any judicial development in modern
law. The analytical problems to which its adoption
/gives
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gives rise are discussed in a subsequent chapter.
From a historical point of view, however, the
importance of the description lies in its
association with the development of a theory of fraud
in the late nineteenth century in which actual loss
to the victim was not essential.
The other significant aspect of the modern Scots law
of fraud has been the extension of the range of
relevant consequences beyond those which are purely
economic, culminating in the now generally accepted
proposition that "any definite practical result...is
55
enough••. The difficulties in this theory too are
discussed in a later chapter. It may however be
pointed out, to conclude this historical survey, that
the effect of Adcock v. Archibald together with the
decisions which have followed upon it has been to
establish the possibility in modern Scottish practice
of a liability scarcely less wide-ranging than that
of the South African offence so that any for® of
dishonesty not constituting some other recognised
common law or statutory offence can be brought
within the ambit of fraud. The limits of this
offence, and it is submitted notwithstanding the
dicta in Adcock that there must be such limits, have
never been judicially discussed.
- 39 -
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PART TWO
The Analysis of Fraud
44
CHAPTER IV
The element of deception
A. THE METHODS OF DECEPTION - REPRESENTATIONS
The first element to be considered in the actus
reus of fraud is the element of deception or the creation
of a false belief. In principle, no obvious legal
limitation suggests itself as to the range of methods
of deception which the law should repress. Nevertheless
a feature of both the Scottish and South African case
law has been the tendency to impose limitations upon
the relevant methods of deception, under the obvious
influence of the traditional English approach which
confined the element of deception within the
requirement of an objectively false representation or
pretence. Although as a result of the Theft Act 1968
English law has largely been liberated from this
requirement,1 current law in Scotland and in South
Africa is still affected by it in certain important
respects.
The older Scottish writers considered the question in
very general ter is, speaking of fraud, swindling, cheating,
2 3
cozenage, trickery and the like, " but Hume drew
heavily on contemporary English case law in his analysis
of fraud, and since then the Scottish writers have
always narrowed the issue by speaking of a "false
4
pretence". The effects of this approach are to
isolate the representation element from the accused's
/state
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state of mind, and to establish a series of cases
in which certain so-called implied representations
are recognised."5 The requirement of an objectively
false representation creates difficulties of analysis
because it may easily lead to the assumption that
the accused, the victim and the court share an
identical understanding of the meaning of the
representation, and further that the representation
has a single meaning or at least an identifiable range
of meanings. There are practical difficulties in so
viewing the question, particularly in matters of
description. These are apparent in R. v. Weqe where
the South African court had to consider the
truthfulness of a sellers' assertion that a vehicle
was "new". Although the decision was reached on a
properly subjective basis on a review of the evidence,
the Court referred, unnecessarily, to a previous
judicial definition of "new" in a civil case. This
may be a suitable technique in the civil law but is
inappropriate in a criminal ca^e. The question is,
firstly, what the accused meant by the description,
and further what he intended or knowingly allowed the
victim to understand by it. Accordingly, while as
6a
Gordon suggests, the accused is entitled to show that
he used "glory" to mean "a knock-down argument", he
must further prove in such a case that he did not intend
the other party to understand anything else by it.
This is aptly illustrated by the following statement
/of
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of Herbstein A.J.P. in R. v. Wege:
"Whatever meaning "new" may have in the abstract,
it is clear that, in the instant case, (the
salesman) used it in a particular sense and
himself acted - as it were - as his own
dictionary, for he meant that the tractor
was in "a new condition" as is shown by
his further statement that it had just been
off-loaded at the station. The only reason
he could have had for saying this was to make
it clear that the tractor had not been used -
7
even for demonstration purposes."
Q
Similarly, in R. v. Alexander t Ptv) Ltd.. where the
words used were capable of two different meanings, it
was necessary for the Court to refer to the accused*s
9
state of mind to determine which meaning was proved.
B. IMPLISD REPRESENTATIONS
One of the recurring difficulties in the law is
that of assigning "implied" representations to the
conduct of the accused in certain circumstances. For
example, Gordon states that
"Where A gives B a cheque drawn by him on a
bank he impliedly represents that he has an
account in the bank and has authority from
the bank to draw the cheque and that the
cheque will be honoured on presentation."
Smith and Hogan state that the drawer of a cheque
represents
"as a fact, that it is a valid order for the





Although there are cases to that effect, such
statements are no more than canons of evidence, the
13
representation in each case being a Jury question.
Accordingly, it is the substance of the accused's
actings spoken or otherwise, which must be examined
on a review of the evidence in order to determine
14
what representation he intended to convey, as, for
example, where confidence tricksters or card sharpers
pretend to be strangers to one another.*5 It is
submitted that the most useful summary of the Scottish
view is that of Lord Fraser in H.M.Adv. v. Livingstone
"Any deception by which one man makes another
believe to the letter's injury, something that
really does not exist. It may be done either
by direct assertion or by a suggestion, not
amounting to direct assertion, of something
which was untrue."
C. PROMISES AND PREDICTIONS
One of the traditional limitations in English law
in the former statutory offence of obtaining by
false pretences was that which confined the pretence
to a statement of present fact, thereby excluding
representations which were either promissory or
predictive. A promissory representation is essentially
a statement as to the present and not to the future.
It is a statement of present intention. A predictive
/representation
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representation is also a statement as to the present
since it is a statement of present belief as to the
occurrence of a future event.
Promises
It has always been accepted in Scotland that a
false promise is criminal when accompanied by a
17
further false pretence as to a present fact but
where liability has been asserted on the basis of a false
promise only the position was, until recently, less
18
consistent. In the case of Meldrum and Reid an
indictment for fraudulently obtaining goods on credit
narrated that the accused had misrepresented that he
would be receiving payment of a sum of money at a
future date. It then narrated that the accused
"did fail to pay the price of said (goods) and
did thus defraud"
the victim. The indictment was probably irrelevant in
that it failed to allege that the panel intended not
to pay at the time he obtained the goods and in the
19
later case of James Chisholm the Court insisted on
such an allegation. In two notable cases Lord Cockburn
accepted the relevancy of promissory fraud. In
po
James and Robert Mackintosh" he remarked that it was
enough for liability that an order for goods, if duly
fulfilled, was combined witha res lution never to
21
pay entertained at the time. In James Hall where
the representation libelled was simply one of
intention to pay the Court had no doubt that the
/charge
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charge was relevant. Lord Cockburn on that occasion
remarked that it was not buying goods without paying
that constituted the crime, but buying goods and
obtaining delivery with the intention of not paying
22 23
for them. However, in John Hall " the earlier view
was departed from. That too was a case where goods
were obtained by means of false representations of
intention to pay. The objection to the relevancy was
sustained by Lord Young for reasons which were
clearly adopted from contemporary English theory.
"Now although a man who buys goods which he
knows he cannot pay for, and therefore, in a
very real and practical sense, has no
intention of paying for, and still more a
man who, being unable to pay, buys goods
intending to leave them unpaid is certainly
dishonest, I am unable to extend the
criminal law, as administered in this Court,
to such dishonesty as that. The purchaser of
goods certainly promises to pay for them
whether the promise is expressed or left to
implication, and if he does not intend to
keep it he is dishonest. But intention with
respect to future conduct, whether expressed
or implied, would be a very inconvenient
and hazardous issue to send for trial in a
criminal court, and I am indisposed to countenance
a legal proposition which might expose anyone
to be criminally tried and convicted on such an
issue - although the establishment of it might
be useful in the comparatively rare cases in
which credit is improvidently given to knaves
/who
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who have practised no falsehood or false
pretences beyond representing expressly or
impliedly, that they are honest men who
will honourably pay their debts. I am of
the opinion that the falsehood which is
essential to the crime here charged must
relate to a present or past fact, that is,
that something shall be asserted (falsely)
as an existing or past fact. This indeed
is the common legal notion of falsehood.
A promise, or profession, of intention to
pay money, or do anything else, in the
future not intended to be kept, is
immorality beyond the scope of the
criminal law, which does not, in my opinion,
protect people against the consequence of
their credulity by punishing those who
abuse it - beyond this, that swindlers who
impose on them by false representations
(spoken, written or acted) regarding past
24
events or existing facts shall be punished."
25
In the later case of Macleod v. Mactavish promissory
misrepresentation was accepted by the Court without
SMb
comment, but later still in Strathern v. Foqal1922
Lord Ashraore remarked that professions of intention could
not ground a criminal complaint. He was of opinion in
that case that the pretences alleged, being related to
27
future conduct, «ere irrelevant. This was a
surprising poant of view since the professions of
intention made by the accused were accompanied by a
misrepresentation of existing fact to the effect that
certain leases had already been entered into. In
/this
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this respect therefore the decision applied an even
more restrictive principle than the English law of
the time.
Promises in English and American law
The exclusion of promissory misrepresentations
originated in the restrictive approach adopted by
the English judges towards the crime of obtaining
by false pretences in the nineteenth century. It
was established in England as early as 1821 that a
28
false promise was not a "false pretence", although
the principle was never applied to the crime of
29
larceny by trick. This led to the curious result
that it was criminal to obtain possession by a
promissory pretence, but not criminal to obtain title
30
by this means. Moreover in the civil law it was
always recognised that a false statement of
intention could in the appropriate case render the
31
defendant liable for deceit.
Since the 1757 Act formed the basis of the law of false
pretences in the American jurisdictions it was not
surprising that the English approach was closely
32
reflected in th American decisions.
In both the English and American jurisdictions, however,
the principle was consistently modified in one important
respect, in that where the false promise was
/accompanied
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accompanied by a false pretence as to sane other
existing fact, generally a false assumption of
character or the like, the accused was held
33
criminally liable. In an attempt to resolve the
difference between the civil and criminal effects of
false promises, the courts frequently fell back upon
an illusory distinction between a false statement of
34
intention and "a mere promissory false pretence",
but this distinction was later rejected.
In England the problem arose as a clear cut issue in
35
R. v. Pent where a jury found that the accused, who
had obtained payment in advance under a contract, had
at the time of making the contract no intention of
carrying out the work. The Court of Criminal Appeal
held this finding to be an insuffient basis for
conviction. The court distinguished Edgington v.
Fitzmaurice and reaffirmed the common law principle
that a false representation as to the future was not
per se criminal unless coupled with a statement of
existing fact. There was no distinction, in the view
of the Court, between false statements of intention
and promises. The question of the dividing line between
present and future, where there was a promise made to
do something, was said to be vague but this was because
few promises intended to be performed immediately did not
import some statement about the promisor^s readiness to
37
perform. The issue was equally clear-cut in Chaplin
38
v. U.S. where the appellant had obtained money on a
/promise
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promise to repay it and there were no accompanying
representations as to the present or past. In that
case too a jury had found that at the time of
making the promise the appellant had no intention
of carrying it out. The majority opinion of the
court in reversing the conviction reaffirmed a
consistent line of authority but the importance of
the case was in the sharp divergence of view between
the majority and the dissenting opinions both of
which explored the social and judicial policy behind
the traditional rule. Clark J. in the majority
opinion distinguished the concept of intention as
a fact in criminal cases and in civil cases on the
ground that failure to fulfil a promise was as
consistent with ordinary commercial default as with
criminal conduct and that there was a risk of
prosecution, in circumstances of failure or inability
to pay, which might impede business dealings.
These and other arguments in support of the traditional
rule all proceeded, however, on an unnecessary
substitution of law for fact. As Edgerton J. observed
in his dissent, to justify the traditional rule it
would be necessary to show that false statements of
intention are a harmless way of obtaining money or
else that such an intention could not be proved in
prosecutions for false pretences although it was constantly
/proved
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proved in other prosecutions, including those for
larceny by trick and in civil actions for deceit.
The court in Chaplin did not attack the jury's
finding of fact as to the intention of the appellant,
but merely subjected that finding to an arbitrary rule
of law, a rule which would make a prosecution
impossible even where there was an admission by the
accused that he never intended to fulfil his promise.
As Edgerton J. put the matter
"The old illusion that a promise states no facts
is not the only source of the old tolerance of
falsehoods regarding intention. That a fool and
his money are soon parted was once accepted as a
sort of natural law* *n 1821 the fact that
•common prudence would have prevented the injury*
seemed to an English court a good reason for
refusing to penalise an injury which had been
intentionally inflicted by a false promise.
The fact that common agility in dodging an
intentional blow would have prevented an
injury would not have seemed a reason for
refusing to penalise a battery. Fools were
fair game though cripples were not. But in
modern times, no-one not talking law would
be likely to deny that society should
protect mental as well as physical helplessness
39
against intentxonal injuries".
The trend of modern statutory reforms is to classify
40
false promises as relevant types of false pretence,
and in English law in particular the matter is now
settled by section 15 (4) of the Theft Act 1968.
The modern Scots Law on false promises
As a result of the dictum of Lord Ashmore in
/Strathern
Strathern v. Foqal. the modern position of Scots law
on this question remained until recently in some
doubt. The academic writers were generally hostile
41
to the traditional English rule. T.B. Smith, for
example, argued for the principle of the English civil
law that the existence of an intention is a matter of
42
fact, and he was supported in this view by Gordon.
Macdonald, too, preferred the earlier Scottish
43
authorities to the same effect.
The question arose for decision in the appeal in H.M.Adv.
44
v. Richards. In that case it was an essential part of
the charge that the accused had caused a nominee
purchaser on his behalf to submit false statements to
the sellers of a property as to the purposes for which
he intended to use it. The defence relied on R. v.
45
Dent for the contention that such representations,
being purely de futuro. could not found a charge of
fraud. The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected this
argument. Lord Justice-Clerk Grant, with whom
Lord Milligan concurred, after a survey of the case
law, was of the opinion that Gordon's conclusion that
"a statement of present intention as to
46
future conduct can ground a charge of fraud"
47
was "fully justified by authority". Lord Wheatley,
however, while expressing general agreement with the
Lord Justice -Clerk concluded that in the instant case
the representation was
"not just a present statement about future
/intentions
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intentions, but a statement of fact in
relation to the qualification of [the
nominee J for consideration"
as a prospective purchaser.-*8
South African Jas
In South African law the coutts still formally
adhere to the view that only representations as to
the present or past are relevant to criminal
liability but the view is taken that every promise
implies a statement of intention and that this
49
intention is an existing fact. The South African
courts have therefore accepted in the criminal law
what has always been accepted in the civil law in
_ , 50England.
Accordingly where the accused not only fails to fulfil
a promise but had no intention of fulfilling it when
he made it then he is liable for fraud and this principle




Another aspect of the traditional policy which
required a pretence to be false in respect of an
existing fact is in the exclusion of predictions. A-
prediction may be distinguished from a promise in
respect that while it is in the accused#s powers to
fulfil a promise, his predictions may relate to the
occurrence of an independent event. Predictions
/therefore
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therefore relate to expectation rather than
intention. Accordingly it can be argued that if
only existing facts can be considered, the event
which is the subject of prediction is not a fact
until such time as it occurs. This difficulty has
been avoided both in Scotland and in South Africa, in
two cases on similar facts, by means of construing
52
an implied representation. In Meldrum and Reid and
53
in R. v. Larkins. representations by the accused
that they would receive a payment at some future date
were held in the circumstances to imply a
representation of present entitlement to such payment.
The statutory and common law liabilities on clairvoyants
54
are presumably based on similar reasoning. There is
no logical reason why predictions should be excluded
from liability since they are statements of the existing
belief of the accused. There is statutory liability
in Scotland and England for false predictions or
forecasts under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments)
55 56
Acts 1939 and 1958 and the Protection of Depositors
57
Act 1963 and it would be strange and unsatisfactory
if in a case where charges were laid both under the
statute and at common law the jury should be
instructed to find in fact whether predictions or
forecasts were true or false in considering the
statutory charge, while being directed to disregard
them under the common law charge.
/Many
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Many such predictions are virtually representations
of present facts other than the accused's
expectation, and liability cannot be avoided by means
of the syntactical form in which a statement is cast.
For example, a statement to a prospective purchaser
of the amount which a property will yield in rents




On similar reasoning statements of opinion should
not be distinguished from statements of fact since
every assertion of opinion is an assertion of a
present state of mind. It is therefore possible
falely to assert an opinion and to deceive another
as to the sincerity of that opinion. Representations of
59 60
belief, of expectation and of opinion can be
established as false in the civil law, which makes all
the less plausible the view that their exclusion
from liability in the criminal law is based on the
lack of any satisfactory test or measurement.6* The
problem arose in the Scottish case of H.M.Adv. v.
Pattisons62 tried before Lord Justice-General Balfour,
where one of the allegations was that the panels had
misrepresented the financial standing of a company by
overvaluing whisky stocks in the company accounts. It
was argued on relevancy By the defence that the value
of the whisky was a matter of opinion and could not
/found
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found a criminal charge. The Lord Justice«aGeneral
repelled the objection on the view that this was a pure
jury question.
"If the prisoners can by evidence satisfy the
jury that [the increase in the stated value ] was
an honest increase, they will give the accused
the benefit of this view and acquit them of
this charge; but as the charge stands, and it
is not irrelevant, I should not feel justified
6 3
in declining to allow it to go to a jury."
64
South African law appears to adopt a similar view.
B. REPRESENTATIONS OF LAW
There is no Scottish authority in cases where the
pretence is as to a question of law. In the South
o5
African case S. v. Schnittker. it was held that a
misrepresentation as to law was relevant. In that
case the accused had represented, according to the
charge, that the complainant was obliged by law to
exhibit certain notices in his premises although the
accused knew there was no such legal obligation. It
was held that the charge alleged a pretence of fact.
The Court relied on a principle of the law of
contract which distinguishes expressions of opinion
as to the legal effects of a particular fact situation
and expressions of fact as to the relevant law on a
particular point,°6 The latter is sometimes described
7
as "A conclusion of law stated as a fact". This
however is an unnecessary definitional refinement,
since any assertion of a legal proposition in circumstances
such as those in Schrittker involves an assertion that
/the
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the belief that the proposition is accurate is genuinely
held. The simple question of fact is therefore
whether the accused honestly held the view of the law
which he asserted.68
The traditional theory on misrepresentations of law in
Anglo-American jurisdictions, and the theoretical
objections to it, sure well illustrated in the American
69
case of State v. Edwards where a pretence that
corporate stock was not subject to assessment after
purchase was held to be a misrepresentation as to law
and not to be criminal. The dissenting judge
considered that the representation implied that the
facts necessary for the legal rule to come into effect
70
already existed. One of the less plausible
justifications for the traditional rule which excluded
these pretences from liability was the principle
ignorantia juris neminem excusat. This argument was
cogently dismissed by the dissenting judge in the
following way:
"One is not shielded by reason of his ignorance
of law from the consequences of his own illegal
action. But the maxim that ignorance of the law
excuses no-one was not intended, and ought not
to be used, to enable a wilful wrondoer to protect
himself from the consequences of his act
because of his victim's ignorance of the law. To
71
use the maxim to that end is a perversion of it".
The question never arose in English law but the Criminal




representation should be criminal and this is
expressly provided for in section 15(4) of the
Theft Act 1968. It is unlikely that Scots law
would now follow any different rule.
F. EXAGGERATED COMMENDATION. ADVERTISING AND SAUSS TALK
One of the most important social problems
relevant to the law of fraud is the extent to which the
criminal law should interfere in the course of trade
in respect of advertising claims and sales talk, and
it is notoriously difficult to devise a satisfactory
test which reconciles logical theory with the
realities of commerce. Gordon attempts to resolve
the question on the basis of a distinction between
opinion and fact, but as has already been submitted,
statements of opinion can theoretically be as false
as statements of fact. According to Gordon
"The line between opinion and fact is
necessarily not a definite one, and it is
a question for the jury in each case whether
the alleged representation falls within the
class struck at by the law. A considerable
latitude is allowed to sellers to "puff" their
goods in advertisements, and it is unlikely
that, for example, *Brand X removes grease
instantly* would be regarded as a fraudulent
73
representation, if it were false".
This is a more satisfactory approach than the
robust attitude adopted by Lord Ardwall in Tapsell v.
74
Prentice where he spoke of statements which were
"just the ordinary lies that people tell when
they want to induce credulous members of the
/public
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public to purchase goods, or to do something
for them",75
a view of the matter which is flatly contradicted by
Lord Ardwall*s own judgment at first instance, and
those of the Second Division affirming it, in the
celebrated civil case of Bile Bean Mfg. Co. v. Davidson.
Nevertheless the test proposed by Gordon is
unsatisfactory in several respects. There is no
satisfactory theoretical distinction between statements
of opinion and statements of fact. As has been submitted,
every statement of opinion involves an assertion as to
the honesty or sincerity with which the opinion is
held. The indefinite nature of the dividing line
between opinion and fact creates uncertainty as to
the extent of liability. Moreover greater social harm
may be involved by assertions of opinion by salesmen
which are not honestly held and which may relate to
matters which the salesman may know to be untrue, than
by more direct assertions of untruth.
Still less satisfactory is the solution proposed by
Smith and Hogan who argue that a knowing exaggeration of
the quality of goods will not necessarily infer
liability for the English offence of obtaining by
deception because, as they argue,
"Regard must be had to the effect produced in
the mind of P. There is a deal of give and
take in commercial transactions and P is
/unlikely
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unlikely to be deceived by mere puffs.
On the sale of a car it is thought that D
would not be guilty of deception when he
asserts that the car is "a good runner"
for no-one is really deceived by puffs
of this kind" ,77
This however is an over-simplified solution, involving
as it does an arbitrary pre-emption of an issue of
fact with a rigid principle of law which ignores
entirely the intention of the accused, and the actual
proven effect of his assertion on the mind of the
victim.
In contrast, an attractive statutory solution is offered
in the New Zealand Crimes Act, 1961 which provides that
"Exaggerated commendation or depreciation of
the quality of anything is not a false pretence
unless it is carried to such an extent as to
amount to fraudulent misrepresentation of
fact".78
The determination of that question is a question of
79
fact.
The problem may also be examined from the standpoint of
Hunt who suggests an exclusion of puffing from
liability
"on the ground that the necessary fraudulent
intent is not present and/or on the ground
that it is an honest expression of opinion.
A puff, properly so-called, is a statement
which X does not intend or expect Y to take
/literally
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literally, but at a discount for
exaggeration. Such an intention falls
short of the intent to defraud required:
X does not intend his statenent to be
.
, „ 80acted upon".
This test adequately meets the difficulty that certain
misleading or exaggerated advertising is published in
the expectation that few will be deceived by it( but
in the hope that at least some will. On the "intent"
approach there would be liability for such
advertising in the appropriate case and it is
submitted that from the social point of view this is a
conclusion to be supported, because it is generally
the most credulous and susceptible who suffer most by
such deception. The content of mass advertising
cannot be varied according to the critical faculties of
those who read it but it is submitted that it is
reasonable to require of such advertising that it
should not be capable of misleading even the most
unintelligent reader. Such a principle would leave
ample scope for advertising technique without unduly
£
inhibiting the advertiser.
In any event it is submitted that any criticism of the
wide ranging liability previously suggested is
adequately met by consideration of the question of
causation because in the average case there is
probably, on the facts, no causal connection between
the advertising and the purchase of the goods since
/the
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the purchaser generally acts upon his own opinions
and judgment; but precisely in the case where the
purchaser is most susceptible to advertising or is
most reliant upon the knowledge, skill or persuasiveness
of the salesman there will still be a causal
connection and therefore liability; and it is submitted
in that case there ought to be liability.
G. SUMMARY
From an analytical standpoint the classification of
"non-factual" statements into predictions, opinions,
statements of value, statements of the law and the like
is unnecessary. It is sufficient to observe that all
such statements involve at the very least an
assertion of belief. The exclusion of such statements
from the scope of liability because their subject
matter cannot be empirically verified is based on an
error of analysis caused by undue concentration on the
pretence itself. It is not the subject matter of the
pretence which need be true or false: as to all of
these matters it is possible to hold a belief. It is
therefore possible to effect a deception by creating a
false impression in the mind of another as to the
existence cf that belief. There can be no convincing
reason why the law should not distinguish honest from
dishonest statements of belief as to the unverifiable,
just as it distinguishes honest from dishonest statements
of belief as to the verifiable. In each of those
/rfituations
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situations there is a verifiable fact involved,
namely the belief itself, and if the courts were, as
a matter of evidence, to have proper regard to the
state of mind of the accused and his intentions as
to the state of mind of the victim, there would be
no reason why any particular method of deception
should be excluded from the scope of liability.
H. OMISSIONS
Materiality
One important difficulty which has been created by
the former requirement of the "false pretence" in English
law, and as a result in certain statements of Scots
law, has been the situation where liability is founded
on an omission. Various situations can be said to
involve an omission of material facts from a representation
of other facts. In England a distinction was attempted
31
in a civil action Peek v. Gurney between "mere
non-disclosure of material facts" and "active mis-statement
of fact, or, at all events, such a partial and
fragmentary statement of fact, as that the withholding
of that which is not stated makes that which is stated
82
absolutely false". But this is not a satisfactory
analysis. Materiality cannot be seen in isolation from
the question of causation. If the disclosure of a
particular fact would have caused the complainer to have
acted otherwise than he did, then that fact is material.
Non-disclosure in that situation cannot fail to affect
/ the
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the overall truthfulness of what is actually said.
33
In R. v. Kylsant a prospectus which was absolutely
true in everything which it said but omitted certain
further information with the result that it gave a
misleading impression of the true state of a
corapany*s affairs was held to be "false in a material
particular" w&thin the meaning of the relevant
84
statutory provision. This principle is well
established in insurance law in regard to proposal
35
forms. The decision in Kylsant could only be reached
by reference to more than the actual words of the
prospectus, namely the impression of the reader.
Duty to disclose
A problem remains, however, in cases where there
is a complete failure by the accused to make any
representation at all. The common law of fraud in
Scotland leaves this question in some doubt. Gordon
suggests the following approach
"Fraud may be committed by omission in cases
where A has a duty to disclose the truth to 3.
This duty may arise from a contractual
relationship between A and S which obliges A
to disclose the whole truth to Bj in such
cases any concealment of truth would lead to
a fraudulent misrepresentation, since there
will be implied in all these statements a
representation that he has disclosed the
whole truth There may also be cases in
which A innocently makes a statement to B
which he subsequently realises as creating
a falsa impression on B from which A stands
/to
68
to benefit. If it is A*s duty to correct
that impression his failure to do so will
amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation.




Hunt commits himself to a similar view. This
approach is not however a helpful one. It is a
circuitous argument which offers no guidance as to
the circumstances which will or will not infer a duty
to disclose. Above all, however, it suggests that
the duty to disclose is restricted in some way or
other and at least in the criminal aspect of
fraudulence is not one of general application; and
this is q questionable proposition.
The whole "duty" mechanism is inappropriate and
unsatisfactory. The question may be a simple one
88
where there exists a statutory duty to disclose and,
as has been decided in Scotland, failure in that duty
89
can give rise to common law liability for fraud; but
otherwise it is by no means clear whether the duty to
disclose posited by the criminal law is separate and
distinct from the duty to disclose of the civil law,
90
for example the dufry to disclose in insurance law.
If it is, then to say that failure in such a duty
gives rise to liability is a tautology. On the other
hand, if the duties are coterminous, considerable
inroads must be made on the subjective basis of
liability.
Knowledge and causation
As an alternative to the duty theory the question
/may
- 69 -
nay be considered from two aspects, namely the
accused's knowledge and causation. This was the
approach taken by Lord Fraser in H.M.Adv. v. Livingstone
a statutory prosecution under the Bankruptcy Acts where
he observed to the jury
"There was no assertion certainly that (the
accused) was not an undischarged bankrupt, but,
on the other hand, he kept back the important
fact that he was an indischarged bankrupt. He
knew perfectly well that if he had told that
fact he would not have got credit for a single
sixpence".
This, it is submitted, is the preferable theory. Apart
from the simple, and possibly rather few, cases where
there is an explicitly established duty, the courts
need only determine the following questions of fact*
would disclosure of the fact omitted have induced the
victim to act otherwise that he did; and can the
accused be proved to have intended that the victim
would not have acted otherwise than he did? If those
facts are proved, then, it is submitted, the necessary
asens rea is established. To speak of the matter as
inferring a duty to disclose in the situation is to
say little more than that there is a duty not to defraud
The forego|ng view is supported by the dicta of
Lord Kyllachy in the civil case of Patterson v.
93
Landsberq„ where in relation to an allegation that
certain items of jewellery had been falsely represented
by the sellers to be antiques, his Lordship held, on
the facts, inter alia.
/"(I) that
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"(1) that the appearance of age and other
appearances presented by (the) articles
constituted by themselves misrepresentations.....
.....(2) that this being so, the defender was
not entitled to leave, as he says he did, the
articles to speak for themselves, but was bound
to displace the inferences which the appearance
of the articles was to his knowledge bound to
94
suggest".
This approach also derives support from the judgment
95
of Lord. Justice-General Halfour in H.M.Adv. v. Fatt isons
where one of the charges against the accused was that
they had published a prospectus containing a
certificate of the profits of the company prepared
by accountants from company books from which material
entries had been omitted. It was objected by the
panels that since the whole of the company books had
been put before the accountants the missing entries
could have been detected by them, and accordingly the
mere submission of the books to the accountants
constituted no representation as to their accuracy.
This objection was repelled on the basis that it was a
jury question:
"Upon (the) evidence one or other of two views
might be taken. If the jury should think that
the books were presented under such circumstances
as practically to say to the accountants "We
shall tell you nothing about these books; we
shall not tell you whether the ultimate books
are complete; find out all that for yourself in
this roomful of books." - the jury would consider
/whether
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whether omissions from the final books were
or were not fit matters for a criminal charge.
On the other hand, if evidence is led before
the jury that, according to the practice of
book-keeping pursued by honest firms, these
things should have appeared in the ledger and
ultimate books, and if accountants experienced
in those matters say that the presenting of
the books implied a representation that they
were true and accurate, it would be for the
jury to draw their own conclusions, and to say
whether any misrepresentation was implied,
and that the accountants were not expected to
pursue back every transaction to its ultimate
source, but were entitled to make a balance
from what they took to be hemest and accurate
96
statements".
Several South African cases support the general
proposition that fraud can be committed by silence but
there has been little attempt in the South Africa
courts to formulate a general theory on the question.
97
The question was raised but not decided in R. v. Herzfelder.
98 ,
Zn a later case, R. v. Larkins, Gardiner JA cited with
99
approval, obiter. the text in Voet: "Reticentia falsuro
comroittitur qeneraliter. si quis veritatem
dolo malo retic 'ferit celaveritgue. quo alios in
errorero deducat." In that case however, the actions of
the accused were such as to warrant a finding in fact
that by implication he had positively represented his
right to a payment of salary at a specified future




The leading modern authority on this question is
100
S. v. Heller (2). in which liability for omission
to disclose was fully accepted. That case, however,
was decided under reference to the existence of a civil
duty to disclose owed by a director, in his fiduciary
capacity, to his company.*01 The theoretical difficulties
102
in so deciding the issue have already been discussed.
Nevertheless the learned judge gave an indication of
a wider view of the question by holding that for a
breach of such a duty it was necessary, inter alia, that
the circumstances be such as "to equate the non¬
disclosure with a representation of the non-existence
103
of that fact". On the assumption that the
relevant intent exists, the latter approach indicates
what is submitted to be the better view, namely that
whether or not a silence is fraudulent is a pure jury
question to be approached on a thoroughly subjective
basis, .independently of the duties of disclosure of the
civil law.
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CHAPTER V
The mens rea of fraud
A. FACT AND LAW
The tern "fraud" relates to law and not to fact.
When an action or a state of mind is said to be
"fraudulent" a legal quality or characteristic is
being ascribed to it. The imposition of liability
depends upon the attribution of that legal
characteristic to the proved facts of the case. The
purpose of the definition of the crime of fraud is to
prescribe the facts necessary for the attribution of
the character of fraudulence to an individual's conduct.
It therefore follows that "fraud" ought not to appear
within the terras of the definition of the crime
otherwise the definition becomes circuitous. The
definitions of the crime however commonly require the
presence of "an intent to defraud" or "fraudulent
intent"* and these terras are commonly used in statutes
2
to define an element in liability. In considering
such phrases it is important to distinguish the
respective provinces of fact and law which they imply.
Intention relates to factual results. It does not, or
at least it need not extend to the legal quality of
those results. There are obviously cases in which
intent may extend to law as well as to fact. The
/political
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political demonstrator, for example, may intend to
publicise his cause by breaking the law, for example
by breach of the peace, and will perform the physical
act necessary to achieve that quality of illegality;
or a tramp seeking shelter for a winter's night may break
a shop window in order to be taken into custody; but
these are exceptional situations. In each the
extension of the intent to law as well as to fact is
essentially a matter of motive with which the Court is
not concerned. For the constitution of liability the
Court is concerned solely with the question whether the
accused intended the physical consequences of his
actions. That it is unnecessary and indeed irrelevant
for the intent to extend beyond those consequences is
indicated by the principle iqnorantla juris nominem
excusat, for if knowledge of the illegality is
unnecessary, still less necessary is the intent to
achieve it.
These considerations indicate the terror of such phrases
3 4
as "intent to defraud" or "intent to cause prejudice".
Since the fraudulance of an action or the prejudicial
quality of the result is a matter of law, the
circuitous argument which these terras imply can be
avoided only by recasting the analysis of intent in
terras of fact. This is best done by relating the
intent el aent to each of the two elements in the
factual composition of the crime of fraud, namely the
/deception
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deception and its consequences. This reflects the
general distinction made by iiurchell and Hunt between
intention in respect of circumstances and intention
in respect of consequences,5
B. HONBSTY OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF
Intent to deceive involves two questions of fact;
the accused's own belief as to the truth of what he
asserts and his intention as to the belief of the
complainer.
Scots law and English law
In assessing the state of mind of the accused in
relation to the truth or falsity of the representation
the Scottish Courts nowadays apply a subjective test.
If therefore the Crown fails to establish that the
accused actually knew that his representation was
false, the prosecution must fail.6 The subjective
approach extends also to cases where, on proof that the
representation was false, the accused claims to have
had an honest belief that it was true.
7
Certain dicta in the older Scottish cases suggested that
an honest belief recklessly arrived at could form the
basis of a civil action of fraud, but it is now well
settled that the presence of an honest belief
necessarily excludes fraud.^ A fortiori. there
9
cannot be criminal liability in such cases. This is
illustrated in Brander v. Buttercup Dairy Co..1Q where
/on
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on a finding that a representation had been made
with gross carelessness but not with dishonest
intent the High Court made clear that the two mental
states could not be equiparated.
Ih both Scotland and England the principle applicable
in both the civil and criminal law is that laid down
by the House of Lords in Perry v. Peek.11 Although in
that case recklessness was accepted as a relevant
state of mind for fraud, the recklessness was admitted,
subjectively, as a matter of evidence, and not of
law, to the extent that its existence could justify an
inference that the maker of the statement had no
honest belief in the truth of what he said. In the
classic formula of Lord Herschell in that case:
"Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false
representation has been made (1) knowingly, or
(2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly,
12
careless whether it be true or false".
Lord Herschell saw the third case as
"but an instance of the second, for one who
makes a statement under such circumstances
can have no real belief in the truth of what
he states" -
an observation which empha s aasthat recklessness per se
is not equivalent in law to intention, but may, as a




The distinction between an assertion of a false
belief arrived at by carelessness, and even gross
carelessness, but nonetheless honestly, held, and an
assertion uttered with such recklessness or
indifference as to its truth that it cannot be said
to be believed to be true has been recognised in
Scottish practice since the judgment of Lord President
Inglis in Lees v. Tod.14 In Paterson v. Ritchie.15
for example, a widow applied for and was granted a
widow's pension although at the time she was cohabiting
with a man. She was acquitted of fraud in the
Sheriff Court on the ground that under the relevant
statute she was in the circumstances entitled to a
pension. The High Court held on an interpretation of
the statute that the woman was not entitled to the
pension but refused the prosecutor's appeal on the
ground that she might well have believed that she was.
It follows of course from this subjective test that in
considering the accused's belief in the truth of what
he says
"The question is not whether the (accused) in
any given case honestly believed the
representation to be true in the sense
assigned to it by the court on an objective
consideration of its truth or falsity, but
whether he honestly believed the
representation to be true in the sense in
which he understood it, albeit erroneously,
when it was raade."1<S
The circumstances may be such that it cannot be held as
/a fact
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a fact that the representation was understood in
the sense claimed by the accused, but this is a
question of evidence.
It follows also from this subjective view of honesty
that the reasonableness of the belief cannot as a matter
of law determine liability, but will at the most raise
17
certain inferences of fact. In Nimmo v. Lanarkshire
IS
Tramways Co. a school teacher travelled on a
special workmen^ tram service at a reduced fare to
which, the tramways company maintained, he was not
entitled. He was acquitted of a statutory offence of
knowingly travelling beyond the distance for which he
had paid on the ground that it had been established in
evidence that he genuinely believed he was entitled to
the reduced rate of fare.
The test of honest belief was however challenged in an
interpretation of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments)
Act 1939, s.l2(l), which with its successor the
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, s.13(1)
imposed criminal liability for, inter alia. "The
reckless making of any statement, promise or forecast
which is misleading, false or deceptive" whereby
people were in certain circumstances induced to invest
19
money. In R. v. Bates the provision was interpreted
as covering the case where there was a high degree of
negligence in reaching the belief on which the statement
/was
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was based, although the belief was honestly held.
This view was approved obiter by the Court of Criminal
20 21
Appeal." In a later case" under the same section,
however, Salmon J. insisted on the interpretation
of recklessness laid down in Perry v. Peek.
In a case under the 1958 Act a further interpretation
was proposed of recklessness which seemed to envisage
liability without actual dishonesty provided that
there was a finding in fact that the statement was
rash and that there was no real basis of fact to
22
support it. The test seemed hardly to differ from
that in Sates. It may be doubted whether as a matter
of inference there can be said to be any possibility
of honest belief in such circumstances, but in any event
the test must be rejected to the extent that it fails
23
to take adequate account of the subjective element.
Difficulties arise in the situation where the accused
neither states a fact on his own authority nor
expressly affirms his own belief regarding it, but
merely passes on the information second-hand, attributing
its authority to another source. Here it may be thought
to be a defence that he accurately relates the information
given to him should that information be proved false;
but this is not sufficient. The Court should examine
the knowledge or belief of the accused regarding the
/truth
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truth of the information. If he does not know the
information to be false, or at any rata if he does
not actually believe it to be false, the accused
cannot be liable because jui limine he has an hon- st
state of mind. If however he knows or believes it to
be false and intends to deceive another as to its
truth, then he cannot escape liability by
attributing the information, albeit truthfully, to
another source. There may of course be a question
of causation involved and it will be a question of
fact whether the victim relied on the authority of
the accused or of the original source. In the
latter situation, however, in the circumstances
posited there could well be liability on the accused*s
part for an attempt.
South African law
24
The leading South African case, R. v. Myers.
/ 25
expressly adopts the rule in Perry v. Peek together
with a statement in Halsbury that a belief is not
honest which is "The outcome of a fraudulent diligence
in ignorance - that is, of a wilful abstention from all
sources of information which might lead to suspicion,
and a sedulo:us avoidance of all possible avenues to the
truth, for the express purpose of not having any doubt
thrown on what (the accused) desires and is
determined to, and afterwards does, in a sense,believe".
In Myers the Appellate Division emphasised the subjective
basis of liability in such a case in holding thAt
/negligence
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negligence in making enquiries or unreasonableness
in drawing inferences from the known facts, whether such
negligence or unreasonableness be gross or of a
lesser degree, can never in itself amount to an
27
absence of honest belief. Such seeming negligence
or unreasonableness may however give rise to an
inference that the accused actually knew that his
26
statement was false, or that his alleged belief in
its truth was the outcome of a "fraudulent diligence
29
in ignorance", or that his hopes to fulfil his
statement of intention were so nebulous as not to
30
constitute a bona fide belief in the statement.
e
The intentional aspect of deceit and the unintentional
31
aspect of negligence were said in R. v. Heuer to
preclude the assimilation of the two states of mind as
a matter of law.
Since the test of the honesty of the belief is a
32
subjective one there can be no presumption at
33
common law of a dishonest state of mind. For
34
example, in R. v. Nqweshiza. a native woman
represented that she could point out a wizard. It was
held on appeal from conviction that it could not be
presumed that she knew that the representation was
35
false. An adverse finding in fact was made against




On the assumption that the accused has no honest
belief in the truth of the statement, it is clear
that some further element of intent must be present,
otherwise novelists, for example, would incur
liability. It is helpful to consider this intent
again in terms of deception rather than of
fraudulence.
C, INTENT TO DECEIVE
Intent to deceive relates the dishonest state of
raind of the accused to the state of mind of his victim.
The relationship denotes the intention on the part of
the accused that what he himself knows or believes to
be untrue should be believed to be true by his victim.
Clearly whether or not that intention is present is a
question of fact, intent, in this branch of the law
37
at least, being a thoroughly subjective question. The
significance of the representation is therefore as an
33
index to the intent. It will be apparent that this
interpretation of intent to deceive, being c onfined
to the effect of the deception on the belief of the
victim, ignores entirely the results of that belief.
In view of the insistence in the definition of the
crime in Scots law on the element of fraudulence, it is
obvious that a result-related aspect of intent is
required^3" although as has been suggested the phrase
"intent to defraud" does not satisfactorily express
the point. The intent must be related to the result
because fraud is a result crime and where liability is
predicted upon a result, that result must, unless there
/is
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is strict liability, be "intended". To hold
otherwise would undermine the subjective basis of
liability. As Gordon states,
"Fraud is a 'crime of intent* and A cannot be
guilty of fraudulently inducing 11 to do X
unless he intended to produce such a result
40
by his falsehood."
Smith and Hogan give a useful illustration of the same
point in relation to the English offence of obtaining
by deception:
"In the course of negotiations for the purchase
of goods on credit, for example, D might tell
what to him is an inconsequential lie (e.g. that
he is old Etonian) but, as it turns out, this
is the substantial reason why P allows him to
have the goods on credit. It is thought that
D would not be guilty of obtaining by deception
although he has in fact deceived P and this
deception in fact caused P to part with
the property."4"'"
This question was touched upon in the Jouth African
42
case of S. v. Cooraer where an 83 year old creditor
who held a bond over a house concluded an agreement
with the owner of the house for its purchase by him.
Refore the title could be transferred to him, the
creditor stated to a third party that he was the owner
of the house and then leased it to the third party with
an option to purchase. The true owner then removed
the third party after she entered on the occupancy
of the house. It was held on a review of the evidence
that the accused creditor never "intended" to
represent to the third party that he was the owner and
further that he had no intent to deceive her and
/therefore
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therefore no "intent to defraud". The latter
question was considered in terms of the accused*s
4.3
"honest intention of carrying out his undertaking"
with the third party. Likewise there can be no
intent to deceive where a false statement is made in
the honest belief that the complainer knows that the
44
statement is false.
To distinguish between intent as to the creation of
false belief and intent as to the consequences of such
false belief may perhaps seem rather unreal. On a
common sense view no one intends to mislead another
simply for the sake of misleading him. The
creation of a false belief is generally an essential
preliminary step towards achieving certain desired
behaviour on the part of the party deceived. There
can be few cases where this is not so. Equally, there
can be few beliefs which are not acted upon in some
way or another, so that in some cases the deceiver
will at least expect certain consequences of his
deception to occur, albeit with varying degrees of
certainty as to the nature of those consequences and
the likelihood of their occurrence. This is a
question of evidence. Deliberate deception raises
certain inferences as to the results intended by the
deceiver; but, theoretically at least, a distinction
must be made between the deception-related and the
consequence-related aspects of the intent, in order
to meet the situation where the accused intends to
/dece ive
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deceive but does not intend, and may indeed try to
prevent, the consequences founded on by the
45
prosecution as being prejudicial.
Intention of course does not necessarily involve a
desiderative element. It is sufficient that the
accused foresees that the result founded on will
occur, and either intends that it will or is at
46
least reckless as to whether or not it does.
D. MOTIVE
The significance of the distinction between the
two aspects of intent emerges also in the context of
motive. As Gordon retoarks
"The motive with which the pretence is made is,
of course, irrelevant. A fraud carried out in
order to perpetrate a practical joke is a
fraud in the same way as a threat perpetrated
47
for the same purpose is a threat."
In general, motive in the criminal law has two distinct
usages. The term may describe a result-related intent
or it may describe the psychological reason why a
48
particular intent is held. In the first case
"motive" describes no more than what Salmond calls
49
the "ulterior" intent, or the intent to produce
the ultimate consequence to which the immediately
intended consequence will lead. If the
intentional production of the immediate consequence
is criminal, such further intent is obviously
irrelevant. The second usage of "motive" is not
/result-related
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result-related. The motive in this case is
explanatory of the holding of an intent which may
extend no further than the immediate consequences.
The distinction is aptly illustrated by Gordon's
examples of a killing with intent to inherit the
victim's money and a sacrificial killing of a
child.50
Gordon's opinion on the former category of cases
where there is a motive to joke or to hoax is, it
is submitted, the correct one. There is no
convincing reason why if ail the other definitional
requirements of fraud are satisfied, the defence that
the accused merely intended to play a practical joke
shall succeed, unless of course the accused can prove,
subjectively, that he did not foresee any of the
consequences founded on by the prosecution.
There is no Scottish authority on this point,but certain
South African cases support the contrary view. In an
early South African forgery case where "intent to
defraud" was considered it was observed, obiter, that
a false document must be made with the intention of
influencing the conduct of the person to whom the
document was communicated but that a joke
perpetrated in this manner was not criminal if the
5
accused did not intend to induce anyone to act upon it.
This diet tan seems however to have proceeded on a




that extent, cannot be supported. The same
reasoning is to be found in a modern South
53
African forgery case, S. v. 'ell. where it was
held that the publication of a false newspaper
notice purely as a hoax without the accused's
contemplating that the victim would suffer
prejudice did not establish intent to defraud.
54
Miller J., however, argued that even where the
hoaxer1s intent extended from the deception to
the results themselves, in that he anticipated loss to
the victim, there would nevertheless not
necessarily be liability. This view is insupportable
because it confuses motive with intention. The so-
called motive to hoax denotes merely an ulterior, and
55
therefore irrelevant, intent. S. v. Harlow and
Another5^ is a theft case which was decided on a
motive theory. It was held that case not to be theft
from a company if the taking was done with intent to
benefit the company: but the judicial analogy in the
judgment in that case, with taking a poor man's jacket
57
for repair is palpably fallacious.
The analysis of such cases is no different from the
analysis of cases where, for example, the accused
obtains credit on a pretence of solvency for the
purpose of making profits with which to pay off his
58
debts. A fortiori. it is of no relevance whatever




for himself. In the Scottish case of James Wilkie
it was suggested that to establish liability the
misrepresentation must be made "with a view to obtain
a fraudulent advantage", but this purposive aspect
of the accused*s state of mind is surely irrelevant.
The question is simply his intent as to the
60
consequence not to himself but to his victim.
E. CLAIM OF RIGHT
The question of claim of right or entitlement
as a defence to a charge of fraud usually related to
the question of the result rather than to the
question of intent. If the accused deceives
some-one into giving him his own property back,
assuming for the moment that the property is
unencumbered by pledge or lien, or into paying him
money which is lawfully due to him, he may well be
said to have acted dishonestly in the method of
accomplishing his purpose. The question is
whether he has acted fraudulently. Since, as has
been argued, the fraudulent quality of the act is
a matter of law determined by reference to the
result, the relevance of the defence of claim of
right depends on whether the result is to be held to
involve prejudice to the victim. It seems sound in
principle that it is not prejudicial to the
complainer to be deceived into performing his legal
obligation, and that in the situation considered
/the
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the accused*s conduct while dishonest, is not
fraudulent. It has been so held by the Appellate
z: a
Division in South Africa in R. v. De Ruiter.
It is also sound in principle that a genuine belief
on the part of the accused that he has a right to the
property so obtained, even though the belief is
mistaken in fact or in law, should be a good defence.03
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Mens rea in Statutory offences of fraudulence
A. INTENT TO DEFRAUD
In a system of statutory offences such as English
law the concept of "intent to defraud" tends to be
interpreted with reference to the particular offence
rather than as a general mental state. For example, in
Starev v. Chilworth Gunpowder Co.the court were
concerned to interpret "intent to defraud" within the
2
meaning of the Merchandise Marks Act 1887 s.2 rather than
to consider it as a general mens rea in offences
involving misrepresentation. The meaning of the
3
phrase may vary in different statutory contexts.
A further difficulty in English law is the fact that
the phrases "intent to defraud" and "intent to deceive"
4
are used in different statutory contexts; and, in the
5
case of forgery, in different parts of the same Act,
which necessitates a distinction between the two. In
the making of this distinction, however, the problem
is not one of intent at all, although it is invariably
looked at in this way. The cases on the question and
the controversies surrounding them demonstrate that
where intent to defraud or deceive has been in issue
the real controversy has not been as the state of
mind of the accused so much as to the objective
consequence necessary for liability, and these difficulties
are in no way removed by the substitution of "dishonesty"
as the test of mens rea in the T&# t Act 1968.
/It
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It is necessary therefore in the context of English
law to deal with the question of intent under
reference to the objective aspect of the prejudice
or result.
B. THE RESULT ELEMENT
Intent to defraud in the English law was the
statutorily required mental element in the former
7
crime of obtaining by false pretences, and
therefore since the "obtaining" was the specific
statutory actus reus it was sufficient for liability
thnt the intent was related to that actus reus and
accordingly unnecessary and irrelevant to consider
whether the actus reus was prejudicial.
This important distinction was demonstrated in R. v.
0
Carpenter where the accused had induced members of the
public to deposit money with him by means of false
statements. The jury were directed that there was
an intent to defraud if the accused made statements
which he knew to be untrue for the purpose of
inducing people to deposit money, in the knowledge
that they would not deposit it but for their belief
in the truth of his statements; and if he intended to
use their money for purposes other than those for which
the depositors understood from his statements that he
intended to use it. The direction to the jury in that
case included the statement
/"You
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"You are not defrauding him of the money if you
eventually do repay it, but you are defrauding
the man because you are giving him something
altogether different from what he things he
is getting, and you are getting his money by
9
your false statements".
The direction in Carpenter was expressly approved by the
Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Kritz10 where the
appellant had obtained a sum of money from a bank against
uncleared cheques which he knew to be worthless. The
appeal was taken against a direction that an
intention on the accused*s part to repay the money was
immaterial. That direction was upheld.
The reason for this principle is clear. In each case
the crime of obtaining by false pretences was complete
as soon as the property was "obtained". The line of
authority on this question in England arose of course
from situations in which actual loss had occurred and
the English judges were not required to consider
situations where, for example, the deposit was duly
repaid or the investment yielded handsome dividends,
or where goods obtained on credit were paid for at the
due date mo as to earn for the seller a profit of the
transaction. But such cases are in theory
indistinguishable because in each the liability is
incurred as soon as the property is obtained and all
that follows is merely a subsequent and irrelevant
realisation of the accused*s optimism.
/Equally
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Equally, it was no defence to a charge of obtaining
by false pretences that the goods given were value
for the money paid, if the goods were not what the
12
victim was led to believe he was getting.
Section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968 provides that the
offence of obtaining by deception is committed by any
person
"who by deception dishonestly obtains property
belonging to another, with the intention of
permanently depriving the other of it".
This offence requires two elements in the mens rea. an
intention to deceive and an intention thereby to obtain
the property, which under this section means to obtain
either possession or control only or the full rights of
ownership.
It is submitted that exactly the same principles
g
as are set out in cases such as R. v. Carpenter must
apply to the latter aspect of the mens rea. so that as
Smith and Hogan observe,
" D may act dishonestly for the purposes of
deception although he does not obtain the property
with a view to gain, or notwithstanding that he
13
intends to pay for the property."
The statutory use of the idea of "dishonesty" in this
context may therefore be explained simply as a recognition
14
of the defence of claim of right.
/C.
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C. THE CONTRASTING FEATURES OF COMMON LAW LIABILITY
The contrast which the common law crime of
fraud presents in similar situation is in the
consideration that even when the actus of obtaining
is complete the court must still, to establish
liability for fraud, evaluate the actus as a question
of law from the point of view of prejudice. A statutory
15
liability for "obtaining", for example, arises from
the doing of a forbidden act, whereas the common law
liability for fraud arises from the doing of a
prejudicial act. The prejudical quality of the act
in common law fraud is assessed by the court, whereas
the prejudicial quality of the forbidden act under such
a statutory offence is a prior decision of the legislature.
P. THE PREJUDICE ELEMENT IN FORGERY
However, when the intent element in the Bnglish
crime of forgery is examined it is apparent that the
real problem is not purely the intent but rather the
element of prejudice in the consequences; and, in
forgery cases at least, the English courts have been
required to consider what types of consequence
constituted relevant prejudice and have done so in
similar manner to the Scottish and South African courts
in their analysis of fraud.
The earlier English common law, which struck at forgery
of public documents only, required that the forger
/intended
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intended to deceive. When the scope of the crime was
extended to cover forgery of private documents the
additional element of prejudice was required. This
was expressed in the form of a requirement of an
intent to defraud; but although prejudice was the
test of this intent there was doubt as to the proper
10
nature of the prejudice.
The commonest example was of course, economic loss; but
there were a number of controversial cases which lent
17
support for a wider test of prejudice.
An important statement of the law on this matter was
made by Buckley J. in a civil action in 1903 where the
distinction between fraud and deceit was in issue. In
X3
Re London & Globe Finance Corporation the distinction
was described by him as follows:
"To deceive is to induce a man to believe that
a thing is true which is false, and which the
person practising the deceit knows or believes
to be false. To defraud is to deprive by
deceit; it is by deceit to induce a man to act
to his injury. More tersely it may be put, that
to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of
mind; to defraud is by deceit to induce a
course of action".*9
The main support for the "economic loss" theory of
20
prejudice was academic rather than judicial. The
supporters of that theory relied heavily on a narrow
/construction
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construction of the foregoing dictum, since the cases
21
in which the dictum has been approved are not at one.
The problem fell to be decided by the House of Lords
22
in Welham v. P.P.P. in a case under s.4(l) of the
Forgery Act 1913 which required "intent to defraud".
The appellant had uttered false hire purchase
documents in respect of fictitious sales upon which
finance companies had advanced money to the company of
which he was manager. No one was any worse off
financially as a result of this arrangement. The
finance companies and the appellant's firm were in a
very real sense better off since they were able to
circumvent credit restriction regulations by this
arrangement. The appeal proceeded on the footing that
the appellant intended to deceive the authorities
enforcing the credit squeeze into believing that the
regulations were being observed. It is clear from the
decision upholding the conviction that the distinction
between deceit and fraud in English law is now that in
the former an erroneous belief alone is induced, whereas
in the latter the belief so induced is acted upon, but
not necessarily with economic effects. It was
therefore sufficient in Welhaa that there was an intent
that the actions of the authorities would be affected
to the extent that they would not institute proceedings
in respect of the transactions.
/Although
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Although mere acquisition of an erroneous belief is
not a sufficient consequence for fraud, there is an
obvious difference between an erroneous belief such as
23
that in R. v. Hodgson which is not acted upon in any
way, and that in Welhara which causes inaction; because
in the latter case the complainant is influenced in his
resulting course of conduct. Welhaw decides that the
action or inaction need not be of an economic type and
there is accordingly intent to defraud on the part of
someone who forges a prescription in order to obtain
drugs even though he intends to pay, and on the part of
someone who forges a testimonial in order to gain an
24
honorary position such as that of J.P. It is therefore
clear that Welham has routed the economic loss theory of
prejudice in regard to forgery, but it leaves the
difficulty that "instances of deceiving that are not
25
also instances of defrauding must be rare". A
further objection is that it is "hard to understand...
why it should have appeared necessary to make criminal
the faking of a public document with intent only to
deceive".26 The strongest objection is perhaps the
insignificance of instances of deceit which are not
also instances of defrauding because such instances
will almost certainly come within the de minimis principle.
The effect of Welham is probably to interpret intent
to deceive out of existence. The Court were concerned
to find an independent meaning for "deceit" and
23
Hodgson provided such a meaning. But since, as
27
Lord Radcliffe pointed out, some of the more
fanciful non-economic results comes within the de
/minimis principle
- 109-
minimis principle, a fortiori so do all cases of
deceit, since no result whatever occurs.
E. THE PREJUDICE ELEMENT IN "OBTAINING" OFFENCES
The decision in Welhaat was of significance in
relation to false pretences since it impliedly
23
affirmed the case of Potter in which the accused were
charged with obtaining a driving licence by false
pretences, one having impersonated the other at a
driving test. It was held in Potter that intent to
defraud existed if the accused intended thereby to
induce the licensing authority to issue the license
document itself, or alternatively to take a course of
action which they would not otherwise have taken,
namely issue a licence, and which it was their duty not
to take had they known the true facts. The two grounds
of this decision are fundamentally different. On the
8
interpretation of intent laid down in Carpenter and in
Kritz10 it ought surely have been sufficient that the
licence itself was "obtained". Reference in that case
29
Kassey. a forgery case, obscured the point that
the liability for false pretences arose simply from
the performance of the forbidden act of obtaining a
valuable thing with an intent related to that obtaining,
whereas the liability for forgery contained the
additional requirement of prejudice in the consequence.
The second ground of decision in Potter was thus
/appropriate
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appropriate to forgery but not to false pretences.
This latent difficulty in Potter became apparent in the
30
decision in R. v. Wright where the appellant obtained
money from the Post Office on behalf of another on
producing a written authority duly signed by the latter
but not witnessed. The appellant was proved to have
forged the witness* signature himself. On the charge of
obtaining the money by false pretences, the jury were
directed to convict if they found that the accused by
writing the false signature induced the Post Office
assistant to pay him the money and that she would not
have done so if she had known that the authority had not
been validly witnessed. This, on the basis of
Carpenter and Krita. was surely an unexcipiable direction
in law. The Court of Criminal Appeal, however, quashed
the conviction on the ground that what happened to the
money later was relevant to the question whether the
accused was acting dishonestly. The case is only
briefly reported but it implied a considerable
modification of the concept of intent in false
pretences. However, even if in view of Potter and
certain dicta in Welham the interpretation of intent
to defraud is the same in "obtaining" offences and in
forgery, the case is difficult to reconcile with




The most serious objection to the decision is that
the gravamen of false pretences was the harm to the
person from whom the property was obtained. The
question in Wri^it was not whether the accused harmed
the pnyee of the money, but whether he harmed the
Post Office. The relevant consideration, therefore,
was not his honesty in relation to the payee but his
honesty in relation to the Post Office. It is submitted
that the view of the Court of Criminal Appeal in that
case was based on an insupportable motive theory, and
that under s,15(l) of the 1968 Act a conviction on the
same facts would be warranted on the basis of the
conception of dishonesty suggested in Section 2 of the
Act.
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C H A P T E R VII
The result element in fraud
in nineteenth century Heots law
A. PRACTICAL CHE'TING
The theoretical problems associated with the result
element in the modern Scots law of fraud seem to have
originated in I'acdonald's denomination of a category of
practical cheating in which, he alleged, a result was
unnecessary.
In modern Scots law Gordon has recognised and adopted a
similar category of fraud.^ In Gordon's discussion,
"practical cheating" is distinguished frcm "simple fraud"
because in practical cheating "It is not necessary that
(the pretence) should have brought about any result, it is
2
enough th t it should have been made". This proposition is,
on the face of it, surprising, since it suggeststhat in fraud
different legal consequences follow from the manner in which
the pretence is effected, and that where a particular method
of pretence is adopted, fraud ceases to be a result crime.
According to Gordon, "the important feature of practical
cheating is that is involves the passing off of an article
or writing which itself pretends to be other than it is".
f;he examples show, however, that in regard to liability for
fraud this view cannot be supported.
he/..
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The type case cf practical cheating, according to Gordon is the
uttering of false documents; hut uttering, as has been
4
emphasised, is a separate crime and Gordon recognises thi3.
Since it is distinct from fraud, its inclusion in the
discussion of fraud inevitably confuses the proper interpre¬
tation of the crime. Uttering is a separate crime distinguished
precisely because a result is unnecessary.
The second type of practical cheating to which Gordon refers
5
is that of 'tittering false articles as genuine" either by
tendering them as authentic or by tendering them as being
other than they are. The example given by Gordon of tendering
as authentic is that of faking a work of art. It should be
emphasised here that Gordon's view implies two propositions -
that in practical cheating a result element is unnecessary
and that in practical cheating the liability is for fraud.
There is no authority for the view that tendering false
articles, such as art fakes, as authentic is fraud. Obtaining
money by this method certainly is. it may well be that simply
to tender them as authentic is criminal, although this has
never been established; but if it is, the liability would he
better founded on a logical extension of the crime of uttering,
or on the basis of attempted fraud, rather than by doing
violence to the principles of fraud by holding a result to he
unnecessary where the pretence instead of being verbal assumes
a practical form.
Gordon next considers as practical cheating, and therefore as
completed,/...
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completed fraud, the tendering of articles as being other than
they are, and this view is open to the same criticism. The
sole authority supporting it i3 Bannatyne^ and there is strong
authority against it. Tn Bannatype a spurious mixture of grain
was delivered in purported fulfilment of a contract for the
supply of oatmeal. It was held that there was liability for
fraud even though the grain was neither used nor paid for.
The ca. e must however be interpreted in i's historical context.
It was decided at a time when attempted fraud w»3 not yet
criminal and when accordingly an extended concept of prejudice
was invoked to establish liability for the completed crime.
Both sides started from the assumption that a result was
necessary for liability, even one which did not entail actual
less. The sole question in the case was whether or not only
an attempt had occurred, and nothing in the case suggests that
the practical natu e of the pretence was material to liability
or constituted any ground of distinction. Indeed the later
7
cases in which the ratio of Bannatvne was adopted involved
only verbal pretences; and of course when attempted fraud
became criminal in 1887" that ratio ceased to apply. Since the
law laid down in Banna tvne was directed to the problem of the
result, and not the method, the case must be considered an
obsolete authority and it is certainly superseded by the later
Q
cases.Gordon suggests that "Bannatyne itself could today be
charged as attempted fraud, but the decision is concerned with
a completed crime and would apply where there was no attempted
fraud",^<J but it is difficult to envisage a situation in which
if/...
- 117 -
if a spurious article is deliberately tendered as authentic
there is no attempted fraud, except of course where there was
no relevant intent and therefore no liability either for the
completed crime or for an attempt.
tacdonald's view, which forms the basis of Gordon's view, is
that the actus reus of practical cheating occurs "where an
11
article is made over to others as being that which it is not".
T is however misrepresents the decision in Bannatyne. The case
did not establish that there w-s a special liability, not requir¬
ing any result, where the pretence was in practical form. It
simply established that the supply of the spurious article wa3
in itself a sufficient result. It did not suggest that where
the pretence wa3 verbal any further result was necessary, and
12
Hood v. Young proved that this was not so.
These criticisms of the supposed category of practical cheating
13
are supported by Kacdonald's other example of it, Baton. which
on its bizarre facts certainly involved practical rather than
verbal misrepresentation. In that case the oanel entered cattle
in a competition after inflating their skins and fixing false
horns to them. If there is any substance in the "practical
cheating" theory it would have been sufficient for liability
14
for fraud, as liacdonald sug ested it was, that the cattle
were entered for the competition; but, as the report shows,
the question in the case was whether the awarding of the prizes
was a sufficient result or whether payment of them was necessary.
B./..•
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THE 0PPE REFCRR 1887
V/hen one considers the development of the concept of prejudice
in the nineteenth century Scottish cases, it is important to
bear in mind that before the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act
15
1887 there was no liability for attempted fraud. In fraud
cases before 1087 the facts of which would in modern theory
be considered as attempts, there was a strong desire apparent
on the part of the judges to impose liability. Restricted as
16
they were by the exclusion from liability of attempted fraud,
the "cottish judges devised a liability for the completed crime
by an extended interpretation of the concept of prejudice.
Cases whic ; demonstrate this concern fraudulent schemes which
failed, and in these the idea of prejudice was extended to
cover situations of only potential loss to the victim. As
the cases show, before the 1887 ct the theory of fraud had so
interacted with the theory of attempt that every extension of
the concept of rejudice was made at the expense of the proper
concept of an attempt; with the result that conduct was held
to amount tb an attempt to commit fraud, and therefore not to
be criminal, only in the limited case where it had failed to
17
deceive the intended victim at all. A similar process gave
rise to offences such a3 housebreaking with intent to steal,
there being no liability for attempted theft.
18
In 1 acint.vre where an insolvent concealed certain assets and
the charge of "fraud" failed to allege that the 3che-e was
effective or that anyone was injured th%:eby, it was held that
success/...
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success was unnecess ry: "Everything was done by the panel
19
which was necessary to constitute guilt on his part". There
20
were further indications of this view in ipaen. notably in
the statement of Lord loncreiff that "all the overt acts set
forth are said to have been committed with a criminal intent,
21
and for an unlawful design. This, in my opinion, is enough".
3y the middle of the nineteenth century therefore the crime
of fraud in the typical case consisted of little more than
the making of a successful deception with a fraudulent intent.
22
In .'annatyne where the accused had supplied a spurious
mixture of grain on an order for oatmeal, the prejudice
23
alleged was that he "did impose upon and did cheat and defraud"
the buyers. It was contended on behalf of the accused that the
facts alleged amounted only to an attempt. The grain had neither
beei paid for nor consumed. The indictment made no allegation
that the panel had profited, or that the buyer had sustained
loss. The Court concluded however that "The article was thus
furnished; and that is enough to complete the crime charged ..
24
and it was laid down that the buyers were defrauded
merely by being supplied with the spurious article, whatever
its value.^
The development of this view significantly contributed to
by the failure of the Crown and the Court to appreciate the
distinction between falsehood and fraud, particularly in
respect of the result element and once that distinction was




for fraud upon potential prejudice only. Taylor. which has
been already referred to, is the most notorious example of
this where of course the appropriate charge was forgery and
where, so far as fraud was concerned, there was at most an
27
attempt. However, there being no liability at that time
for attempted fraud, the Court took an extended view of the
result. One judge held that the crime of fraud was
committed as soon as the victim posted the money in reply to
the letter, whether or not the panel obtained it. This was
correct enough from the point of view of fraud, but the
majority, presumably with falsehoo by writ in mind, thought
that the crime of fraud was complete as soon as the accused
sent off the original letter, just as in Bannatyne liability
had been incurred at the time of supply. Similarly, in
12
Hood v. Younrr where the accused arranged an auction of two
unsound horses about which they made various misrepresentations,
it was held to be sufficient for liability for fraud that the
horses were knocked down to their purchasers, even though
the price was not paid and the purchasers' obligation to pay
involved at the most a potential loss.
The extent to which the definition of the crime had before
the 1887 Act encroached on conduct which was in substance
28
an attempt is further illustrated by Eaton.where the panel
cheated in a competition and in conse uence was awarded prizes.
It was not alleged that the prizes had been given to him and it
was assumed in the debate that they had not. It was contended
on behalf of the panel that a mere attempt wan charged in 'hat
the/...
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the deceit had been detected before payment of tho prizes to
hin could be made. Lord ..rdmillan observed: "It will be
a uestion of fact on the merits, whether, fter the ruud.
any repentence on the part of the prisoner prevented his
obtaining he prize. But should his purpose be frustrated
by early discovery after lie has corr,itl:::1 the fraud, and
-■■ucceeded in the deception, and done all in his own power to
accomplish his object, it were contrary to all justice that
29
he should escape". It is noteworthy how closely this state-
30
r'ent resembles the language of Hume in his discussion of
attempts. Lord Heaves, however, grasped the true point in
this case which was not the question cf how much of the
scheme the panel had achieved, but the question whether there
had occurred a practical consequence sufficient to constitute
liability for fraud. In Lord eaves'view there would have
been an attempt in this case only if no-one had been deceived.
He considered that a successful deception leading to a
■otential loss was a sufficient consequence to infer prejudice,
31
provided the loss was of a patrimonial nature.
C. "HK CA::;: L7? AFTER 1837
fter tho 1887 Act when a verdict of, 'pter alia, attempted
fraud ecane competent, the consi orations behind the earlier
decisions on the result element no longer applied. Nevertheless
the earlier decision- continued to be accepted and applied quite
uncritically by the Acottis; judges without their realising that
these earlier decisions were incompatible with a developing
theory/...
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theory of prejudice in which loos to the victim vas not essential.
It is important to emphasise that what may conveniently be called
the 'attempt cases" of the pre-1 G37 period concern the situ-tion
where the victim had not aid anything to the accused but lord
merely incurred a liability t pay. There followed a separate
tr . st of decisions in cases in which payment had been made,
but the victim had got value for mcney. This was an entirely
sep. be problem, but wing tc an imperfect understanding of
the " ttempt coses" the High C urt on t le st two occasions
decided that since in the latter the victims liability to pay
h d b en held sufficient result f r fraud, __ fortiori there
32
was liability for fr ud were payment was actually made.
Dj, T! T' C ' ~;JU ".ID I" TI: T ?■ fr,?.
If the consider tions affecting the pre-1087 decisions had been
properly understood, it is possible that "he Court in these
1 ter cases would have demand'd an allegation of loss tc the
victim as essential to the relevancy, since without such an
allegation it would have been t le t arguable that to receive
value for money could not in pecuniary terms infer less.
"fowever, because of the casual adoption of earlier authorities,
a rother wider conception of ojudice resulted in which
o r,r ble ecuni.iry loss woo not n essential nd a theory
deve o ed in which he basis of rejudice the alteration




This theory, which originated in "hod v. Young, .as further
'3
develo ed in the case of .Y. J 'th which, 1though it can
be criticised on relevancy, contained important and in so e
respects novel statements of the principles of fraud.
The case established that there was prejudice to the victim
even where, as a result of the deception, he acquired an asset
orth the price he paid for it, and therefore that loss wan
34
not essential to prejudice. It was sufficient that the victim
changed his position, in the economic sense, in reliance on the
truth of the representation and would not have done so but for
the deception. Such a change occurred in i. !. 'faith simply
in the victims' investing money in faked historical documents.
It follows from this view that it would be no defence that the
victim acquired an asset worth more than the price paid because,
if loss in not essential to prejudice, neither can .gain be
relevant to it.
35
In Turnbull v. Stuart the complaint alleged that the accused's
misrepresent.' tions bout horses which he submitted for auction
were made with the intention of inducing competition and obtaining
higher rices for t era, the circumstances misrepresented being
such as to give the horse3 a greater value in the eyes of bidders
than they would otherwise have had. The prejudice alleged was
that the successful bidders bought the horses at prices, which,
hut for the false descriptions, they would never have paid,
he defence contended that the complaint failed to alle ;e that
'he/...
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the ho ses wereworth less than the prices paid for them and that
'herefore it could not he said that the buyers hud sustained
loss. On the basis of .0. . ith however, which the Court
followed, the purchasers had altered their position with
pecuniary effect.
35
In Turnbul1 v. f-tuart the Court also followed the earlier
12
case of hood v. Youqg but for no good reason. Hood v.
22
icung. like Banna tvie. was properly an attempt case where the
accused had not received payment at all from the victims of the
deception. It was therefore materially distinguishable from
Jurnbull. where payment had been made. It is interesting to
notice that in the later case of J. & ; . Coots : td. v. Hrcwn.^
on facts similar to those in Turnbull. the case of Bannatyne
formed an equally inappropriate basis of decision.
In J. P. Coats Ltd. v. Brr wr. it ./as alleged that the
respondent, having contracted with the complainers to supply
coal of a certain type, had knowingly supplied coal of a
different type and taken payment at the contract price,
thereby defrauding the complainers. The outstan ing feature
of the case, so far as relevancy is concerned, is that the
Bill for Criminal Letters did not allege that the coal supplied
was of a cheaper or inferior type. The Bill made no reference
at all to the value of the coal supplied or of the extent to
which the complainers were defrauded, and in the opinions of
the judges upon relevancy such references were obviously
thought to be unnecessary. The basis of liability was the
earlier/...
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e rlier pre-1887 idea that something had been sup lied other
than that contracted for. The significance cf the case was
that in adopting Bannatvne the Court confirmed by implication
the view th t actual loss was not essential to prejudice.
This was however a separate q ection from that in Bannatyne.
whatever the Court may have thought, because J. .1-. I. Coats fd.
v* ' r :;n concerned a situation where the intended consequences
were achieved without the victims being any worse off in
pecuniary terms. 1 seem.3 clear from the judge ents that,
regardless of the value of the goods supplied, prejudice to
the complainsrs existed because, as in 'i'urnbull. the deception
induced the buyers to do something which but for the deception
they would not have done at all. This principle was re-
37
affirmed in li.. . .dv. v. ichards ..'here on a charge of fraudulently
inducing the sale of a house, it was implicit in the charge, and
conceded at the trial, that the sellers were paid full value.
The wider implications of this theory of prejudice are
70
de onstrated in hodger -where the prejudice alleged was that
the seller of the goods had been deceived into believing th t
the accused was a person of good credit and thus to accept
against delivery long-dated bills which, it was alleged, the
accused had no intention of honouring. At the time of the
trial, however, the hills had not yet fallen due. The defence
argued that it could not yet be said that the ccmplainer had
sustained any loss. The Court however held that the prejudicial
consequence had already been sustained in that the deception
had induced the granting of any credit at all. Simply to have
been/...
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been induced to accept a person such as the accused as his
debtor was, from the complniner's point of view, a worsening
of his economic position ever thou, his loss had not yet
, 39
crystallised. imilarly in cleod v. nctavish where the
accused induced his employer to pay over a sum retained in
security of a debt owed to him by the accused, there was
liability for fraud even though the employer's claim against
the accused was not yet enforceable.
urnbull v. tuart was significant in that it contained the
first intimation by the Court of dissatisfaction with the theory
of rejudice which had by then developed. Although the judges
in that case felt the selves bound by previous decisions,
particularly '.f. ' it" . it is apparent that they would have
preferred a different view had they considered the question
to be open.
40
In Tarsall v. rmtice in 1910 this theory was for the first
time definitely departed from. The prejudice alleged was that
the victim was induced to bny a rug "ii excess of its proper
value". Both Lord \rdwall and 7,0-d Salvesen considered it
• defect in the complaint that it was not alleged that the
price hal been paid. This clestly discredited the pre-1887
cases on the question. Both judges appear to have considered
that for the buyer to be induced to enter into a contract
of sale was not a sufficient conse; ence to infer prejudice,
sirce without payment being made it could not be s id that




any injury. 4X1 three judges took the natter further, however,
by requiring allegations of the true value of the rug and of the
price actually paid. This requirement, which conflicted with
the previous view in Turnbull v. tv. rt and J. "h "oats T td.
v. Brown, was justified on the unconvincing ground that in
Tan-sell v. Jlrentice the pretence did not relate to the article
sold. This ought not to have been a relevant consideration
and the cases cannot satisfactorily be distinguished on this
ground. However, albeit unconvincingly, the earlier theory
was thereby -eparted from and this departure was later
confirmed in an obiter diet ..n of ord shr.ore in t thorn v.
The effect therefore of the last three cases mentioned was
to place considerable doubt on the prior theory of prejudice,
without however clearly indicating in what respects it was to
be modified. The reason again is probably that the judges
failed to recognise that the pre-1887 cases were determined
by considerations which no longer applied.
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CHAP T E R VII I
The development of the modern theory
of the result elenent in Scots lair
A. APCOCK V. ARCHIBALD
It is futile to conjecture what theory of prejudice remained
in "cot3 law after ktrathern v. Togal.1 but obviously the concept
of prejudice was more restricted than it had been before. On the
next reported occasion on which the matter was discussed however,
2
the case of Adcock v. Archibald
, a completely new approach was
talien which greatly extended the ambit of the crime and dictated
the modern development of a theory of prejudice which admitted
consequences which were not of an economic nature.
When Adcock v. rchibald is considered it is essential to
distinguish what was alleged from what via3 proved. The appellant
who was a miner had removed the identifying pin from a hutch of
coal worked by another miner and substituted his own in order to
be credited with having worked the coal himself. The complaint
alleged that in consequence of this he induced the employers to
pay him, instead of the other miner, at the end of the week for
working the coal. The complaint was plainly relevant. It was
established in evidence, however, that both the miners were
employed on a minimum wage system with a bonus payable for hutches
worked in excess of a certain number. In the week concerned
neither miner exceeded the minimum. Both wore paid the guaranteed
wage and the colliers lost nothing as a result of Adcock's deceit.
The/...
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The complaint was thorefore not roved. The only consequence
of Adcoc *y pretence was that the employers made a ledger 'entry
crediting hia with having worked the coal and failed to sake an
entry crediting the oth< r minor with having worked it. There
was therefore during the remainder of the week a possibility of
loss to the other miner or to the employers which, aa a result
of the final output of the two miners, did not materialise. It
being obvious that Adoock had not done what he was charged with
doing, that should have been the end of the matter. The
conviction -under the complaint should have been for attempted
fraud, Tevcrtholer,s, the igh Court sustained the conviction
of fraud or. tlx round th.it the accused hid induced the
employers to crcit him and not the other miner with having
worked the coal. s Gordon obaerves " 'he accused i/as in effect
convicted of : crime with which he was ot charged - he was
charged wit inducing the employers to pay hia 1s. 3-Vd on
January 23 and convicted in effect of inducing then to make a
"X
book entry sometime between January 16 and 23". The value of
Adcock as an authority must be considered in the light of this.
The statements of the Court in acock suggest an entirely new
theory of prejudice. Lord Justice-General Clyde stated as a
general principle that in fraud " ny dofi: ite practical result
achieved by the fraud is enough".'' This w.v: a startling
•ropositior.. -.-eviou: case law su • -est - that roof of loss was
re mired but the Court in Adooch reverted to the obsolete
nineteenth century principle upon which the definition of the
cri :.e intr w: the principles of attempt and or which the
occurrence ..,
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occurrence of actual loss was not essential# Lord Clyde's dictum
suggests the wide rule that the occurrence of any definite
practical result in nor so prejudicial • hether or not it infers
loss. Purthe ore, there is no liedtat ion suggested as to the
nature of the result: it my include conoiic benefit, mid -ould
certainl - exhuc clain of right aa a defe?ice. ' uch a faiw
reaching rule deserved a sound basis in previous decisions or else
a fully argued r sort to principle but no authority was cited in
either of t o jucL'-enenta and no argw sent was advanced in
justifies!! of the rule. The proposition put forward by the
Court was not so self-evident as to be dealt with in this way.
The definite r ctieal result in the case was held to be that the
employers erroneously credited the accused with work done and
failed to credit the other air.cr with that v rk or, as Lord unter
put it, "They were induced to do something thoy would not othesv
5
id.se have done". hen one considers that the employers would in
any event have made a ledger entry relating to the hutch the
practical result was at the aoot the asking of a wrong but
ultimately i:._ ...terial ledger entry, sun ly one of the nest
insignificant result ever relied upon in support of a conviction,
ne :*ay -n der L -.t view the Court would luivo taken if the hutch
pins had crel, been set aside until the : amors' final output
for the woo. a..- determined, or if AdcocL had .nnde the relative
book entry ir : elf.
It would h. vo b on ore in keeping with the nineteenth century
cases to . v- rolled on the economic significance of the wrong
entry/...
- 135 -
entry rather than on the physical making of it and thus to have
posited liability on the potential loss to the employers or to
the other minor or to both; but this point was not taken.
There must, however, be many cases of unsuccessful attempts to
obtain money where the intended victim's actions are at least
affected in some "definite practical" way. For example, where
the intended victim investigates the truth of the accused's
statements before refusing to pay. Indeed the earlier case of
H.A. Adv. v. O'anerons.^ where the accused were convicted of an
attempt to defraud insurers by the means of a mock robbery,
would come within the scope of the rule in Adcock v. Archibald.
In Camerons the accused reported the robbery to their broker
who intimated the loss to the insurers. The insurers wrote
a letter to the accused requesting them to submit a formal
claim. There was considerable doubt in that ca e whether on
7
these facts there was even liability for an attempt,, yet it
could now be argued that the writing and pasting of the letter
by the insureg would be as definite a practical result as the
making of the ledger entry was in Adcock.
The High Coui*t had the opportunity to apply the ratio of Adcock
in Kerr v. kill' but declined to do so. The appellant in that
case had been convicted of making a false report of a road
accident to the police. Although no-one had been accused of
a crime as a result, the police had been put to some trouble and
various people had come under suspicion. The Crown cited Adcock
in argument in support of the conviction but the judges did not
mention/.•.
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mention the ca.;e in their decision and do not a pear to have
considered that the a pellant was liable for fraud.
No-one familiar with case law which preceded dcock can be
satisfied with the Court's perfunctory treatment of the case and
q
its suiierfici.nl consideration of the relevant law. The sole
question should hive teen whether or not there was to be an
acquittal or a conviction for attempted fraud. In these cir¬
cumstances the dicta on the wider uention of the prejudice
element in fraud ought not to have bee'- necessary; and on that
question the law is as a result in a thoroughly unsatisfactory
state.
It hn3 to be recognised, however, that until the case is re¬
considered by a lar or Court, it will continue to provide a
useful basis for indictraente in cases of deceptions which have
caused no loss to be sustained but «here rhe Crown consider a
pr secution to be desirable. This is certainly suggested by
two recent cases discussed later in this chapter. Before these
are examined,however, it is useful to survey the views on the
nature of fruudulence which preceded dcock and the cdem
c ntroversy which surround:; it.
b. T?r- c- nc: xc !.t;h cct;:!V.-sgy
Fraud has aim ya been classified in the textbooks as an
offence arqainst property, -aid before acdomld all the writers
considered that the relevant result i fraud was of an economic
character. Hume refers to the result as being the obtaining of
"Hoods/...
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"Co< In or • oney, or other vnlu\.bl< Ju'r;, to the offender's
profit",a definition Mch in obviously based rn the Polish
ct of *757.^' Burnett^and Alison'"' speak of the result in
terse of derrfeifig .-mother of Ms [property. "The oldor writers
who preserved the civilian ter~ ntelli;nate all analyse! the
14 15
resv.lt in economic tor s. in itherir. ton. ord Justice-
General n 'lio inferred to the Unit as the obtainir >• of "goods,
roney, or sore other value or ndvunt: o" to the profit of the
accused vnd the -0 -responding injury of the vict'n.
it' t o go- in - exceptions, the n neteenih century o--.se law
sur-ortn this view. The decision of the High Court in deed•
v. 'rchi''li. however, ut the matter in sen® doub-. The case
involved o-ly a qu otion of economic loo ut the diet ..
p--.rticule.rly th t of Lord J' nti co-General Gly-'e that " ny
definite ractleel result .... is en:n: -Ji"''' sug-^stc/l '
considerably wiler conce tion of the nature of the elev int
result.
"V; -scvie rer- -It.- rn the nlnct-'--n th cent - -• "e.c:
There fall to 'e considered two special nineteenth century cases
in which a renult of a non-economic type was discussed in the
context of fr d. Pert these e-se - be tor ®.- silv identified
*th the air: lino of development of 'he crime it should '«
emphasised that in each the cV r~n was not in the torn: usually
ad ted in fr d cases t th t ti o, 0 "a t there in even scno




The first case was Rae & ittie where the accused were
indicted for conspiracy to defeat or obstruct the administration
of justice, as also "Fraud, particularly the wickedly,
fraudulently and feloniously personating, or causing or procuring
any party to personate another before a Court of Justice with in¬
tent to defeat or obstruct the administration of justice". The
words of the indictment demonstrate the unusual nature of the
jjrejudice alleged: "and in consequence of the said false and
fraudulent personation .... the said Court was deceived or
imposed upon, and was induced to proceed in the said trial on the
understanding, and in the belief, that the said Rae was per¬
sonally present at the bar; and further, in consequence thereof,
or partly in consequence thereof, the said prosecutor was unable
to establish the charge". The prejudice alleged in the second
charge was not of an economic type: it was the infringement of
the interest of the Crown in a pr' perly conducted prosecution,
and in this respect the case was the origin of the later doctrine
of offences against the administration of justice. It is
difficult to see in what sense the court or prosecutor could be
said to have been defrauded or of what they were defrauded. No
objection was taken to the relevancy of this charge and the
question was not discussed by the Court.
The second case is illia.-- Fraser^, on which Gordon relies
strongly for his theory that the result element in fraud is not
confi ned to an economic type. As Gordon puts the matter,
"Fraud is not restricted in Scots Law to fraudulent appropriation,
-•or is any distinction made between fraudulent appropriation and
other forms of fraud. The: civilian principle that any form of
prejudice/.,.
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prejudice caused by fraud is relevant has remained in the back¬
ground, oo to speak, ready for use when the occasion arose",1'
'his of course does not sate the civilian osition accurately"
and it nay be ou©nested that lllian Fraser is not, as Gordon
sweats, 'in example of the extended form of fraud in cots Law
to which ho refers.
The allegation in William .aor was that the panel had inter¬
course with a married woman by pretending to her that he was her
husband. The Crown brought three charges - rape, assault with
intent to ravish, and thirdly "fra dulently and deceitfully
obtaining access to and having carnal knowledge of a mar-ied
woman, by pretending to be her husband, OB otherwise cond cting
himself, and beh ving towards her so am to deceive her int the
belief that he was her husband". It i3 submitted thut the third
charge was not a charge of fraud at all.
The real issue in the case w s whether force was a necessary
ele ent in rape or whether the consert of the woman was
fundamentally vitiated by 'he pretence which. i~ disced it. bevon
Judges considered the natter d d cided by a majority of four
to three hat the first two charges were irrelevant.
The relevancy of the third charge was accordln ly not considered
by the minority Judges. The majority, however, were anxious that
such conduct although not •mounting to rape should not altogether
esc c lin ility but their analysis of the third charge was not
clear. ord Coc burn, it is true, said Fraud, however, is
an uestiomibly/...
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unquestionably a crine, and, therefore, I a of opinion that the
pi pp
third charge .... is relev nt'!. ord edwyn on the other
23
ban and possibly > lso Lord Justice-General Boyle considered
that the third charge libelled an innominate offence. Lord ood,
r ther inconclusively, concurred in the opinions of Lord Cockburn
and Lord Kedwyn.2
It is ar uable therefore that Gordon's view of this case is
sup orted by only one judge cf the Court. The primary question
in the case was whether the conduct -.lie ed constituted rape;
and two considerations dominated the discussion - the nxiety
of the majority not to extend the scope of rape, then still
a capital off<nee, and the obvious determination of all the
judges that the panel should not escape punishment.
The third charge in "illiam Frrtscr was not in the style then in
25
use for fraud and it seers to have been intended to set out an
innominate offence against the person. Although a false pretence
was alleged, the gravamen of the offence was the sexual violation
of the victim, and the throe charges were ciu-de -eneris in a
descending sequence of gravity. Certainly '"acdonald did not
consider the offence as fraud. He cited the case as an example
26
of the crime of clandestine injury to 'women, ~ and also as an
illustration of the use of the declaratory power of the High
27
Court. Parliament'3 attitude was later made clear when the
28
srecier, facti was statutorily declared to constitute rape.'"
Offences against the adainistr tion of justice:
■t/,..
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t about the aa;>e tl e as 111-- ?. o-'T. however, an tte pt
29
was ado by the Crown in the case of Elio; illar. to ex end
the scope of fraud to cases involving the perversion cf the
c.urse of justice. This was a bolder stop than had been taken
in "lae tittle because whereas in .c . kittle the charge had
been libelled simply 3 "fraud , in ' liot illar the Crown
assimilated the case to the orthodox fraudulent appro riation
case in charging "falsehood, fraud and wilful inpesition". It
was alleged that the panel had falsely accused his wife of a
c ire for the urpose cf perverting the administration of
public justice nd with the ntention cf subjecting her to
accusation and unishrent, and of injuring her feelings, and
reputation or liberty. The consequences fo nded on were the
investigation of the accusations by the authorities and the
VQ
a; prehension and committal of the panel*s wife."'
This case was tried on circuit before a single judge who upheld
the rslevancy of the charge, without however giving an opinion;
and its value as an authority is therefore slight.
he Crown a e red to have been co acinus of he novelty of the
fraud charge because it v s supported by an innominate charge,
"he wilf\l''y, wicV.odl", nr. . felorlouol", needing an innocent
person tc the public prcaecut. r or ether officer of the law, as
beinp guilty of a heinous c ine, for the purpose of preventing
the administration of public jurtice, and injuring the person
accused in feelings and reputation or liberty, the accuser well




This case was a further intimation of tho later doctrine of
offences against the administr tion of ustico. acdonald
cited the ce.se as an illustration of tho crime of "false
31
accusation as well ■ s of fraud. If the fraud liability had
been clear the in ominnte charge would have been unnecessary.
lthou -h one judge at least wan satisfied that the result
ele ent in cases like -iliot illar was relevant to fraud, that
32
view was short-livod. Tn . ; it-j, nllncher or -'oyle. on
33
similar facts, only the innor.inr-te crime was charged and no
reference w a made to fraud.
34
Tho decision of the High Court in err v. iill" completed the
evolution of this innominate of once and the eclipse of the
fraud theory, Tn that case a false report of a road accident
was made to the police although no-one was specifically accused
of havin committed a crime and no-one was charged. In view of
the obiter d eta in dcock v. rchiMld it was open to the Court
to hold, aa the Crown argued it should, that the facts
constituted fraud since "a definite practical result" had been
caused in the investigation of the natter by the olice. It
is clear however from the opinions expressed by the Court that
the facts were considered solely in the context of an ofx"ence
against tho administration of justice, as a development of the
3b
crime of "false accusation" first disclosed in .Hot illar. "
The,/...
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The proper 3ign:'fic .nee of thes-... cases i-" that they concerted
undeveloped areas of the crin:: • al 1 w. In '.'ltot illar. and in
■iae ■■ „lttle if that in ansume.I to have been a case of fraud,
the acre sophisticated doctrine of offences against the admin-
iatr&ticn of justice had yet to be developed. Instead cf
locking to the result element in the accused's conduct as
deter ining its legal classification, as . ts later done in this
36
category of cases,' the Gro n loch i to the method used J3
providing a convenient ,cint of identification with an already
recognised crime. n lut-.r devel p e ', of course, when the
result element was recognise I tc determine the protected
.interest, and therefore the classification of the conduct, the
37
question of liability for fraud did not rise.
Irxlarly, lord Cock" urn's view ir. ill! 'moor, which also
involved argument ."ror the method instead of froa the result,
was in due course superseded, in this case by statute, so th. t
the result element thereafter detorined the legal classification
of that p -rticul..r gracing Ihcti.
The -ro'ectod inti-ivat In fraud.
The contrary view which the difficult nineteenth century canes
and certainly the obi tor "ic ir i.. . icoch v. rch.ib.uld see to
suggest leads to a rather strange cc clusio w ich say be
illustrated by the case where the victi is induced by deception
38
t sustain a fatal Injury. :c don, who supports the wider




esse, the charge is not "r?jud bet mrder. ' t seer,3 t< follow
however frcn the wider view that there i3 also liabili ty for
fraud, either because there ia a definite practie 1 result as
required in Adcock. or because it "injures and violates ihe
rights"^' of the victim. But just 3 murder can be committed
by means of deception so too can extortion, theft, assault,
obstructing the course of justice and innumerable st- tutory
crimes. The point cf distinction between all of these crimes
where deception is the method used, BUss in the result? and
simil rly the noint of distinction between fraud and each of
these crimes uat also lie in the result. To argue tht in
each of these cases there is a concurrent liability for fraud
ia a strente and unsatisfactory conclusion. The bulk of the
0 se low establishes ^ that freud is a result crine although,
as Cordon recognise , it is e so tial in fraud that a particular
werhod, n ely deception, be aed to nch eve that result. If
fraud were not a result crine then the telling of a lie, or at
any rate the successful telling of one, would be criminal,
42
w: ich ' certainly not the law. It follows that fraud being a
result crime is distinguishable fro; other result crimes, in part
at le at, in respect of that result, and not in respect of its
method of commission. This is so even of cognate crimes ouch an
murder in assault. fortiori it should be so of disparate
crimes ouch as robbery and rape. Tt has never been suggested
that one who commits rape also cc r ta robbery, precise 1-
been'use the result ele-ent in rape n rot conoi 'ered relevant to
r- bbery. vct auch a conclusion woul see to folio-.; if it in
Mu'rta'ned that cue who obtains intercurse by deception and thus
commits/...
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c . its statu t-ry rape also co its fraud# This is even leas
tenable if one considers the rise reposed by Gordon of
"fraudulently"'^' (a word which begs the rues ion) inducing
scr.oone to touch a live electric wire. T such a person is
induced to do so by force, it is nsrnlt and rot robbery.
niEilarly, it is submitted, if he is .1 duced to do so by
deceptio it is assault and not fraud.
1. :it; i if? . ; ,:xrui v. . "II' ];? tktitn v..
. . dv. v. iahrris:
The only reported case in which deed: v. .rciiibald has
bee. founded upon in '. . d. . v. Ach rds.The ..".chards
case resulted from a decision by the Corpora icn cf Edinburgh
to sell a vacant ;<«nsion h use known as Tlillwood house and
sever: 1 ac es of surrounding garden ground. The ansion hou- o
war in a deteriorating condition and required conoidera>le
ez enditure to ml o it hablt ble. For reasons of amenity the
Corporation were concerned to ensure that the property should
be sold for rivets resident: 1 use mther than for redevelopment.
The allegation in the indictment was that the accused forced
a fraudulent scheme tc induce the Corp-ratio- to dispose Ofothe
rojerty in feu, by means of false ©toneen -is to the identity
of the rty lesirous of obtaining the feu and as to the urpoae
for whic it a desired. It w s then alleged that the accused
caused several oth r parties to -retend to the Corporation that
.-c Turns dr-ired to purchase the subject for the rivnte
rood ential use of himself and him family and the -e y induced
the O rp- ration t" conclude nioaivos of sale wi.th Purns, the
truth/...
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truth bein; that Burns has no intention of us In:: tho subjects
for these ureses and that the accused Intended to acquire
the subjects for his own purposes, which were not how; v r
specified in the char e, fu thor charge alleged that in
purn -nee of the fraudulent cche: e the accused also caused these
oth'. r parties to re tend to the Cor oration that Burns desired
to take the title tc the subjects i 'he nacse of a Halted
company in which he would be the major and controllii; share¬
holder and therely induced the Corp ration to execute a feu
disposition of tho subjects In favour of the company, the truth
bein^; that Burns had no shares or interest in tho company nd no
intention to acquire shares or other interest in it and that the
accused hid negotiated tc take over the company for his vm
purposes, wi ich were a ain una o: ikied.
It wis r,o part of the Crown case that the price at which the
Corporation agreed to sell the subjects was not a fair :aarl:et
value, and it was conceded that the Corporation had been anxious
to find a buyer for the property. There was therefore no ;uestion
of economic loos to the Corpor tion, except in tho trivial
expenses incurred by then in entering into missives and executing
the feu disposition. Further ore, although the indictment
alleged that the true positi n was that Burns did not desire to
rehcise the subjects for the private residential use f inself
and is family, it was no* specif1e-.il/ alleged that th< accused's
i-.t'-nticn 3 t ac lire tho subjects for any different purpose.
The indictment however, adopted n terms the formula of »ord ntcr's
..let". . in .,dCwCi: by all gin as the result of the fraudulent scheme
that the accused fraudulently induced the Corporation "to do an
ac... • • •
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act which they would not otherwise have done, naraely to accept
( urns - as the genuine offerer to urcho.se in feu said subjects
for the private residential use of himself and his family and tc
enter into missives with bin there nent".
The defence adopted the viewpoint of Gordon in seeking to limit
the unqualified view of the result element which had been
expressed in acock. It war argued for the accused that any
practical result wan rot of i-self sufficient tc constitute
fraud, but that the result must also 1 volve sere legally si *»
nlficnnt prejudice. It was implicit in the charge that if the
Cerror tion had known that Bums was not a enuine offeror and
wanted the subjects for his own residential use, they would not
have entered into the transaction with him at all. n the f ce
of the indictment, however, there was, as the Crown appear to
hv concede!, no specific allegation of prejudice, economic or
otherwise, to the Corporation. Indeed, there was no allegation
that had the accused offered for the s bjects in his own name
and at the sane price the Cor oration would not have sold the
subjects to hi • The allege ion of the result element in the
crime therefore amounted to no more than that the Corporation had
been induced to enter missives for v e s* le of the subjects
under an error as to ihe identitr of the -erson who would obtain
occupancy of them. At the pre liminary debate on relevancy, the
heri f -i-.cipal stated th it he * a no* le to accept the
m dificati r. or limitation of *he dccck p-ri ci-le which had
been suggested by the defence, a ~od'fie- i n ?h;ch was in his




•'.c^ c'- v. rchjbald". ' Ho therefore rejected the view that
fraud must involve prejudice in addition to a practical result.
Unfortunately, this aspect of the relevancy of the indictr*nt was
not argued on appeal and no reference was made to ' 'coci in the
judgments of the Appeal Court.
r. . dv. v. ac ecd Dunn
"ofore 1970 the decision in 'c-o' . rchib Id hi been a
neglected treasure frota the Cr vr.'s point of view. The 'ch rda
cane, however, provoked a re-exanination of the possibilities
which Icoc1 holds out for 1 wide-ranging liability for dis¬
honesty, and the Ir wn have not teen slow to exploit them.
I ;,c end. Dunn two local officials of a trade union were
charged with having submitted to the returning officer at the
union's headquarters forged documents bearing to >ecord a ballot,
which had never been held, between two candidates in s dele ;nte
election, "p to this point, the indictment was a perfectly
respectable charge of forpery and probably also of conspiracy.
The indict-ent however contined as follows:
"
.... and you did thereby induce the said returning
officer to credit the said J.B. with 11 votes nd the
said J.F.C. wit! 214 v:tcs in said Election and this
you did by fraud''.
The case wan tried on the ll'sgcw Circuit before Lord Justice-
ClerV -'heatley and, unfc -tunntely, a plea to the relevancy of
the indictment was ©parted frc at the outset of the trial,
jn/...
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In his charge to the ^ury, the Lord Juatice-Clerk ouid, "hut is
alleged .... in effect is that the accused were guilty of f rgery,
uttering and cf fraud. .... forgery and uttering are alleged by
the Crown .0 be the mans where';, the fraud was perpetrated md
achieved".
Alt; ough it was relevant to charge a fraud in which the deception
47
consisted in the uttering cf for ed documents, i: would
nevertheless lave been perfectly relevant to ch trge for gery
si Plici ,er. If for ery had been charged, there would have been
no need to libel any consequence whatsoever, if conspiracy ad
been charged* it would have been possible to libel what was
arguably the really important cense ueneo of the forgery, ra. ©ly
that the Unior and the -nembers of the local district had had
foisted on them a delegate who had not been validly elected. In
adopting this curious fcrr of fraud charge, however, the Crown
libelled the consequence to the person deceived, namely the
returning offic. r, whose function w;.a p rely administrative,
who had no personal interest in the ratter, and who so fur as
the charge disclosed, sustained 10 injury to his reputation or
to his feelings. The position of the returning o "ficer was little
different from that cf the colliery c oapuny in ,dcoc„ who were
induced to make a false entry in a record.
The uord Justico-dlor" in his charge referred to the result a
being "the i-.proper . trib ition of votes to ;.he candid,ten
i volvod in the election' and stated that if it w 3 .'.roved that
the .ccuscd uttered the for -ud records, knowing the;-: t be forged,
then/...
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then frv d v- cormitted "bec-".u:3<- of the result that inevitably
followed".
. . v. " t
-•o 'i Sunn utefullv ill', -.tr ten the he re tic-1 dangers In
brinpinj fraud charges in 1Mb cases because such charges
nee oitate that the pe-scn libelled as the victim of the
misrepresentation shall be someone who is f-uite obviously not
the /.ri -ry victir of the aisr-.-pr "ont 'ion and is r. victim
ml; in th general sense thr.t he has boon induced lo act upon
a lie.
s art11ns example of this then ensued in the case of . dv.
48
v. t short. This case arose out of the failure of a firm of
stockbr Icera with consequent financial losses to '-heir clients
and, ultimatel- , the ftock bxchnrvpe lunrantee ,;\md. "ft vms
then alio,pod by the Crown th-.t durin- n period of several years
befo *o the bankruptcy the icctred, a solicitor, hod assisted the
fir. to conceal its vor ening financial position by temporarily
tr; naforrin • funds dross his mn fir- to the other each year on
the eve of its audit date. I was alleged that the stockbrokers'
auditors were thereby deceived r.r to the firm's liquidity position
and reported in satisfactory t thereon to 'he took xehange.
It s not however alleged thr.t a deception was practised on the
Stock' hxchan « or that, had they kuo*m the truth, they would have
sur. ended the it* t an earlier s'> e and thereby prevented 11
or/...
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or any of the losses sustained. nsteud, the indictment was
founded on the deception on the members of the firm of
accountants appointed y the tock Exchange to inspect the
Balance dheet and deports in each year and report thereon, -and
it was alleged that in each of the relevant years the
inspecting accountants were thus in uced to accept the Balance
Sheet and relative Report u3 genuinely representing the
financial position of the stockbrokers to be satisfactory and
so to report thereon to the Stock exchange Council. It was
argued for the defence that the charge of fraud was irrelevant
in resj-ect that,on the facts narrated, it set forth that the
reporting accountants had been deceived but not defrauded, in
respect that they had suffered no loss, financial or otherwise.
dcock. • owt v r, was an i super le obstacle for :he defence
nd .ord acDonald held that, as in .dcock. the innocent
aking of the erroneous report by the inspectin accountants
to the Stock Exchange wa3 a sufficient practical result for
fraud.
If those drafting the ch rges in coses such as oc' ocd , .)unn
and 'islv-rt had accepted the principle recognised in modern
South African law that the prejudice element in fraud need
net be sustained by the person to whom the misrepresentation
49
is addressed these difficulties might have been avoided.
B. S . . Y
■ cock therefore has had a 3ingul rly unsettling effect on the
;cottish/...
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C' '-ink law of fraud. Jordo » despite his well- euscnrd
50
crltici:- -.a of the decision itaelf, h . e now accepted us a
definition of the cri. e the fortrola in that cuao of "inducing
aono no by decei^tion to do what he would not otherwise h .v
51
done This deftnit "2 n is of course asply warranted by etc ck
and the od rn c aos which have d -avra sup ort from. it.
The definition, however, indie tes a liability so wide raagin ,
•ad indeed so liaitless, that in well and truly out of hand.
horo c.n e few deceptions which do not have effects on he
vJ cti.-.'o ecu oe oi' action; .... to . ..e defi• .iticn ^ust quoted
there could be added the words "or to refrain from doing an act
which he wo Id otherwise have done . lie result, therefore, of
the definl ion is to snake the ;ellin.; of a lie al: est inevitably
a c i e, because even if the lie fells to deceive, or if having
deceived it fails to induce . cti- n or inaction in the sense
described, there will be liaVd.li.ty at least for attempt©.* fraud.
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g H A F T R R IX
The result element in South African law
ICT I.-'flAL '-I-JUD'CS
The modern South African crime cf fraud is defined by Hunt
as follows: "Fraud consists in unlawfully making with intent to
defraud, a misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or
which is potentially prejudicial to another".^ The reference
in this definition to the idea cf otential prejudice is necess¬
itated of Ci urse by the long line of authority establishing that
2
fraud and forgery are comprehended within one crime. ne result
of this has been the recurring problem of defining the circum¬
stances in which there is so-called "potential prejudice".
Numerous dicta in cases of forgery and fraud, which are now cited
indiscriminately on this point, have laid down various
formulations of the tests to determine the degree of likelihood
of this prejudice which is necessary for liability, and the
standard by which that likelihood is to be assessed.
3
In R. v. Jolesa^ the test of potential prejudice was held to be
whether the misrepresentation was calculated in the ordinary course
of things to prejudice another. In JR. v. Dyonta. r "calculated"
was defined by the trial judge, Tindall, J., as "fitted or made
suitable for the end in view, in the ordinary course capable of
5
deceiving a person". n R. v. lienkes the test was said to be
whether the misrepresentation used was "calculated to prejudice".
In _R. v. I ruse^ "calculated" was interpreted, as in Dyonta as
meaning "likely, in the ordinary course of thing, to prejudice".
evertheless/...
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■ vertheless, the e .rlj nte q;-etution of " likelihood" us being
whether the occurrence of the prejudice was probable, dir- ct or
7 8 9
reasonably certain was idened in jl. v. e.-be and. T« cviWl
tc include cireu stances where there was a risk, not too remote
or nciful, of the liar; occurring. The application of tliia
rinciple, however, lo <d to a rather contrived result in c. .ses
where some objective consideration, such as police entrapment,
ensures that the isrepresentation can ot succeed. 0 In a ch
sos it is held th t there is an objective risk of prejudice
3uffcient to satisfy the for 1 requi. orients of tin crime. The
o .oe approach is held to warr nt co viction, -n the asis of
the potentially prejudicial nature o; the misrepresentation, in
cuoea lie re the prosecution fails to rove that the actual
prejudice relied on was cRUael by the misrepresentation alleged.^
fu-ther difficulty, ill strated by the definiti nal require¬
ment of 'actual or otenti 1 judieo, is found in cases where
a fr& dulent purpose is thwarted. It was at first th ught that
tiie potential prejudice doctr." o applied only where no burn had
, 12 T . 13actually occurred. In J,, v. if -~ : ore. however, it was
held to apply in cases where the accused succeeded in hia purpose
t deceive vrithou causin actual ham, but where hia conduct
was "calcul:ted'1 to do so, (as already defined). It was doubted,
however, whether as a matter f evidence it could be established
in such cases that the miare reaennation w is calculated to cause
^ , 14prejud ce.




_ nliei y ]- apellate division, that the
bjcctivo livelihood o:' ,rojudice uut bo isseoscd by . ro .son-
15
a lie u::.n tost. This req ire rent is unneces -ry and to 30ae
e:... t misleading, because if a test is objective no standard
other than that of the reasonable nan can be usefully applied.
?u thar ore, 'he . - j* etive 'ssesncent of whether a r.iorepres¬
ent ition is calculated t cr.se ;r«"judicial result does not
affect the test of the int"nt itself, which remains entirely
s bjective.'^
tion
The potential pre udice theory has also caused roble n in
res^rd t the requirement of causation. It ray be subraited in
qenera' that ir any conduct crl-e causation hr 3 no lace. In
erjury, for example, li bility is predicated upon n oliey,
either udicial or legislative, that the tellin,'"' of lies by
soreone on oath in judicial roceedings is potentiallv harmful
t< value which should be ley"illy protected, namely the
administration of justice, and that therefore such conduct should
17
bo criminal. The mler-sness of the accused's conduct nay in
certain circus-stances be defence, fo- example where the false
evidence relates to n immaterial issue, but that question, too,
involves a further consideration of le.<rtl olicy. The important
point is that these aspects of policy do not form pert of the
f ctual composition of the crime.
ccordinyly, the relevant f eta of n conduct crime are encompassed
wit in/...
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vfithin the intention 1 doing cf "he relevant forbidden act. it
is therefore in theory unnecessary to charge or prove the potential
consequences of that act. Furthermore, even thong1 the haraless-
ness of the act in a conduct crir.e may in certain circumst' nces
be - defence, that in turn depends upon a prior question of law
as to what constitutes harnlessness in the given case.
In contrast, causation is a question of cardinal importance in
an' result crime, because in a result crire the liability is
predicated upon the intention 1 causing of a result which the
law for reasons of policy forbids. 'esult must be alleged
and p-oved. Therefore, before any legal judgment can be brought
to bear upon the question of the result, an essential issue of
fact must first be established, no ely, that the result alleged
did occur and that that result was caused by the actions of the
accused, .''or example, in a murder c- se there oust be proved to
have been a death caused by the conduct of the accused before
any legal judgments can be made relating to that result such as
the issue of justifiable homicide.
The South frican Courts as a result of assimilating falsity in
its historical sense with fraud have constantly directed attention
t; the requirement of a result or at least to the possibility of
a result. In the latter case, the fall' clous principle has been
stablished that the misrepresentation made by the accused oust
1 8
c use otential prejudice. This principle is illogical because
there car be no causal connection between a misrepresentation
and s -nothing which did not occur. .t most, all that can be said
in/...
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in a case where potential -re.udice it: founded on is that if
a certain result had occurred, its occurrence would have been
caused by the misrepresentation alleged. This difficulty is
1 9
not, however, surmounted simply by saying, is Hunt does, " that
the word potenti 1 "incorporates . causative element". The
potential prejudice theory in cases of fraud in the proper
sense (as opposed to forger;;, for example) is throughout
founded on hypothesis. In order to pursue a formal requirement
of causation in such cases the fouth 'frican courts have
devised a substitute for causation in the concept of a
misrepresentation's being "calculated to prejudice" and it has
bee- emphasised that "calculated" in this sense does not refer
to the intention of the accused but to the quality of the
20
risrepreso tation itself.
T is theory, although contrive! , would not cause undue difficulty
were it not for the effects w ich it has had upon natters of
proof. Cnce it had been accepted that the potentially
prejudicial nature of the misrepresentation was sufficient for
liability for fraud, it wa3 i short step to the osition that
where ther was no causal connection between the representation
and the actually prejudicial consequence sustained by the
complainant, there was nevertheless liability for fraud based
u on the potentially prejudicial natu-e of the misrepresentation.
The development of this theory can be traced in the c; se3 of
t i 21 .. 22 . 23 . 24 ..... 25 . , :
■ olos , ertzfelder. . u-;b .r, der, cnarackz and . wasa.
ftrdkihg- examples of the theory in modern practice occur in
27
cases such as
_ . v. d.,r.i where poods were su lied for a reason
vui! e '...
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uite unconnected with the misrepresentation. Li' bility in
th t cr.se was established on the otentially prejudicial nature
of the representation, the special knowledge of the complainant
bein. ignored. It h u always been ccepted th t the question of
prejudice in such cases falls to be determine 1 at the moment
, 28
whe the representation is wade.
Similar reasoning would no doubt have justified a conviction of
fraud in South tfrica on the facts of the English case of It. v.
PQ
Clue -.3" where the accused by false rretences induced a hock-
raker to accept on credit, a winning bet. '-"hen the bookmaker
paid the bet, it wis held that the winnings had not been obtained
by false pretences, the effective cause of the payment being that
the accused had backed the winning horse. \ similar example in
30
reee t Couth African law is the case of v. Jeljer where it
w.s held that fraud could be co itted where a false pretence
w-;s made to a company all of whose beard were aware that it was
false.
The 've theory has also been pplied in a sircil r tyre of case
where the misrepresentation has caused results held by the
31
Court ot to be actually prejudicial.
In vier of the authorities cv: he uestion of potential prejudice
it would be logical for a modern South African definition of
fraud to require only potential rejudice and to make no mention
whatever of anyie mirement of actual prejudice, because in every
case where actual prejudice is caused here is i-.so facto
potential/...
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potential prejudice at the accent the representation is made,
iiiis position has not been adopted, however, by any of the writers,
nor has it ever been suggested in any of the judicial definitions
of the cri >e.
otenti ,i prejudice in relation U attempt li'-bil tv
ihether or not the potential prejudice theory in the South African
law of fr-ud is well founded historically, it eiaains open to the
objection that it is illogical. The primary difficulty about
the otential rejudice theory is that it supplants the theory
of attempt liability. The basis of attempt liability in the
criminal law is in the inferred purpose of the accused in his
roved actions, and in the inferre : consequences of his actions
had not his purpose been frustrated. In looking to what would
or could have occurred the courts n a sense apply a potential
prejudice theory in most cases of attempts, even in those cases
which involve impossibility. But fraud is unique among South
frican crimes in the predication of liability for the crime on
success nd failure alike. If ■otential prejudice is sufficient
for fraud it would seer to follow that fraud is not a result
crime, yet the constant reference to results made in the cases
makes such view difficult to maintain. In any event, the fact
situations which ire involved in the c ses of -otential ;rejudice
•*2
are more satisfactorily interpreted as attempts. In £. v. Dyonta.
for example, the accused attempted to sell ieces of glass on the
pretence that they were diamonds. The complainant, who was a
detective, was not deceived -ct it v r. held that the pretence
c used/...
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caused potential prejudice to him. fortiori, it was held in
315
H« v» endrickz that otenti 1 prej. "ice was caused where the
complainant was deceived but the isrepresentation did rot cause
the consequence founded on by the prosecutor. Conversely, in
34.
-L* v* dam the c sequence founded on did occur, but w is not
caused by the misrepresentation because the complainant, by
reason of his special knowledge, was not deceived and this too
35
was held to have c;: sed him potential prejudice.
The ratio of hy-nta is - nsatisf. ctory in its reference to the
accused as aving "cau ed potential prejudice". The fact in
such cases is that no result has been caused, and ind ed in
Dyontu's case the intends' consequence c uld not in the
circumstances be caused. l/hat is re ally involved in cases such
as Dvcnta is the justification of liability as a matter of law
on the ground of the potentiality of the conduct in cause the
material consequence. This is precisely the reason on which
the criminal law punishes attempts and it 3s significant that
if the accused in Dvcnta'3 case had been charged with theft by
36
false pretences the liability would have been for the attempt.
In Pyontr1s case the com lainants .ere policemen so that the
decision that there wr 3 otentia1 prejudice is all the less
realistic, ft is noteworthy, however, that the courts have
infr nged t is principle even in cases where there was a definite
37
possibility of prejudicial r<suit.
11 coulf ho ever be argued th: t if all li- bil'ty for attempts
were/...
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were tr be excluded fr in the scops of fraud, there would be no
practical roblem, since a potential prejudice principle would
fulfil the same function in the application of the law. What
cannot be argued, however, is that the two can logically
co-exist, although this is what modern South African practice
tries to secure.
B. ATTEKiTBP FRAUD
In an article entitled "Falsity and the Form of Indictment"
in 1S34 C.W. De Villiers concluded from an examination of the
R man-Dutch authorities that there was no such crime as attempted
fraud. The comtemporary case law c uld not have justified this
39
conclusion. For example in JR. v. Hoare a conviction of fraud
had been altered to one of attempt to commit fraud where the
complainant had parted with his money in the knowledge of the
falsity of the isrepresentatinns; and in v. John^ an
unnsuccessful impersonation of a candidate by a qualified
driver at a driving test had been held on appeal to be attempted
41 42
fraud. Two cases decided in 1933, v. Yenson and R. v. Cohen
indicate that at that time the idea of attempted fraud was by no
means ruled out. Soon after Yenson. however, the Transvaal Court
43
decided in R. v. Nayr that t ere was no such crime.
That the acceptance of the potential prejudice theory had - usted
the theory of attempt is clear in R. v. Nay from the statement
of Solomon J. that "Fraud consist of a false representation
deliberately made with the intention of beinr: acted upon
by another to his detri- ent.
Directly/...
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Directly such, false representation has been made with this
crinin 1 intent and with potential prejudice to the com¬
plainant the crime has been com- itted, whether the accused has
succeeded or net in extracting from the complain.-.nt the money
A4
he wanted to obtain". This view was confirmed by essels
45
C..T. in R, v. Pvonta where he remarked that "The law looks
at the matter from the point of view of the deceiver. If he
intended to deceive, it is i material whether the person to be
deceived is actually deceived or hether his prejudice is only
'Otenti 1. This is probable due to the fact that in "raud there
46
cannot be ; verdict of attempt".
47
In R. v. Bangani a distinction was Kg este between a mis¬
representation which resulted in no actual prejudice and an
attempt to make lisrepresentation which was frustrated, and
this approach was adopted when attempted fraud was eventually
48
admitted by the Appellate Division in JR. v. ' c.,ne. In the
course of his judgment in that case, Hchreiner J. . approved
the distinction made in Ban: ni and upheld the view th t there
could be attempted fraud in cases where the representation was
49
not communicated to the mind of the intended victim. This
limited recognition of attempts leaves unimpaired the rule that
'where the representation is r-ucce3sfully made, but not acted upon,
50
there is liability for the a . leted cri^e.
Hunt categorises four cases in which, from the limited
recognition of attempt liability in Heyne, it can be s id that
attempted fraud is c mmitted; namely, where the dsrepresentation
- 166 -
is not communicated to the mind of the representee; .here the
misrepresentation is so patently ridiculous that there is no
potential prejudice; where for some other reason the mis¬
representation contains a risk of prejudice that is too re ote
or fanciful; and where the accused mistakenly thinks his
representation is false or can cause prejudi e, whereas
51
prejudice is impossible. T is analysis is not warranted by
the existing state of the law s laid down in leyne. This
c< mmcnsense approach iowev. r, which is influenced perhaps by
the refined doctrine of impossibility in cri inal attempts in
52
South ifrica, is inhibited by the now firml. established
potential prejud ce doctrine by which the impossibility theory
tends to be obscured; and it is difficult to see any satis-
53
factory solution which stops short of De et and Swanepoel's
convincingly expressed view that liability for the completed
crime of fraud should he confined to c-se3 where an ctually
54
rejudicial result occurs.
If the potential prejudice theory coincided with what would,
on De Wet and Swunepoel's definition, be attempted fraud, there
would be little worthwhile criticism of it from a practical
point of view, but there a e cases which indicate that the
potential prejudice theory does not achieve this result. In
41
R. v. lenson the accused claimed compensation from carriers
for goods which he falsely reported had been lost in transit.
It was proved that no claim for compensation would be enter¬
tained by the carriers unless an elaborate procedure was
followed involving, inter 11a, the submission of a formal
wri tten/...
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ri.ten cl i . ho .u-cu convicted, of attoapteu fraud.,
but on appeal it wis hold that thore could bo nc potential
prejudice an there '.as no , jeaibility of the infernal claim
bein,- acceded tc. This case is probably discredited as an
authority in at le-st -wo respects, firstly, the appellate
Division hold soon after enson that
. tentiul prejudice
55
exists even where the cotapl. inants ..re -dice officers.
eco idly, the case so far s Jt de 1b with t+e pts is impliedly
56
overruled by the leading ease of _. v. Daviea. r.owev. r, in
• ver 1 canes where the c vai c-' ai:-. ion between the pretence
nd the reouli has not been es ibiinke the courts have not
considered the ention of patent! 1 prejudice, but have acquit-
57
ted 1 together.
urthorrore, the potent! 1 . rejedice theory of fraud does not
entirely auppl nt the theory of tt.e -.pt .- and , theoretically
at le ot, there would be a liability for attempted fraud
altho gh n- potent! 1 prejudice where the representation,
58
contrary to the belief of the accused, was true. ;">uch
liability C'uld also, theoretical y, h ve been established in
59
ii« tevr"where unknown to the -used, iarepresentation
of expenses by for ery in support f a claim for n allowance
could not, s the Court held, orsibly have succeeded since
the How nee w ••• of a fxc 1 -• -.mt rr- rdle s of the cla! nt's
C-'-.l expenditure. In that cr the recused w a acquitted
1 together on a ch rge of for fry.
... . . . 'If bC ' ,_f L - -■
In/...
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1 i cases involving econc ac prejudice it is the vietin's
immediate, rather than his eventual position that matters. It
is therefore no defence that even if the isrepresentations had
been true the victim would have been in no better position, cr
even in a much worse position, in any case where the immediate
consequence of the deception is to ^ut the victim's economic
interests at risk. It has been a matter of some difficulty
in the South African case law whether there is prejudice to
a victim who is induced to purchase an assest which is worth
the price he ays. In A_. v. Jon : cro^° the opinion was
expressed by Solomon J. . that the complainants would not have
been rejudiced if the shares which the were induced to rurchase
were of a greater value than the price which they paid for them.
61
In R. v. hcndrncks the excused induced the complainant to
t:ke out a policy of life insurance by pretending that it would
be n acceptable security for an immediate loan from the
insurers. Re Villiers J. . conside ed it an entirely open
question whether or not there would have been prejudice if the
policies had been worth the premiums paid.
62
~n H. v. Rohnle it wan hell that in the absence of a specific
allegation of prejudice none c<y 1 \ bo brplied from an allegation
that a gem offered for sale was net a diamond. As Hall A.J.
observed obiter: "~f what the .ccused sold was a precious stone
which wen not a diamond, it light till conceivably (e.g. if it
C.'Z
hod been an cueraid) be worth 'the price paid)".
(A
J tor cos s support a different view. In R. v. ■ lifunt the
cor lainant had paid money for a diamond, but there was no
evidence/...
evidence to rove that the siaos which he actually got was not
worth the price. The conviction was upheld in that case on the
view that the complainant's "resolve to urchase was induced by
the representation hat what he was buying and receiving was
a diamond or diamonds anu notiiing else and that it was on that
representation and in that oeiief that the was induceu to part
65
with his money". Similarly in jj.. v. hoale medicines were
sold on the pretence that t .ey were manufactured in Germany.
Ithough there> was no evidence that they were ot worth the
rice paid, prejudice was fou-d in the fact that the purchasers
would not have bought the"1 at all if they had known that they
were manufactured in '-outh fricn.
De 'et and Swanepoel in addition to taking the view that the
rejudice in fraud must be of an economic type, further insist
that for prejudice to exist the victim must be financially
worse off. They criticise cases such us <. 1 1' at and ueale on
the ground that to hold that the acquisition of the property
is sufficient pr- of of prejudice infers that the pro.erty is
not worth the price paid.
.. t is submitted, however, that this is n unnecessarily strict
re ■ irement. It should be sufficient as was held in R. v.
66
Gilbert that the victim has been induced to alter his economic
osition by the deception because he has been de rive ; of a free
and informed choice in the conduct of his financial affairs.
That, it is submitted, should be held to be prejudicial to him.
'o hold otherwise would le- 1 t considerable dangers to
standards/...
- 170 -
standards of honesty in business dealings* In particular, it
would expose rosecutions in such canes to the convenient
defence that the poods given were value for the money -aid in
circumstances where it was plain that h d the victims known
the truth they would net have entered into the transaction at
r.l", and would involve the courts in the difficult and, it is
sub~itted, socially undesirable process of enquiring into matters
of V"lue where in nan;,- cases no objective criteria re available.
/"f7
This view of xhe sues1ion is su-ported by 2. v. v ala and
68
T. v. "rugcr and by the r cent decision of Tech J. in £. v.
69
d~---;ir. where he held that prejudice was sustained b one who
is deceived into lending money in that he is thereby induced
"to exchange his existing rights of ownership in his money for
70
the contractual rights of a lender thereof'.
Under a statutory offence of obtaining by false pretences cr by
deception, the forbidden act is cf course the mere obtaining of
the property and therefore value for money can never found a
71
defence to such a charge.
'
VtTU"? .y^fy-v.pr" CT
The other main feature of the prejudice theory in Couth
'frican 1 w has been the extension of the scope of 'he relevant
typos of prejudice, actual or potential. The extensive range
of prejudice canvassed in the early forgery eases has already
been discussed in Chapter 2. These cases were relied on to
in ort/...
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1'-!. ort sir.:' 1'.r categories of prejudice into fraud. Thus
°rloren van Themaat concluded that prejudice in fraud denoted
72
tXhy "breach of another's rights' . *" This a _ roach ac _ ..ired the
7*5
'-■hthcrity of the .ppellate Division in jt. v. " evne, a fraud
Case where Ichreiner, J,l. sUii that it was sufficient that
there was "so e risk of ham, which need not be financial or
Proprietary". cccrdingly, as in cases of forgery,^4 the
Prejudice element in fraud extends to such consequences as loss
f refutation, exposure to ris' of rosecution and the like.
'ore ' art ntly, however, Heyne es' .blished that Jhi.. view of
Preju&ioe extends te the infringement of the interests of the
State where for example the purpse and effect of a
misrepresentation is to evade regul tory legislation dealing
»yc ry/' nry
with rationing, the sale of liquor, or road traffic.
This theory that "the State .... has interests peculiar to
nro
itself' goes beyond the narrow co norcial interests of the
'
te and creates a loose and ill-defined area of interest.
'hile "eyne did not lay down that the interest of the State in
enforcing the law would always bo sufficient, no guidance was
79
•iven the limits of this doctrine and it is difficult
to see how it could be made to stop short of that extreme.
80
indeed in cases such as evro it appears that the Court is
coming very near to ennv: usin.. ' he general juris rudential
problem of why attempts should b punishable.
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C H A P T K :i X
Causation
COLLATERAL REPRESENTATIONS
It has always been held to be essential that a causal
connection should exist between the deception and the result
suffered by the victim, but this is an over-simplification of
the matter. There are two causal links to be considered; the
first between the representation and the acquisition of false
belief by the victim, and the second between the acquisition
of that belief and the consequence founded upon. The first of
these links is an essential element in the deception aspect,
whereas the latter relates to consequences. In the assessment
of causation in regard to the victim4s belief the question is
whether or not there is a successful deception. If the
intended victim is not deceived, there can of course be
liability in Scotland and in England for a criminal attempt.
The special position of South .fricanlaw on this question has
been discussed in connection with otential prejudice.
A more difficult problem arises where there is a successful
deception but no result. In that situation there ought to be
liability for at least attempted fraud, if not for the completed
crime. Nevertheless, two Scottish cases indicate an arbitary
limitation on liability based on the subject matter of the
pretence even where the pretence causes the victim to acquire
a false belief and in that belief to sustain prejudice.1 The
2
facts alleged in the complaint in "'ause11 v. rentice were
that/...
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that the accused misrepresented her identity to a shopkeeper
and pretended that she was manageress of a company of gypsies
who were about to encamp in the neighbourhood and that she
intended to urchase provisions for them from the shopkeeper
to the value of about '30. The complaint then narrated that,
"relying solely on the truth of said misrepresentation (she)
did thus induce (the shopkeeper) to purchase (from her) ... a
rug in excess of its proper value and ... did thus defraud the
•T
(shopkeeper)". Lord Justice-Clerk ' acdonald and Lord rdwall
considered it fatal to the relevancy that the pretence com¬
plained of did not relate to the subject of the bargain, na ely
the rug or its value. As Lord .rdwall put it, "Now there can
be no crime in such a sale as is here alleged unless the
fraudulent misrepresentation relate directly to the articles to
4be sold". This reasoning is erroneous. The complaint alleged
that the prejudicial consequence and a. fortiori the false belief
were causally connected with the pretence and if that could be
proved there could be no convincing reason why the pretence,
whatever its subject matter, was not a relevant one, Tn this
case the Court was probably influenced by the consideration that
the causal connection could not be proved, but that should have
been a matter of evidence and not of relevancy. This argument
had not been canvassed in earlier cases, notably Turnbull v.
5 6
Ctewart and ! loyd v. II., , idv. in which certain of the
misrepresentations libelled were, by this test, collateral.
This exclusion of so-called collateral matters not relating to
the subject matter of the bar ain was confirmed by the High
Court/...
7
Court in otr thorn v. fogal where a landlord and his sons were
charged on complain t with having pretended to tenants of the
landlords* shops that the shops had been let to is sons and
that the tenants would thus be ejected unless they paid
certain premiums. It was alleged as a consequence that the accused
8
"did by the pretences foresaid .... fraudulently obtain" these
payments. This charge was held to be irrelevant. The ratio of
the decision on this point is not clear. The majority view is
that of Lord Hunter, in whose opinion Lord Ar adale concurred,
which seeks to establish a3 a test of relevancy the nature of
the subject matter of the pretence itself. Lord Hunter observed
that "The misrepresentation, if made, did not in any real sense
affect the subject of the bargain, but was essentially
9
collateral, thong: it might be material and induce the contract''.
Tf a causal connection existed between the pretence and the
payment of the money, as the Crown undertook to prove, or more
accurately, if a causal connection existed between the pretence
and the false belief, then it is submitted, those pretences were
material. The majority appear to have been influenced by the
consideration that the accused landlord was perfectly entitled
to exact money from his tenants.^ It does not follow, however,
that it was legitimate to secure payment by false pretences or
that the tenants would not have acted otherwise had they known
the truth. To the extent that this coaplnint set out a causal
connection between the pretences and the payments it was rele¬
vant. ihether or not such a connection existed was a matter for
proof. Lord Ashmore in that case was right in founding on the
need for a causal connection, but he w s wrong in his further
conclusion/...
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conclusion that the Crown's account was "consistent with the
tenants having agreed to make the payments asked for, upart
altogether from the alleged misrepresentation about a bona
fide let".^ He reached t ds conclusion on the ground that it
was "apparent from the complaint that what induced the payments
was not the existence of a let, but the representation that the
respondent .... would not renew, or might not renew, the tenancies
12
unless the payments were made". This was an unwarranted
inference of fact, going to the merits of the ca. e, which should
13
not have been drawn from the terms of the complaint.
14
The question was again raised in U.K. Adv. v. lichards in which
it was alleged that the accused had induced the complainers to
enter missives of sale for certain heritable property with a
third party by means of false representations that the third
party desired to purchase the property for the residential use
of himself and his family. It was argued by the defence that
these representations were collateral and therefore irrelevant.
The Sheriff Trincipal repelled this plea on the ground of
causation, holding that the representations were "of the very
essence of the matter" because it was averred that without »hem
the complainers would not have accepted the third party as
a purchaser. The Court of Criminal Appeal without overruling
either Lapse11 or Jogal effectively discredited both cases. As
Lord Justice-Clerk Grant put the view of the Court: "No doubt
there are many cases where the future use of heritable subjects
is of no moment to the seller and nay he a matter extraneous to
to the actual contract for the sale of those s bjects. Here,
however/...
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however, on the face of the indictment .... the future use of
the subjects was of crucial importance and was an essential
governing factor in the completion of the contract for the
sale of those same subjects. It cannot, in my opinion, be
1 5
treated merely as a matter collateral to the contract".
The effect of the decision on this question in Richards is
therefore to abolish the special category of collateral
misrepresentations in the *cot3 law of fraud. A representation,
on the principle in Richards' case, will be collateral only if
it is not linked with the result libelled by way of cause and
effect, either in the terms of the indictment or in the light
of the evidence. In the former case, the representation is
objectionable and falls to be deleted on general principles
of relevancy: in the latter, the Crown will simply fail to
rove the charge.
B. CAT■Vi'ICN IN "JilATIOK TO TIIl'I fUIT
If the victim is successfully deceived, it must be then
considered whether or not the deception was the operative cause
of the prejudicial course of action taken by the victim. It
is generally this aspect of causation which is in issue when the
courts refer to the causal connection between the pretence and
the result. The question of causation is now recognised to be
16 17
a question of fact, but in Janes 'ilkie. a board and
lodging case, the intervention of the Court prevented the
question fr ra going to the jury. The indictment in that case was
held/...
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held to be irrelevant on the ground tliat, as Lord «J stice-Clerk
oncrieff put it, "It is not clear fron the indictment that the
prisoner obtained the food and lodging upon the strength of the
false representation which he is charged with having made, or
that these were necessarily made ivith a view to obtain a
18 19
fraudulent advantage". In James iilkie or ic uilkan
however, the same panel was unsuccessful when the Court upheld
the relevancy of a similar indictment. No convincing
distinction can be made between the indict ents in the two cases
and it is submitted that the latter decision is correct.
There are only two situations in which, provided the other
elements of the crime exist, the lack of a causal connection
arises; and of these only one is properly a question of
liability, if the other relevant elements of the crime are
proved, the accused can escape liability for fraud only if
there is an error in the drafting of the indictment, or if is
conduct amounts only to an attempt.
In reported cases falling within the former category there is
a theoretical liability for fraud, but not under the charge as
20
laid. The clearest example of this is Mather v. II.M. Adv. ,
where a conviction failed on appeal on the ground that no causal
connection was alle ;ed in the indictment between the
misrepresentation and the consequence. In that case it had
simply been alleged that the panel "having purchase! and obtained
delivery of" some cattle tendered a cheque drawn upon a bank in
which he had no fluids and which he knew would not be honoured.
The/...
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The Court however emphasised that it would have been relevant to
charge that the accused obtained the property by issuing such a
21
cheque knowing that it would not be honoured. But there are
situations possible where the latter charge cannot be made and
ather may have been one such. For example, if the transaction
is conducted without reference to the mode of payment and the
cheque is tendered after the goods have been obtained there is
liability for fraud if the urchaser knows the cheque is worth¬
less; but the relevant pretence is not that which is or may be
implied in the issue of the cheque, it is the deception as to
intention to pay throughout the course of negotiations,
22
evidenced by the ;issue of the worthless cheque.
In the second class of cases, the attempt cases, there is a
proper question of liability. Some attempted frauds do not
come within this class, for example those where the deception
i3 unsuccessful. There is a problem, however, where the
deception succeeds but the victim sustains prejudice in
consequence of his own misjudgement or of s reone else's
deception or misjudgement. This raises a real question of
liability, because it cannot be said that the accused's pretence
is causally connected with the result, but since the accused has
made the pretence with the relevant intent there is clear
liability in Scots law for the attempt. This is best
23
illustrated by the facts of the English case of R. v. Roebuck
where the accused offered a chain, which he falsely alleged to
be silver to a pawnbroker as a pledge. The pawnbroker was
found to have accepted the c'a:n as silver,in reliance on his
own/...
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own test of the metal and not of the accused's false statement.
A problem arises in one version of the long firm fraud, if the
accused, having obtained goods on credit on the strength of a
false pretence, promptly pays for them. The question may then
arise whether goods which he may subsequently have obtained on
credit and appropriate were obtained in consequence of the
original misrepresentation. This has been held to be a question
24
of fact. However, if it is proved that the seller became
aware of the falsity of the original misrepresentation yet
continued to supply goods on the strength of previous prompt
payment there cannot be said to be a causal connection between
the misrepresentation and the loss. It is clear that the cause
of the loss is the calculated risk taken by the seller. There
is however, surely liability for attempt on the part of the
accused. Lord . cLaren in acleod observed obiter that in that
situation the case would very likely break down, but this can
only have been true with reference to a conviction for the
25
completed crime. An early example of this approach is
26
eldrum and Raid where the panel made various misrepresent¬
ations as to his present employment and his expectations of a
pension. The complainer was examined particularly as to
whether he was induced to grant credit to the panel solely in
27
consequence of those representations. 7evertheles3 if any
one of those misrepresentations caused or partly caused the
28
granting of credit there would he liability for fraud.
leinforceme-it of a prior false belief:
"/here/...
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here there is no iramedicay between the pretence and the result
it is a question of fact whether the effect of the pretence is
29
spent. A distinct problem of causation does, however, arise
in situations where the erroneous belief of the victim has been
formed before the accused makes the false pretence. It appears
to have been decided in England in the re-1968 law that in
30
that situation the accused was not guilty. There are two
possible solutions to the problem. If the pretence replaces a
prior belief as the operative cause of the victim's actions,
then the accused is liable. If however the pre-existing
belief remained the ojjerative cause, as was possibly the case
in Seely. then the accused could not be liable for the
31
completed crime but might well be liable for the attempt.
South .frican lew:
A similarly factual approach is adopted in South Africa. Tn
32
JR. v. ilenlces " a stockbroker pretended to clients who had
instructed him to buy shares on their behalf that he had
fulfilled their orders and thereby induced them to pay him
money and place further orders. It was held to he no defence
in that case that the broker intended ultimately to deliver
the shares to the clients, the reason being that the accused
intended to produce the immediate consequent s, the payments
and the further orders, which were held to be prejudicial to
the clients and on the occurrence of those consequences the
crime was complete. Equally if follws that if an intended
consequence actually occurs and is a prejudicial consequence,
the/...
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the accused is liable for fraud no matter that that consequence
is not the immediate consequence of his deception, rovided of
course that the chain of causation is not broken. For example,
in R. v. Younaleson (1) ^ the accused pj etended to two women
that he was single and willing to marry them. Later, while
they still believed these pretences he induced them to transfer
to him certain property although these pretences were not the
immediate cause of the transfers. He was nevertheless held
liable on the grounds that although the original deception
was not the proximate cause of the transfer of property, that
transfer would never have occurred hut for the original
deception. It was necessary of course that the intent with which
the original misrepresentations were made was related to the
34
ultimate transfer of the property.
There are a number of South African cases in which the causal
connection has been held not to have been proved. These dis¬
close no more than an error in the drafting of the charge. ]n
35
Goddefroy v. JL the appellant was convicted of "falsitas"
for having passed a worthless cheque. The charge narrated that
by means of tendering the cheque the appellant had induced the
complainant "to his loss and prejudice .... to accept the said
cheque .... for work done". It was held on appeal that the
prejudice sustained by the complainant had already been
incurred prior to the misrepresentation made by the issue of
the -orthles3 cheque and accordingly such rejudice was not
•qg
caused by the misrepresentation."' It is submitted however,




facts as the Scottish Court held in rather if the
misrepresentation alleged kid been that of intention to pay-
made at the time when the appellant instructed the work to
37
be done.
The Potential prejudice theory:
In several other South . frican cases, however, the absence of
proof of the causal connection alleged in the charge has been
circumvented, unconvincingly, by a resort to the doctrine of
38
potential prejudice. In jl. v. Kruse. for example, the
representations founded on were admitted by the ccmplainer not
to have caused him to hand over the property which the accused
obtained from him. It was nevertheless indicated by the
Appellate Division that even if that evidence had ruled out
the causal connection alleged, the conviction would have been
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Theft and Fraud in the early Scots Law
A. THE EARLY DEFINITION OF THEFT
The early Scottish definition of theft centred
largely on the original manner of acquisition of the
property. In earliest times, it appears, any taking
which was neither clandestine nor violent could not
constitute theft. According to the relevant text in
the Reqiam Maiestatem. "a furto omnimodo excusatur per
hoc quod initium suae detentionis habuit per dominium
huius rei";and this principle reflected the ancient
2
English requirement of a "trespassory" talking in theft.
In their attempts to modify the ancient rule so as to
extend the scope of theft, the Scottish writers and
judges considered two main problems: Firstly, whether
it was theft where someone, having been lawfully put in
possession of property by the owner, subsequently
appropriated it; and secondly, whether it was theft to
obtain possession of property by a deception of the
owner and with an initial intention to appropriate it.
The resolution of the former question can be traced in
the development of breach of trust or embezzlement and
the long-standing controversy as to the distinction
3
between that crime and theft.
The latter problem was basically that of defining the
boundary between theft and fraud, and the controversy
/on
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on this question was crystallised in the problem of
the dishonest hirer or borrower. In Mackenzie is
found the first attempt to extend the original restricted
scope of theft. As was said in the prosecution argument
in George Brown. Mackenzie "ventured to throw aside the
now untenable principle, that the quality of the offence
depends upon the title of the first acquisition of
4
the goods". In relation to the specific question of
the theft-fraud distinction, Mackenzie considered it a
clear case of theft, contrary to the early rule,
"If a person should borrow anything at first
for another use than what he pretended".^
Forbes follows the early rule to the extent of excluding
from theft any supervening appropriation on the part of
a hirer or borrower,
"if he had no sinister design so to misapply it
at the time of the hiring or borrowing".^
Like Mackenzie, however, he considered it theft,
"if a man borrow a thing for a certain use,
with a design to apply it at the time to
some other use, as when one borrowing things
upon some plausible pretence, designs to
7
break and run his country with them".
Bayne adopts a wider interpretation of theft, which
seems to include both initial and supervening dishonesty
in the foregoing cases.8
None of these writers cited any authority in the case law
for the view that a dishonest hirer committed theft and,
as late as 1810, there are convictions noted for fraud
/where
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where workmen appropriated goods obtained by them
on a pretence that they would work upon them and
9
return them to their owners.
It is noteworthy also that despite the extended view
of theft taken by these writers, Brskine adhered to
the early definition, stating that
"Theft is either committed in a hidden or
concealed manner, which may be called proper
10
theft, or is attended with violence."
Of the nineteenth century writers am the criminal law
only Burnett insisted on the clandestine or violent
appropriation as an essential element in theft.
"The simplest, and perhaps the sound criterion
for distinguishing theft from breach of trust,
and these frauds which pass under the name of
swindling, is to be found in the way by which
the thing is taken, joined to the felonious
intent to appropriate. The fraudulo3 contrectatio
rei seems to imply that it is a clandestine, as
well as fraudulent away-taking out of the custody
of the possessor".**
Burnett concluded that
"a theftlous abstraction seems to imply, that the
thing is ab initio, taken clam et fraudulent^*
out of the custody of him in whose possession
12
it is".
He therefore treated the English "larceny by trick"
13
case as a form of fraud, and was critical of the
decision in James Marshall in 1792 which is the first





The text in the Heqiaa Malestatem reflected the
ancient English requirement of a trespassory taking
in theft. In the early English law, the intrusion of
the jurisdiction of the King's judges upon that of the
local courts was founded on the idea that the King's
15
peace had been violated. Because of this, theft was
cognisable by the King's judges only insofar as it
involved a trespassory taking, that ig , a violation of
physical possession. There was no trespass where a
person in lawful possession of property with the owner's
consent converted the property to his own use. In
Scotland the comparable rule was probably due to the
death penalty in theft.
The English law of theft broke out of the narrow
requirements of trespass by means of fictions. In
17
the Carrier's Case, a carrier who had been given
some bales to transport broke open the bales and
appropriated the contents. It was held that by breaking
bulk the carrier determined the bailment and therefore,
being no longer legally in possession, committed a
18
trespass by taking the contents of the bales. The
scope of larceny was later extended to the case where
the bailee made a fresh appropriation of goods on
19
completion of his bailment.
/Until
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Until 1779, however, the common law of larceny did
not extend to the case where there was a peaceful
taking of property with an initial intent to
20
appropriate it. In Ptear's Case the accused hired a
horse on a pretence that he required it for a day's
journey and immediately sold it. At the time of the
sale his bailment of the horse was not at an end. The
judges brought thi3 act within the pale of larceny by
means of the artificial doctrine that the initially
fraudulent intent invalidated the owner's consent to
transfer possession and accordingly that larceny was
committed as 3oon as the property was taken away and
not, as in the case of larceny by a bailee, on
21
completion of the bailment.
A distinction was made in English theory before the
Theft Act 1968 between larceny by trick and obtaining
by false pretences in that in the latter crime the
owner had to intend to transfer the property in the
goods whereas in the former he had to intend to
22
transfer possession only. The result was therefore
that the law recognised the validity of a fraudulently
induced consent to convey title in the case of obtaining
by false pretence; but did not recognise the
validity of a fraudulently induced consent to transfer
23
possession in the crime of larceny by trick.




Hall observes, made necessary by the fact that the
25
1757 statute which created the offence of obtaining
by false pretences had been ineffectual, so that the
choice in Pear*s Case was between a conviction for
larceny or an acquittal.
C. HUME AND ALISON
The early Scottish rule in excluding from theft
any open and peaceful taking of property, however
dishonest, had at least the merit of applying a very
practical and factual test. In breaking out of the
limits of that definition, however, Scottish practice
in the nineteenth century added to the simple factual
test of the early law an overlay of law in that the
extent, and the legal validity, of the owner*s consent
to the physical transfer of the goods had to be
assessed. This process, however, by which Scots law
reached results similar to those of the Bnglish law of
larceny, developed without any resort to the fictions
of English practice, the question being looked at
largely from the standpoint of consent.
The dividing line between theft and fraud was dealt
with by Hume in a most unsatisfactory way. Confining
himself to the more clear cut cases, he suggests that
"All those cases seem to fall under the notion of
fraud or swindling only, and not of theft, in
which the offender gets possession of the thing
on a finished bargain for the property, upon
/credit
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credit, though the transactions have been
accomplished by means of cozenage and
falsehood".^
27
Hume refers to cases such as Thomas Hall where the
accused pretended to be a trader, obtained goods on
credit and made off with them.
"In cases of this description, the offender's
wrong lies only in the false and fraudulent
inducement, which he has held out to the owner,
for prevailing with him to sell. But how
unfair soever the way in which he obtained it,
he has actually had the consent of the owner
to convey that thing to him in property, to
be his, and in all respects at his disposal,
till the day of payment come. Which bargain
being followed by delivery, the property
passeth in the meantime to the buyer,
blameable as he is; in so much that if anyone
should bona fide buy this article from him,
and get delivery in the course of trade, he
would not be liable to the first owner's
claim of restitution, which is personal only
against his own customer, who imposed upon
w ..28him".
That the Scottish solution to the typical situation of
larceny by trick in England was by no means settled in
Hume's mind is clear from his statement that
"A more difficult set of cases, concerning which
our records afford us still less information, are
those in which the prisoner obtains the thing
by means of a trick, or under a false pretence,
and on some inferior title to that of property
/and
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and has, moreover, from the first, no other
purpose but to cheat the owner, and turn
29
the thing to his own profit".
Hume notes only one Scottish case bearing on the
matter, namely Jaaaas Marshall30 also referred to by
31
Burnett where the accused hired a horse for a day and
immediately sold it. This case arose after Pear's Case
and it was decided that the crime of theft rather than
fraud had been committed; but it is noticeable that
there is no Scottish case prior to Pear's Case supporting
the view that these facts constituted theft. Hume
supported the decision in Marshall on the view that
there was an initial felonious purpose ruling out a
32
valid transfer of title.
Although it cannot be concluded with certainty that the
English doctrine of larceny by trick caused a change in
the Scottish law of theft, it seems likely that Pear's
Case was constantly referred to in the Scottish courts
in justification of convictions of theft on siltilar
facts. Hume certainly acknowledge the influence of
English practice on the conclusions which he had reached
33
in regard to theft, albeit that he did not adopt the
element of fiction which was necessary to the English
doctrine. His analysis proceeded on the simpler basis
that in cases lik ■? Pear's Case the hirer did have
possession, but no more than that. This view seems to




Mitchell a theft charge was upheld on the species
facti of the Carrier's Case without resort to fiction.
Alison deals with this question on a recognisably English
35
basis of consent. He distinguishes at the outset
between theft, which consists of the taking of property
without the Owner's consent, and swindling, which is
"The fraudulent irapetration of that consent on
36
false pretences".
He also adduces the rule that
"It is theft, although the article stolen be
obtained on some false pretence, or by a trick,
from the true owner, provided there was no
consent obtained by false representations to
the actual transfer of the property of the
37
article in question".
Title therefore, in Alison's view, becomes the
determining factor. If the contract fraudulently induced
is one which passes title, and delivery follows, there
cannot be a conviction of theft. Alison notes three
*^8
convictions of theft against dishonest hirers, and
he refers to numerous English cases on larceny by
trick, concluding that in both jurisdictions the
39
principle is the same.
A distinction was also drawn by Hume between initial
and supervening dishonesty in cases where delivery was
obtained on some lower title than that of property, for
example on hire. According to Hume, if there was an
/initial
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initial intention on the part of the accused to fulfil
the terms of the contract, any subsequent appropriation
of the goods by him could not amount to theft but was
rather a case of breach of trust. He committed
himself, however, to the English principle of larceny
by trick in holding that where there was initial
dishonest intent, the appropriation was theftuous ab
40 41
initio. Alison adopted a similar principle. This
42
view was confirmed in the case law in John Smith
where the court appear to have required the Crown to
libel an initial intent to appropriate for there to be
a relevant charge of theft. It was held in that case
that the theft occurred at the moment of delivery.
The result of Hume's discussion was to confirm in
Scottish practice the English doctrine that the
appropriation of goods obtained on possession only with
an initial intention to appropriate them was theft and
not fraud. It does not appear to have been considered
that the theft occurred at any subsequent stage after
the initial delivery. The contrary English doctrine
was necessitated by the rule that the formation of
the felonious intention and the acquisition of possession
4 J
must coincide. " The argument against the resulting
doctrine was based on what was said to be the absurd
result that to obtain goods by a fraudulent bargain for
their possession only should infer a higher crime than
to obtain them with an equally dishonest intent by a
41
bargain for their title. But of course if goods were
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obtained on hire there was no consent on the owner*s
part to the passage of title, and any appropriation by
the hirer contrary to the terms of hire would be
clandestine and would be an appropriation invito domino.
To hold that such conduct was not theft was to confuse
an intent to pass possession with an intent to pass
title. The contrary principle, which required forcible
or furtive appropriation at the time when the goods
were first delivered by the owner, was a relic of a
much earlier rule devised at a time when the criminal
law did not protect the interests of ownership against
verbal fraudulence.
D. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CASES
The theft/fraud problem most commonly arose in
the nineteenth century in cases where goods were
obtained by a pretence from a servant or agent of the
owner rather than from the owner himself. In these
cases liability seems to have depended on whether or
not there was a valid legal, as against purely physical,
delivery; that is to say a delivery with the owner's
consent. For example, the point was taken in James
Chisholm that the liability depended on whether the
contract was one of sale on credit or was conditional
on payment with the delivery. But not all of the cases
4kr~'
were correctly decided. In James and Robert Mackintosh,
for example, the relevancy of a charge ox fraud was
upheld where the circumstances alleged probably disclosed
a theft. In that case the accused were alleged to have
/ordered
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ordered provisions from a shopkeeper who insisted
on cash on delivery. When a messenger arrived with
the goods the accused told him to come back later for
the money. The messenger left the goods behind and
the accused immediately made off with them. This was
surely theft. The messenger had no authority or
discretion in the matter of delivery and if he acted
contrary to his explicit instructions the goods were
never delivered by the owner. In contrast if the
messenger sent with the same instructions had been given
by the accused an envelope containing pieces of paper
instead of banknotes there would be a question as to
whether there was a valid delivery sufficient to pass
title and much would depend on the explicit terms of
4?
the owner*s agreement with the accused.
In James Smithf on the other hand, the original
agreement of cash on delivery was subsequently modified
as a result of the accused*s pretences to what seems
to have been a credit sale. The crime was therefore
4.9
fraud and not theft. James Hall also may be
4 >6
distinguished from Mackintosh " since the promise to
pay on delivery, in the event unfulfilled, was
nevertheless followed by intentional delivery of the
goods by the owner; whereas in Mackintosh, it may be




In Margaret Grahame. the accused was charged with both
fraud and theft, but this was a clear case of theft. The
accused had induced merchants to deliver goods to various
addresses at which she later called pretending that the
goods had been delivered in error and were really
intended for her. Her subsequent appropriation of the
si
goods constituted theft. Similarly Henry Hardinge
was a clear case of theft. In that case the two
accused deceived a railway porter into handing over
to them items of left luggage on a pretence that they
had been authorised to uplift them. There was no
consent on the part of the owners of the luggage to
transfer title; and it is the owner*s, rather than the
porter*s consent which should determine that the
5 2
liability in such a case is for theft.
In all such cases, the questdon whether title passes to
the fraudulent party depends largely on the terms of
the agreement. The recipient of a cheque may protect
himself by insisting on a suspensive sale agreement
whereby no title will pass until the cheque is honoured.
But where cash is given no such question can arise,
and accordingly it seems sound in principle that where
on a cash sale the seller is given fake money, title
53
passes to the buyer and the liability is for fraud.
A distinction falls to be made between deception in the
course of committing fraud and deception in order to
/conceal
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conceal a prior theft.
A particularly obvious case of this is Anderson v.
Stuart. where a goldsmith was given a gem to set in
a brooch and returned the brooch to his customer with
a fake gem in it. He was convicted on a charge of
breach of trust and, on a suspension being brought,
the Court was much exercised by the distinction
between breach of trust and fraud. But clearly no
question of fraud should have arisen, as this was a
clear case of theft of the gem. There was no question
of title passing to the smith and the pretence of
genuineness regarding the fake stone was subsequent to
the incidence of liability, and therefore irrelevant
$
to it. The case which was decided before George Brown
does indicate however the persistence of the early
notion that someone in authorised possession of property
could not steal it, and there is a trace of this as
late as 1911, in Rankine's 21st edition of Erskine's
Principles where it is stated that
"The absence of the owner*s or possessor's consent,
and of any limited right of property in the
subject obtained before appropriation,
distinguishes theft from falsehood, fraud, and
wilful imposition (called, for short, swindling),
for the swindler has obtained the property, or
a lower right of indefinite duration - such as
$>
pledge - with the owner's full consent".
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Macdonald scarcely deals with the distinction
but, to the extent that he seems to suggest that where
a consent is obtained by "fraud" there is no transfer
of title and therefore a theft, he is wrong. According
to Macdonald, in a passage which has appeared in every
edition,
"when it is said that if the taker believed
he was acting with the owner*s concurrence, he
was not guilty of theft, the expression nut?* not
be understood as intended to cover the case of
a person obtaining the owner's or custodier*s
57
concurrence by fradd".
He further states, in a passage introduced in the
third edition, of which he was co-editor,
"If a person by fraudulent misrepresentations
induce tradesmen to part with goods on sale or
return, the fraud excludes contract, and the
property does not pass. Therefore if he
3
appropriates the goods, he commits theft".
The latter passage, however, is founded on the decision
5 9in Wm. Wilson which, for the reasons specified by
60
Gordon, is so plainly contrary to principle and
authority that it can scarcely be accorded serious
consideration. It isrote^worthy, too, that Anderson,
whose work was largely derived from Macdonald, did
not commit himself to this view.^^
The only support for Macdonald*s view that fraudulence
ruled out the transfer of title, and therefore attracted
/liability
- 207 -
liability for theft, is to be found in certain
inconclusive passages in Erskine. In the first
edition of the Institute. Erskine stated that a contract
of sale induced by a concealment of the buyer's
62
bankruptcy was void. The editor of the 1871 edition,
however, J.B. Nicolson, disagrees with this passage
and describes it as a "mere inaccuracy of expression". 3
On the other hand, in the same edition of the Institute
it is said, professedly on the authority of Hardinge's.6*"
that
"it is theft if the owner's or custodier's
consent was obtained fraudulently".
F. RESET OF FRAUD: 1887 ACT
The foregoing survey of the nineteenth century
case-law illustrates the difficulties which the Scottish
writers and judges had experienced in adjusting their
ideas to the extended conception of theft which included
a taking by fraudulent but non-violent means. By the
latter part of the century the extended conception had
clearly won the day and the most startling proof of
this is in the statutory creation of the crime of "reset
of fraud" in the 1887 Act.
Section 58 of the 1887 Act provides that
"Criminal resetting of property shall not be
limited to the receiving of property taken by
theft or robbery, but shall extend to the
/raceiving
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receiving of property appropriated by
breach of trust and embezzlement, and by
falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition...".
It is difficult to interpret the intentions of the
legislature in the enactment of this provision. The
section has never been the subject of any decision. It
could be suggested on the one hand that the purpose
and effect of the provision was to extend the crime to
cases where title had passed from the complainer and
therefore no vitium reale affected the property. There
is however nothing in the case law to support so novel
a development and all of the relevant statements in
the post-1887 textbooks seem to be to the opposite
effect. The current edition of Macdonald, for example,
reiterates the pre-1887 principle laid down by Hume
that
"there must be criminal intent to retain from
67
the owner".
Gordon, while acknowledging the absence of authority on
the matter, suggests that
"there are no practical difficulties in charging
A with resetting goods fraudulently appropriated
by Ji . "
It is submitted, however, that there are obvious
practical difficulties. For example, the specimen




"dishonestly appropriated by theft or
robbery."^'
If, of course, the reset alleged was in respect of
property obtained by falsehood, fraud and wilful
imposition, it might be thought that further
specification of circumstances of the appropriation
was necessary as a matter of relevancy. But, far from
requiring this, section 58 specifically provides that
in such a case
"it shall not be necessary to set forth any
details of the crime by which the dishonest
appropriation was accomplished, but it shall
be sufficient to set forth that the person
accused received such property, it having
been dishonestly appropriated by
falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition.....".
Similar, but not identical provisions apply in summary
70
procedure.
Furthermore, a conviction on such a charge would
obviously leave open to the accused a claim, probably
by multiple poinding, for restitution of the property in
a case where, for example, he had bought the property
foora the person ex hypothesi guilty of fraud in acquiring
them from the complainer, on the ground that title had
validly passed to him. Gordon's view on this point is
also at variance with the principle on which he
■s
7"-
distinguishes theft from fraud, namely that in the




The absence of authority is perhaps the strongest
indication that the statutory creation of a charge of
reset of fraud has been a dead letter. The most that
could be said in its favour is perhaps that retrospective
content has been given to section 58, so far as it deals
with reset of fraud, by the decision in Adcock. v.
Archibald which would justify a conviction of fraud,
on the basis that there was a "definite practical
result" in a case where physical possession of property
had been obtained by means of deception.
For a proper understanding of this provision, however,
it should be borne in mind that the author of the 1887
Act wasSir John H.A. Macdonald (L.J.C. Macdonald and
later Lord Kingsborough), the author of Macdonald*s
Criminal Law.
t
Macdonald specifically but, as has been submitted,
wrongly adopted the view that the false representation
essential to fraud necessarily invalidated the contract
and ruled out the passage of title to the accused. For
someone of that view it was therefore easy to hold
that there could be a vitiun reale in the goods obtained,
since ex hypothesi no title could possibly pass to the
accused.
A further difficulty which the 1887 Act introduced on
this topic is to be found in the specimen indictment in
schedule A to the 1887 Act:
/" You
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"•••..You did pretend to Norah Oraand that
you were a collector of subscriptions for a
charitable society, and did thus induce her to
deliver to you one pound one shilling of money
as a subscription thereto, which you
appropriated to your own use.....".
In an important case immediately after the passing of
74
the Act there was considerable doubt among the
judges as to whether this charge exemplified a new crime
of "dishonest appropriation" of of theft. It seems
clear, however, that the facts alleged constitute theft
rather than fraud.
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CHAPTER XII
Theft and Fraud in modern Soots law
A. MACLEOD v. KERR
The approach taken by Hume and, more overtly,
by Alison in distinguishing theft from fraud is now
firmly established in modern Scots law.''' As Gordon
says
"It is part of the definition of theft that it
is an appropriation of the goods of another
without his consent, and it is the absence of
consent which distinguishes theft from fraud.
There can be no theft if the owner agreed to
transfer property in the goods to the accused,
even although the consent was impetrated by
fraud".2
Gordon further argues that the validity of the consent
in turn depends on whether the contract is voidable or
3
void. In this view he is amply supported by the
4
decision of the First Division in MacLeod v. Kerr.
an action of multiple-poinding raised to determine a
disputed question of title between two victims of a
fraud. In that case Galloway, had negotiated with
Kerr to buy a car from him. He gave Kerr a stolen
cheque signed with a fictitious name and thereby
obtained delivery. Two days later he resold the car to
a dealer who purchased in good faith and without
knowledge of the defect in Galloway*s title.
/This
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This case was quite a straightforward one but it was
dealt with in the Sheriff Court on the basis of
5
Morruson v. Robertson and T.B. Smith*s criticisms of
that case.6 Morn as on v. Robertson. however, involved
a misrepresentation of agency and was therefore
materially distinguishable from the facts in MacLeod v.
Kerr. Nevertheless the Sheriff-Substittite, applying
Smith's interpretation of the facts of the former case,
took the view that Galloway's actions constituted theft
and accordingly held that the claim of Kerr, the
original owner, must prevail over that of the dealer.
The First Division however held that there was a valid
contract of sale between Kerr and Galloway, voidable at
the instance of Kerr on the ground of fraud. Galloway
could therefore give a good title to third parties
7
purchasing in good faith prior to rescission.
Voidness and voidability and the transfer of title
It is apparent from the judgements in MacLeod v.
Q
Kerr that the anglisised view of Gloag on the contractual
aspect of the matter is now settled law in Scotland,
namely that the voidness or voidability of contracts of
this kind determines the question of the passage of
title. In Roman law, property probably passed
according to the reciprocal intentions of the parties
to gave and take title; even on a void contract. As
g
Smith remarks, in civilian systems of ownership the
nullity of the underlying contract does not necessarily
exclude the passage of title. The determining factor is
the intention to transfer ownership. As long as that
/intention
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intention was not so vitiated as to make the
transaction a complete sham, that intention would be
effective even though the contract were void. On such
a principle, of course, the title of a fraudulent
transferee would not be affected by rescission and a
good title could be given by him even after repudiation
by the original owner. This "abstract" theory has
bean adopted in South African law,10 although as
Scholtens11 observes there have been occasional
manifestations of the English doctrine. Smith, who argues
for this theory, which undoubtedly applied in Scots law
before the Sale of Goods Act 1893, points out that a
bona fide third party purchaser of corporal moveables
12
is protected in every case except theft. On this
aspect of the question his view was impliedly rejected
by the Court in MacLeod v. Kerr and the English solution
13
which G4oag would have accepted into Scots law appears
nd» to have been authoritatively confirmed. It is
also confirmed by implication in MacLeod v. Kerr that
where the vitiating factor is error in persona, the
voidness or voidability of the contract is determined
14
by the materiality of the identity; and the case
seems to settle the doubts expressed in the Short
15
Commentary as to whether error ever renders a contract
void in Scots law.
Moi^s son v. Robertson
The discussion of Moris, son v. Robertson16 was an
interesting but unnecessary diversion in MacLeod v.
Kerr. The interpretation of that case in the Short
/Commentary
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Commentary formed the ratio of the decision in the
Sheriff Court, but the ratio was clearly wrong. In
Morrfclson v. Robertson. Telford, the fraudulent person,
pretended to Morrisson that he was the agent of Wilson,
whose creditworthiness was well known to Morrisson.
He thereby induced Morrisson to sell two cows to
Wilson on credit and took delivery ostensibly as Wilson's
agent. That situation was therefore clearly
distinguishable from that in MacLeod v. Kerr. In
particular, Smith's view that Telford was a thief,
being explicitly based on the pretence of agency in
17
that case, could not with justification be applied to
the conduct of the fraudulent party in MacLeod v. Kerr.
Unfortunately, when the judgment of the Sheriff-
Substitute was considered on appeal the Court wrongly
imputed the error of analysis to T.B. Smith.
Lord President Clyde remarked of Morrisson v. Robertson
that it
"truly was a case of error regarding the identity
of the purchaser","*"8
19
and therefore consistent with Cundy v. Lindsy. and
described as "wrroneous" the view of the learned
author of the Short Commentary who, while accepting that
error as to identity was the ratio of MorrLsson v.
Robertson, would have preferred that the same decision
had been reached on the ground that Telford was a thief
and therefore a vitiuro reale affected the property which
he obtained.*" The Lord President took the view that it
/was
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was quite wrong to suggest that Telford was a thief,
21
because Morrisson "voluntarily and intentionatlly"
delivered the cows to Telford.
While the ratio of Morrison v. Robertson is certainly
error in persona, that ratio was not an appropriate one.
There was a misrepresentation of identity, but the
material misrepresentation, that is to say, the one
which induced actual delivery, was the misrepresentation
of agency. There was never any intention on Morrisson*s
part to give title to Telford and therefore it seems
sound in principle that no title could pass to Telford
personally, and that he was therefore in no position
22
to give a good title to anyone else. Error in
persona, on the other hand, could only be relevant
where there was an intention on the owner*s part to
convey title to Telford under a mistake as to his
identity. Telford could not make himself a party to
a contract with someone whom he knew did not intend
to contract with him.
B. VITIUM REALE
The vitium reale concept on which T.B. Smith
relies, is however of little assistance in the
interpretation of Morrisson v. Robertson. The idea of
a vitium reale originated in a period of Scots law
when the theftuous taking of goods required to be
23
either violent or clandestine. This is clear from
the statement of Stair that
/"In
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"In moveables, purchasers are not, quarrelable
on the fraud of their authors, if they did
purchase for an onerous equivalent cause.
The reason is because moveables must have a
current course of traffic, and the buyer is
not to consider how the seller purchased,
unless it were by theft or violence which the
law accounts labes realis. following the subject
to all successors, otherwise there would be
the greatest encouragement to theft and robbery".
Similarly, Erskine states that
"Theft is either committed in a hidden or
concealed manner, which may be called proper
25
theft, or is attended with violence".
Bell too contemplated a clandestine element in the
appropriation.^0 These sources illustrate the
restricted definition of theft in pre-nineteenth
century practice and the irrelevance of the t«st of
the voidness or voidability of the contract as
determining the passage of t tie. The position is
summarised by Gow as follows:
27
"Although Scots theft like English larceny
attaches a vitium reale to goods stolen,
fortunately the former has by and large been
restricted to circumstances where the thing
is stolen either when the owner has no
knowledge of loss of possession, for example,
by a pickpocket surreptitiously removing a
watch, or the entrustment has not involved a
conveyance of title, as leaving a watch with
a watchmaker for repair. The Scots categories
of "breach of trust and embezzlement" and
"falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition" avoid
resort to the subleties of 'larceny by a
bailee*, 'larceny by a trick' and any commitment
28
to an approach based on vitium reale".
/The
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The restricted definition of theft in the early law
was the natural counterpart of an abstract theory of
transfer of title. Burnett, who supported the early
definition in the Regiam Maiestatem considered that
the fraudulent acquisition of title and the fraudulent
acquisition of possession only were indistinguishable.
" They are both of them acts of fraud
punishable as crimes; but the possession
having been obtained from the owner by a
device or stratagem merely, e_t nec vi vel clam.
it seems not to amount in either case to the
2g
crime of theft".
Once the Scots law of theft had broken out of the
narrow requirement of a furtive contrectatio. vitium
reale became an obsolete concept in the analysis of the
crime. It is significant that there was no judicial
development of vitium reale at any time after the
original and limited definition of theft had been
extended to cover fraudulent acquisitions of possession.
It is clear also that in respect of the feature of a vitium
reale or labes realis affecting the goods taken, the
criminal offence of theft has to be considered in
30
relation to the civil delict of spuilzie.
C. SPUILZIE
Spuilzie was a delict which was coterminous with
the crime of theft or its aggravated form, robbery.
31
Stair, defines spuilzie as the
"taking away of moveables without consent of the
owner or order of law, obliging to restitution of
the things taken away, with all possible profits
or to reparation therefor, according to the
/estimation
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estimation of the injured made by his
iuramentum in litem. Thus things stolen
or robbed, though they might be criminally
pursued for as theft or robbery, yet they may
be also civilly pursued for as spuilzie".
Erskine describes it as the
"taking away or intermeddling with moveable
goods in the possession of another, without
either the consent of that other, or the
32
order of law".
He then described it as essentially a delict against
33
possession rather than title, which has always been
34
the hallmark of theft.
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that the theft of
which spuilzie was the civil counterpart was the
restricted type of theft which applied in Scots law
before the nineteenth century, that is to say, theft
accomplished by violent or clandestine means. Thus
Sir Thomas Craig in his Ius Feudale equiparates the
action with the actio vi bonorum raptorum of the Roman
35
law. Bankton describes it as
"the violent seizing, or unlawful taking possession
of goods from another without his consent or order
of law, for lucre*s sake."
Stair himself observed that there is no liability for
spuilzie if the goods are voluntarily delivered to the
37
defender. In the first edition of the Principles.
Erskine, having defined spuilzie as inferring a
dispossession accomplished "violently or without order
of law", describes it as being analogous with the
/pen&l
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penal actions of ejection and intrusion in relation to
heritable property, which necessitated respectively
38
violence or stealth.
D, INTERACTION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PRINCIPLES
There is therefore no authority for Smith*s view
5
that, in a case such as Morrisson v. Robertson. a
vitium reale affects the goods. All that can be said
in such a case is that in modern Scots law no title in
the property passes to the fraudulent party and that
in the criminal law, in conformity with that civil
principle, it is held that theft is committed. It
cannot, however, be argued that no title passes because
in the criminal law theft is committed. Still less
can it be argued that because theft is committed, a
vitium reale affects the property, since the latter idea
is inherent in a very different conception of theft
from that which the modern law has come to recognise.
Smith's suggested solution to the problems raised by
cases such as iMorrisson v. Robertson5 does however
ememplify one of several difficulties involved in the
interaction of criminal and civil principles in the modern
law. One obvious distinction between fraud and theft
considered from the p>oint of view of the appropriate
civil remedy is that the former crime protects the
victim*s rights in personam, while the latter protects
his rights _in rem. But too close a regard to the
/principles
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principles of the civil law can give rise to
difficulties of definition. Is it, for example,
theft in a given case because the civil law rules that
no title has passed to the accused, or does no title
pass because, according to the criminal law, the taking
of the goods amounts to theft? Or does the civil
concept of res furtiva necessarily coincide with the
criminal concept of theft? The whole question of the
relationship between the principles of the civil and
the criminal law can give rise to considerable circuity
of argument, apart altogether from the difficulties
created by provisions of criminal procedure regarding
39
alternative verdicts, and there is no reason why
substantive principles in one branch of the law
should necessarily determine questions in the other. In
the result, considerations of history and policy are
probably the effective factors.
The question of the criminal liability of the dishonest
party generally precedes the civil issue of property
rights, and it might be expected that in determining
whether the accused is guilty of theft or fraud the
courts would invoke principles of the civil law because,
as Smith and Hogan argue,
•'the criminal law relating to the appropriation
of property can only be defined intelligbly, and
operated sensibly, in relation to the civil law
- .
„ 40of property".
In practice, however, this is not always the case. In
English law, for example, the modern statutory offence
/of
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of obtaining by deception^ is wide enough to include
cases where possession only is obtained and therefore
42
theft is committed. Moreover since 1968 English law
has accepted that in cases falling within s.5(4) of the
Theft Act 1968 where property is obtained by another*s
mistake, theft is committed even though title passes to
43
the accused. A similar result has been reached in
New Zealand where the offences of obtaining by false
pretences and theft by fraud overlap to the extent
that for the offence of "obtaining" it is sufficient
44
that possession only is obtained.
So too in Scots law the common law crime of fraud may,
45
as a result of Adcock v. Archibald be interpreted
sufficiently widely to cover circumstances amounting
to theft, since the acquisition of possession from
the true owner is a sufficient practical consequence
to constitute fraud. _In dubio. therefore, the prosecutor
may well charge fraud even when theft might be
established. Secondly, and more importantly, from the
practical point of view, the statutory provisions
relating to alternative verdicts enable the Courts to
sidestep difficult issues of title.
It is therefore not conclusive in the civil question as
to title whether the fraudulent party is guilty of
46 47
fraud or of theft and to invoke the concepts of
the criminal law in such a context can lead to confusion.
/E
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B. THE EFFECT OF MACLEOD v. KERR ON EARLIER AUTHORITIES
Macleod v. Kerr. however, has created a further
difficulty. It appears to have been the view of
Lord President Clyde that the voluntary and
intentional delivery in Morrisson v. Robertson^ elided
48
liability for theft on Telford*s part. This view
cannot, however, be supported. The essence of liability
for theft is that the property is appropriated without
the intention on the part of the owner to give title.
The fact that Morrisson consented to delivery of the
cows to Telford is of no relevance to the latter*s
liability. As long as he did not intend to give title
to Telford, theft was committed as soon as Telford
appropriated the cows. The converse of the Lord President*s
view would be that there is no theft where property
is taken nec vi nec clav?.. and that has not been the
49
law for over lOO years.
The species facti of Morrisson v. Robertson is illustrated
in its criminal aspects by Hi 115° and MenziesIn both
cases the accused falsely represented themselves to be
the messengers of identifiable people known to the
owners of the goods. In the circumstances the consent
thus induced was a consent to give title to their
purported employers, and the accused*s liability was
for theft.
52
Sam Michael. on the other hand, illustrates the
/cr iminal
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criminal aspects of Macleod v. Kerr. In that case the
accused ordered and obtained goods in a fictitious
name, and on a doubt arising as to whether the crime
was theft or fraud, a plea of guilty of fraud was
accepted; correctly, it is submitted, for it was
obvious that the suppliers did not rely on the identity
as regards creditworthiness and therefore the contract
was only voidable. In any event, the suppliers intended
to grant title to the accused.
53
Macleod v. Kerr by implication overrules Wilson which
seems to have been wrongly decided on the question of
title. The accused in Wilson was a retail jeweller who
had obtained jewellery from a wholesaler by pretences as
to his creditworthiness, particularly by the production
of falsified business books. The relevancy of the
charge of theft was objected to on the ground that title
had passed. Lord Justice-Clerk Moncrieff and
54
Lord Craighill appear to have considered that the
presence of a fraudulent representation ruled out
any question of title passing, and on that ground
distinguished Brown v. Marr. Barclay etc. where no
pretence was made and title passed. The decision
cannot now stand with that in Macleod v. Kerr
F. ALTERNATIVE VERDICTS
The provisions of section 59 of the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887 and section 2 of the
/Summary
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Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act 1954 need be
considered here only in relation to the crimes of
theft and fraud. Before 1887 the problems in
satisfactorily distinguishing between theft and
embezzlement were particularly acute, and between
theft and fraud scarcely less so. Section 59 of
the 1887 Act as amended by section 38 of the Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 provides as follows:
"Under an indictment for robbery or for theft,
or for breach of trust and embezzlement, or for
falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition, a
person accused may be convicted of reset; under
an indictment for robbery or for breach of
trust and embezzlement, or for falsehood, fraud
and wilful imposition, a person accused may be
convicted of theft; under an indictment for
theft, a person accused may be convicted of
breach of trust and embezzlement, or of falsehood,
fraud and wilful imposition, or may be convicted
of theft, although the circumstances proved may
in law amount to robbery."
Similar, but not identical, provisions apply in summary
^ 56procedure.
The purpose of the 1887 prevision was to relieve
prosecutors of the irrevocable consequences of a wrong
choice of nomen juris in the libel, and to enable the
Court to avoid difficult questions of fact and law at
57
the stage of trial. The result of this provision was
to satisfy the needs of procedural expediency at the
possible expense of precision in the legal analysis of
/any
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any given set of facts involving dishonesty. The
practical result of the section is that from an
analytical standpoint the nomen juris selected by
the prosecutor, jury or judge need not be the
theoretically correct one. To illustratethe point
it is helpful to restate the simple proposition that
theft and fraud are legal characters attributed to
factual situations and therefore, as matters of law,
matters for the court.
In the marginal case under Scottish procedure this
proposition is easily lost sight of. It is in the
marginal case, where the precise legal evaluation of
the facts is most difficult that the statutory alternatives
are most useful. In such a marginal case the effective
legal evaluation may be made by the prosecutor, rather
than by the judge, when he chooses which crime to
charge. Further, in such a case the effective legal
decision as to liability after trial may be made by
the jury since the statutory alternative convictions
are open to them. It is therefore quite possible in
the narrow case for the accused to be charged and
convicted under a theoretically inappropriate nomen
juris. The problem is taken a stage further in the
situation where the accused tenders a plea of guilty
either to theft or fraud on being charged with either
58
crime. If such a plea is accepted by the prosecutor
the effective legal evaluation of the facts may
/virtually
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virtually beraadaqy the accused himself.
Given such a wide ambit of discretion, little or no
reliance can be placed on the nature of the conviction
in cases after 1887 in support of the theoretical
analysis of the facts, least of all where the accused
tenders a plea of guilty. In this respect, the 1887
Act usefully avoids the practical difficulties found
52
in earlier cases such as Sam Michael. In that case,
the accused carried out a "long firm" fraud, ordering
and uplifting goods in a false name. He was charged
with theft and alternatively fraud. He pled guilty
to theft but his plea was not accepted by the Court
and the libel was restricted to the lesser charge.
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C H A P T E R XIII
Theft, theft by false pretences and fraud
in South African law
A. FRAUD AND THBFT
The South African case law indudes some examples
of confusion on the part of the prosecution between
fraud and simple theft. In R. v. Bruiqom1 it was
alleged that the accused, a clothing manufacturer, had
taken payment of certain sums in advance with customers*
orders and that hehad failed to fulfil the orders. He
was charged with theft of the monies paid to him. The
Court rig h tly took the view that this could not be theft
of the money and that it was a case of fraud, if indeed
2
it was criminal at all. In S. v. Mat1are an attorney
was charged with theft of fees paid to him by a client
for services which he failed to render. Again the only
possible criminal liability in such a case was for
fraud. On the other hand, in the case of R. v. Fauldinq
3
and Young the appellants were convicted of fraud in
respect of their having falsely represented their
authority to purchase goods on behalf of a company and
having appropriated to their own use the goods thereby
obtained, and it seems that the crime committed in this
4
case was theft of the goods.
5
In R. v. Kruse the accused induced a jeweller to transfer
to him on approval possession of two rings, title to
which remained with the jeweller, against the security
of a worthless cheque for their price. He then disposed
/of
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of both rings. The accused was charged with fraud,
but this, it is submitted, was a case of theft of
the rings.^
B. THEFT BY FALSE PRETENCES
The main problem however in modern South African
law has been the distinction between fraud and the
crime of theft by false pretences, an offence which
originated in a different tradition of criminal theory
and was engrafted on to the South African theory of
7
theft in the nineteenth century.
Origins
The term "theft by fa&se pretences" was used by
3
Stephen to describe the Bngli3h crime of larceny by
trick and it appeared eo nomine in Stephen's Indictable
9
Offences Bill 1878. Although the term used by
Stephen wa3 new, the crime which it described was by
then well established in English criminal law. The
term itself and Stephen's definition of it were adopted
in Southern Africa by the framers of the Transkeian
Penal Code 1886,10 which had a strong influence on the
theory and practice of the South African courts.
In its origin the crime was simply a type of theft in
which possession was obtained from the true owner of the
12
property by means of a deception or trick but the early
reports indicate that there was a divergence of view
13
in regard to the charge, it being treated in some




and in others as substantially a charge of fraud,
presumably as a result of a confusion wth the English
offence of "obtaining by false pretences". The term
15
"obtaining" was occasionally used in charges. By
the 1890* s, "larceny" and "obtaining" appear to have
been unified in practice at the Cape under the charge
of "theft by false pretences".*6 The uncertain basis
of this offence is vividly illustrated in a contemporary
manual of practice, Tredgold's "Handbook of Colonial
Criminal Law", published at Cape Town in 1879, in which
"false pretences" is treated in terms of the then English
17
offence of "obtaining", with considerable uncertainty
as to whether the South African offence is distinguishable
X8
from, or merely a species of the crime of theft. In
the same work alternative specimen charges of fraud
and theft by false pretences are framed on the same
19
allegations of fact. Furthermore, it appears from
the specimen charge of "theft by falsa pretences" that
the crime exactly corresponded with the then English
20
crime of obtaining. In Anders and Ellson*s Criminal
Law of South Africa. (1915-17) the crime of "obtaining
by false pretences" is referred to as a species of
21
crimen falsi or fraud, but in a later passage it is
said that the English offences of larceny by trick
and obtaining by false pretences both fall within the
South African law of theft although all cases of






The confusion which developed around this
chArge is illustrated in a series of cases in the
Transvaal in the early years of this century, in
which the view was taken that a consent to transfer
title, if induced by deception, could not be a valid
consent and that therefore the crime committed was
23
theft. For example, in JR. v. Masiminie a witch- doctor
was charged with theft by false pretences of the
money paid to him by one who consulted him.
24
In JR. v. Hyde it was stated obiter that to obtain
money by false pretences inferred liability for "theft
25
by means of false pretences". In Van der Merwe v. R.
the accused bought a nianber of mules under an agreement
that title in the mules should not pass to him until
he paid the price in full. Before completing payment
the accused sold the mules. His conviction for theft
of the money by false pretences was upheld on appeal.
It is submitted, however, that this decision was wrong.
The accused did not steal the money. He committed
fraud against the purchasers of the mules in respect
of the money paid by them, and he committed simple
26
theft of the mules from their owners. It emerges
clearly from this case that the charge was treated as
one of fraud on the analogy of the English crime of
27 28
"obtaining by false pretences". In Storer v. R.
an employee of a company falsely ordered goods in
the company*s name and on delivery appropriated them.
/He
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He was convicted on a charge of theft of the goods
from his employers but it was held on appeal that he
had committed theft by means of false pretences from
the supplier. In this case no title could pass to
the employers, who were not parties to the bargain
and could not be principals in respect of the accused*s
29
transactions. This was a case of simple theft of the
goods from the suppliers and could have been charged
30
as such. The uncertain state of the law at this time
31
is shown in R. v. Constable where the accused obtained
loans of money by false pretences. In the report his
offence is referred to as theft by false pretences, and
the case proceeded on the view, seemingly, that
32
"obtaining" was a species of theft. Innes C.J.
appears to have been confused as to the proper basis of
the crime. He considered the question to be whether
on the foregoing facts the crime of "theft by means of
false pretences" was committed, and stated that that
33
offence was "simply a species of theft", which was
true enough; but he also appears to have considered
that liability for theft arose if at the moment of
34
obtaining the money the accused had no intention to pay.
This line of authority culminated in the remarkable
35
statement of Mason, J.P. in JR. v. Hyland that
"If you take a man*s money or property without
his consent, and appropriate it to your own use,
that is really theft. When he does not really
consent, but you merely procure his apparent
consent by fraud, there is no consent in law,




charge the crime purely as theft".
This indicates a resort, to a sort of eighteenth
century fictionalism on the English model in which a
consent impetrated by fraud was held to be no consent
37
at all, for the purposes of the law of theft. This
was certainly not the position in the law of contract.
If this theory were correct it would destroy the whole
basis of the crime of fraud which is not to prevent
the taking of property against the owner's will, but the
38
valid acquisition of ownership by unfair means.
The distinction between fraud and theft by false pretences
The attempt to distinguish theft by false pretences
from fraud was undertaken by the Appellate Division in
39
1928 an R. v. Davies. where Stratford J.A. observed
"Though it is true that in all cases where the
latter crime is committed there are present all
the elements constituting the crime of fraud, the
converse in certainly not true. The essential
elements of the crimen falsi are a wilful
perversion of the truth made with the intention
to defraud and to the actual or potential
prejudice of another. If the prejudice is actual
and consists in the deprivation of another of
his ownership in property capable of being stolen,
and further if the accused converts that
property to his own use, in such a case only is
the crime also one of theft by means of false
pretences. If the prejudice is potential, then
40
theft is not committed".
This statement is scarcely satisfactory. It seems that
the judge did not have in view the essential distinction
/between
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between the loss of ownership in fraud and the loss of
possession in theft and it is accordingly not clear
whether the transfer of ownership or of possession only
41
was contemplated in the dictum. Furthermore, the
statement overlooked an important group of cases,
already referred to, in which the obtaining of money by
means of false pretences was held to be theft. Although
the cases thereafter consistently reaffirmed the principle
that theft by false pretences was a species of theft,
the case was, and still is, interpreted as justifying a
conviction of theft by false pretences in circumstances
where title in the property passed to the accused, even
where the property involved was money; and even where
42
the money was given as a loan.
Van den Heever J. protested against this charge in R.
43
v. Mofokinq because, as he rightly argued, theft
cannot be present where the victim voluntarily parts
with title notwithstanding the fact that his consent
is induced by deception as to the facts; but a series
of cases ensued, all of them examples of fraud, in
which the courts repeatedly reaffirmed that these were
a species of theft and in which their sole concern was
44
to insist on specification in the wording of the charge.
The matter was again considered by the Appellate
Division in 1959 in Ex parte Minister of Justice: in
45
re R. v. Gesa; R. v. De Jonqh. On this occasion
Schreiner A.C.J, stated obiter that he was in no doubt
/that
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that there might be theft even where there was a
"voluntary" handing over of goods by the victim, if
he was fraudulently deceived by the recipient into
46
handing them over. But again the Appellate Division
failed to make clear whether the "handing over" of
the goods referred merely to the handing over of
possession or to the transfer of title. Subsequent
cases have repeated the error of analysis already
47
referred to. For example, in S. v. Knox the case of
Gesa was founded on in a situation which clearly was
48
one of fraud; and in R. v. Ganqet a charge of theft
by false pretences was brought where the accused
obtained money under a contract of loan in
circumstances where he was subject to an obligation to
repay, but where title in the money given passed to
him.
The confused thinking to which this hybrid offence gave
rise is illustrated by Gardin er and Lansdowr *s
definition:
"Theft by false pretences is committed by any
person who by any false pretence obtains
anything capable of being stolen, with intent
to deprive the owner of his ownership or any
person having any special property or interest
49
in the thing of such property or interest."
In a proper case of theft by false pretences, but for
the procedural requirements as to particularity, the
pretence could be excluded from the actus reus without
/relieving
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relieving the accused of liability because the
gravamen of the charge is the appropriation of
property belonging to another. In contrast, the
exclusion of the pretence from the facts in a fraud
charge would relieve the accused of liability
altogether. The discussion of the foregoing cases
indicates that each can be easily classified as either
a straightforward theft in which the use of deception
happens to be part of the actus reus. or as straightforward
cases of fraud: and there is no reported case in
which the proper liability of the accused cannot
satisfactorily be classified within either of those
two crimes.
Contract cases and the consent theory
The problems associated in the criminal law with
the charge of theft by false pretences have given rise
to similar difficulties in the field of contract.
Although certain of the older authorities established,
as should have been the case, that one who committed this
50
crime could not acquire title, it has now been accepted
that as a result of the confused thinking in the criminal
courts in regard to this charge, the same facts may in
an appropriate case be charged either as fraud or as
theft by false pretences; and therefore, as was said
51
in Dalrymple. Frank and Feins tain v. Friedman (2).
"It is clearly not the case that the passing of
ownership depends upon whether or not the





Hunt suggests a theory by which the principles of the
civil law governing the transfer of title and, it
would appear, the actual state of mind of the
transferor of the property, •iall to be ignored.
According to Hunt
"It is submitted, in general, that a taking is
invito domino unless the owner*s consent is
real, and that a consent is not real (whatever
the law of contract or property may say) if it
is legally incompetent or if it was induced by
mistake, fraud, force or fear, whether or not
these can be said to nullify con3etn completely
and whether or not there was (for the purposes
of the law of property) intention to pass
53
ownership to the accused".
He therefore argues that the obtaining of property, the
consent to which is induced by fraud, constitutes theft,
54
albeit that fraud is also committed.
This theory is supported by the numerous cases to
which the obiter dicta in Gesa's case have given
55
authority, but Hunt takes the matter further by
arguing on grounds of utility and public policy that
the contrary approach would involve the sort of
technicalities from which English law suffered before
56
the Theft \ct 1968.
While it is to be conceded that the criminal process is
concerned with practical solutions and should not be




right remote from the issue in the prosecution,
Hunt's theory involves an equal amount of technicality
in that on every occasion in which, as in the majority
o£ cases, the property obtained by deception is property
capable of being stolen, theft would be held to be
committed even though the property obtained was plainly
58
not "stolen property" in terms of the civil law. Such
an approach resurrects the constructive doctrines of
nineteenth century English practice. It is little
59
different from the legal fictions in cases like Pear's
case, and it does more violence to logic than the
position which Hune criticises.
There is An any event a more satisfactory solution which
equally well avoids technical issues of title, and that
is to charge all theft by false pretences cases as
fraud, since Hunt concedes that, on his own theory, both
crimes are committed.
Hunt argues further that
"It seems anomalous to treat an owner as having
consent when his 'consent' has been induced by
fraud, and one doubts whether the so-called 'logical'
distinction between the tainted but real consent and
a non-existent consent is really supportable in
60
logic or any other branch of philosophy".
If this is true it applies equally well to the civil law,
and the implications of that view in regard to questions
of title are obviously far reaching. The main objection
/to
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to this argument is, however, that it involves an
arbitrary substitution of law for fact in that it
would involve a conclusive presumption against a
consent to transfer title in all cases, even in the
face of contrary evidence by the complainant.
Moreover, it may be argued that considerations of
utility and policy demand that the criminal law and the
civil law should proceed on the same theory on such
basic doctrines as the transfer of title. Hunt's view
61
also necessitates the conclusion, which he accepts that
0 2
fraud cases such as JR. v. Maklakla were wrongly decided.
This is a startling view. In Maklakla. sheep were obtained
on credit by means of a false pretence by the accused
that he was due a certain sum in wages and by means of a
false promise to pay for the sheep. If all such cases
were to be held thefts, then the scope of fraud would be
restricted to cases of non-proprietary prejudice, and
63
it would virtually cease to be an offence against property.
Mens rea
A further objection to Hunt's theory is that in any
theft prosecution a fundamentally different mens rea is
required from that in fraud, namely an intention to
deprive the owner permanently of the full benefits of his
ownership. Hunt's view necessitates an, abandonment of
the subjective approach in that the complainant or
owner is ex hypothesi legally incapable of validly
consenting to divest himself of title, but leaves the
proescution open to a defence based on the subjective
approach that, notwithstanding the deception, the
/accused
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accused genuinely believed that he had the 'owner's1
valid consent. Hunt attempts to have it both ways
by also requiring an intent to defraud, which for the
purposes of this charge is defined as an intent to
induce the owner to permit the contrectatio. But this
formula merely emphasises the unreasonableness of his
position. If these cases are truly theft, and if it
is illogical to regard them as frauds, then the general
mens rea of theft should suffice and no further or other
mens rea. and least of all a mens rea of fraud, should be
required.
The superfluous nature of theft by false pretences
A typical case in which theft by false pretences
can properly be brought is the recent case of v.
64
Haarhoff where the accused was charged with theft by
false pretences in that he had falsely represented that
he was an agent of a company purchasing on behalf of the
company and had thereby induced the owner of sheep to
deliver the animals to him which he then converted to
his own use. It was held that on these facts the
(3 5
offence was "substantially theft and not fraud",
because the sheep were not given over to the appellant
in ownership, either personally or as agent of the
company. This analysis, which is the correct one, may
be held to justify the implication that such a charge
would be inappropriate in a case where ownership was
being transferred to the accused by the victim of the
deception. It also indicates the very important
practical consideration that, if there is the required
/degree
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degree of particularity in the wording of the charge,
the typical case could quite easily be charged as
simple theft. If the charge of theft by false pretences
is correctly classified and analysed it is seen to be
an unnecessary charge, in that it accomplishes nothing
more than would be accomplished by the simple charge
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